The Path from President Trump’s Vision to Middle Eastern Reality

President Trump’s recent comments about relocating Gazans and rebuilding the Strip left many Israelis exhilarated.  Meanwhile, Palestinians and most other Arabs responded negatively to the proposal, raising concerns about ethnic cleansing and the potential destabilization of friendly Arab states.

When I first heard the proposal, my immediate emotional response was negative, but once I had a chance to think about it, two things became clear to me.  First, that Trump’s proposal reflected fresh thinking of the kind that the region desperately needs if the Middle East is ever to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity.  The second was that the proposal cannot be implemented in its present form.

The thing is, with some modification, President Trump’s proposal can form the basis for an initiative that could leave both Israelis and Palestinians far better off, enhance the stability of friendly Arab regimes, and promote US interests in the region. It could even restore momentum to long moribund final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Consider a modified version of the President’s plan.  It has two components.  The first is a three-way land swap between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt.   The second is the conversion of the land ceded by Egypt to the Palestinian Authority into a diplomatic zone (consistent with the nomenclature of the Oslo Accords, this region should be designated as “Area D”) leased from the PA to the UAE, and the development of that land into a prosperous and safe region for Palestinians currently trapped in Gaza – consistent with President Trump’s vision.

Let’s consider the details.

The land swap I am proposing is similar to a concept first proposed by then Israeli National Security Advisor Giora Eiland back in the late 1990s. In Eiland’s approach, Israel would annex the major settlement blocs in the West Bank. In return, the Palestinians would receive from Egypt land in northern Sinai adjacent to Gaza that they desperately need for the Strip’s economic development.  And Egypt would receive uninhabited land from Israel farther south in the Negev.

There were many other interesting ideas in Eiland’s plan (Jordanian land was involved as well), but that was the gist of it.  Central to Eiland’s thinking was that the PA’s borders – even assuming a full Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line – left it with insufficient land (and more importantly, in the wrong places) to assure the economic development required for Palestine to be a success.

Of course, Eiland’s proposal was forgotten once open fighting between Israel and the PA started back in 2000. But during the doomed attempt to revitalize the Oslo process between 2005-2008, Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas engaged in talks in which both sides had agreed to a territorial swap – with Israel keeping major settlement blocs and compensating the PA with strips of uninhabited land along the Green Line – before the Palestinians inexplicably walked away from the negotiations.

Would Egypt, Israel, and the PA agree to such a swap today?  Quite possibly. The swap resolves critical near-term security problems for all involved while creating long-term diplomatic opportunities to advance peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

In terms of security, Israelis will not be safe – and will never feel safe – as long as Hamas remains entrenched in Gaza.  But there are only two ways to get Hamas out of Gaza.  The first is to cut off aid shipments and starve Hamas into submission. The second is for the IDF to physically take control of Gaza and destroy the enemy.

Needless to say, with 2.3 million civilians trapped in the Strip, a cut-off of aid shipments is a non-starter.  As for conquest and occupation, trying to do so while 2.3 million civilians remain in Gaza would result in tens of thousands of deaths among non-combatants, while possibly resulting in more IDF casualties than have been sustained in the entire war so far.  And in the aftermath, the IDF – already fatigued after well over a year of fighting – would need to maintain 50,000 occupying troops in Gaza indefinitely into the future.  Best avoided…if possible.

But let’s say that hundreds of thousands of Gazans relocate to northern Sinai.  As more and more leave for the opportunities offered in Area D – safety, housing, schools, healthcare, and jobs – Hamas will become increasingly isolated in the Strip.  Eventually, the number of civilians remaining will be so small that an Israeli seizure of Gaza becomes practicable.  Absent its human shields, Hamas really doesn’t have a chance.

What about the Palestinian Authority? While they understandably won’t say so in public, the PA is desperate to eliminate Hamas’ presence in Gaza and eventually re-establish its own.  The reality is that the entire history of the PA – from its creation as part of the Oslo process to today – has been dictated by the toxic interaction of the PLO’s fecklessness with Hamas’ recklessness.  Absent the elimination of Hamas, the PA will remain a failed proto-state, and there will never be a Palestine of any kind, let alone a Palestine that exists peacefully alongside Israel.  Furthermore, the recent fighting between the PA and Hamas in Jenin illustrates that the Authority is totally incapable of defeating Hamas on its own.

The PA can do the math as well as anyone else.  The only way to destroy Hamas in Gaza is to strip it of its control of the civilian population there – and the only tolerable way to do that is to resettle the civilian population outside the Strip.

For Egypt, the land swap immediately creates a buffer between Gaza and Egypt’s own population.  This makes it easier to keep the Moslem Brotherhood – with which Hamas is affiliated – at bay.  It also eliminates the headaches of dealing with security along the Philadelphi route and managing the half of Rafiach – a Palestinian town – that lies on Egypt’s side of the current international border.  Furthermore, Egyptian agreement to a swap will gain its regime considerable goodwill from the United States – something that it needs given Egypt’s difficult economic situation.

As for the UAE, what does it get out of agreeing to take responsibility for a portion of the Palestinian Authority?  Quite a bit.  First, it defuses Arab anger towards the Emirates for breaking ranks and signing the Abraham Accords.  Second, it gives the UAE considerable influence over the future of PA and with that, the opportunity to shape a future Palestine into a successful pluralistic state at peace with Israel – making it a natural ally of the Emirates.

Finally, designation of northern Sinai as UAE controlled “Area D” – a portion of the PA controlled diplomatically by another country – offers the Emirates the opportunity to facilitate the rebuilding of Gaza without pouring billions of dollars down the drain.  If operating under Emirati protection, private investors – first and foremost from the UAE itself – will be enthusiastic to invest in building housing, hotels, industrial parks, and even seaports and airports – in what would be a secure corner of the Palestinian Authority.

Clearly, the land swap proposal resolves dangerous short-term threats to Israel, the PA, and Egypt, and does so in a manner that brings diplomatic and economic benefits to the UAE – one of America’s most stalwart allies in the region.  But the proposal also creates long-term diplomatic opportunities to resume peace negotiations and expand the Abraham Accords.

For example, Saudi Arabia is understandably unwilling to normalize relations with Israel absent a timetable for Palestinian independence.  Israel is refusing to set such a timetable – and with extremely good reason.  The PA is clearly not ready for independence today, and not only is it unclear how long it will take for it to build the institutions required for successful governance, but the setting of a timetable may actually disincentivize the Authority from both doing the hard work and making the painful choices required to become an actual successful state.

Furthermore, the Israeli public – once enthusiastic supports of a two-state peace settlement with the Palestinians – now understandably associates the “peace process” with “thousands of Israelis get killed.”  They need to be won over, and feel absolutely confident in their neighbors’ goodwill, before any binding commitment to Palestinian independence can be contemplated.

But by ceding territory to Egypt in return for recognition of settlement blocs, Israel will have taken an action that only makes sense if it intends to follow through with the eventual creation of a Palestinian state.  This sends a powerful signal to Saudi Arabia of Israel’s genuine intent.

So consider a possible agreement that could be made following completion of the three way land swap proposed above.  Israel could agree to convert most of the land beyond its new recognized borders on the West Bank from “Area C” to “Area B,” reflecting recognition that these areas will become part of Palestine if and when the PA transitions into becoming a legitimate and competent partner in making peace.  In return, Gaza – formally “Area A” but de facto beyond any PA authority at all – would also be reclassified as “Area B” – reflecting recognition that Israel has security needs that will require it to exercise control over the Strip for as long as it takes to render Gaza secure.  And in return for this, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, hopefully joined by Bangladesh and Malaysia, recognize and normalize relations with Israel – enjoying the resultant trade and investment benefits as well as earning additional American goodwill.

An eventual peace between Israelis and Palestinians – despite appearances – is still very much possible.  Achieving it will require discipline, honesty, and genuine goodwill from all sides.  But it will also require creative thinking, rather than simply a grim determination to repeat past mistakes in the irrational belief that somehow this time will be different. The President’s proposal represents precisely the kind of creativity required.