The ‘next phase’ for the IDF…and for Iran

As the IDF moves to the “next phase” in the war with Hezbollah with limited and localised operations, the assumptions which have underpinned Iran’s strategy no longer hold. As Khamenei – following the chthonic lead of Nasrallah and Sinwar – moves to a new phase in his living arrangements, Iran has had to move to a new phase in its standing risk assessment.

Iran had considered that its risk in sponsoring international terrorism was largely deflected and redirected to those proxies who deliver it. By enabling them to do its dirty work, it had felt able to sit back and watch Israel defend itself against them. Critical to that arrangement was that while Iran financed them in cash and in weapons, that they convinced themselves that committing acts of terrorism under their own brand names meant that they did not see themselves as puppets. However, their proximity to the acts of terrorism allowed Iran to treat its risk as having been assumed by them. Iran saw them as its protective shield just as much as a ring of fire.

Iran’s risk calculation – that it could light the touchpaper and sit back without risk – has been spectacularly ended by a triple cocktail of reality: (1) the thwarting of its massive drone and ballistic missile attack of 13-14 April, (2) the 31 July liquidation of Haniyeh in Tehran, and (3) the elimination of virtually the entire Hezbollah command structure (and its substitutes) last month, including that bunker-busting wrath visited upon Nasrallah on 27 September.

The first highlighted to Tehran that their direct action would be met not by Israel alone but by a coalition, including the United States. The second served as a reminder that Iranian territory is not off limits, and the third highlighted that if the “central engine” of Iran’s axis of evil can be removed, the strings between it and its proxies can be reduced to a thread. Iran’s new phase in risk assessment therefore points very much towards a level of risk to the regime well outside the range previously assumed.

The discussion reported to be taking place between Iran and its allies as to “next steps” implies that there is unity between them. In fact, the risk assessment, which is necessarily forward-looking, now looks very different for each of them. The proxies see, smell and live amongst hot twisted metal, rubble and smoke, while their paymasters in Tehran do not. That, in turn, makes the proxies less and less of a protective shield for Iran. That looks like a recipe for disunity. And that changes Iran’s risk calculation.