The PKK’s Dissolution: A New Chapter or a Dead End for the Kurdish Question?

On May 9, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) unilaterally declared an end to its armed struggle, formally concluding more than four decades of violent conflict with the Turkish state. This announcement followed a highly symbolic and politically contested process that began on October 1, 2024, when Devlet Bahçeli, leader of Turkey’s ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), publicly shook hands with members of the pro-Kurdish bloc in parliament. The gesture was widely interpreted as the beginning of a new political chapter—one that promised reconciliation but has since proven largely elusive. Within this carefully orchestrated narrative, the Turkish state framed the PKK’s disarmament as part of a broader “Turkey-Terror-Free” initiative—conflating the Kurdish question, which concerns a stateless nation in the Middle East, with counterterrorism discourse. Against this backdrop, Abdullah Öcalan—the PKK’s imprisoned leader, held in solitary confinement on İmralı Island since 1999—issued a public call on February 27, 2025, for the PKK to disarm and dissolve. Strikingly, Öcalan’s message also renounced key Kurdish demands for statehood, federalism, autonomy, and even cultural rights. In their place, he advocated for utopian ideals such as a democratic society and socialism—universal principles that, many Kurds observed on social media, fail to address the specific historical and political grievances of the Kurdish people.

While this gesture of disarmament appeared to mark a historic turning point—a shift from armed resistance to peaceful, democratic engagement—it also raises serious concerns about whether Kurdish national aspirations have been prematurely abandoned without any reciprocal commitments from the Turkish state. These concerns are further underscored by the state’s response, which has been anything but conciliatory. Despite the PKK’s unprecedented decision to dissolve itself, Turkey’s military operations have not only continued but also intensified. The Turkish military declared it would persist until the region is “cleansed” of terrorists and weapons—failing to acknowledge that the PKK had voluntarily disarmed in a peaceful and constructive manner. The hostile rhetoric from Turkish officials, media, and much of the public remains unchanged. No international mediation or legal framework within the Turkish state accompanied the announcement. There was no negotiated settlement, no written protocol, no formal recognition of Kurdish grievances, and no institutional guarantees that the cultural, political, or structural needs of the Kurdish people would be addressed. Instead of seizing this opportunity for peace, Ankara has doubled down on its hardline, securitized approach to the Kurdish issue. What was initially presented as a breakthrough now increasingly resembles yet another chapter in the long and tragic history of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict—one in which gestures of peace are met not with dialogue or reforms but with continued violence, denial, and repression.

The High Stakes of Öcalan’s Calls and Cost of PKK’s Strategic Transformation

The PKK’s shift from armed insurgency to political nonviolence appears to be more than a mere tactical adjustment—it represents a profound ideological transformation in response to changing geopolitical realities. However, the strategic cost of Abdullah Öcalan’s call and the PKK’s compliance extends beyond renouncing violence. It seems to entail abandoning many of the movement’s foundational demands: Kurdish statehood, autonomy, federalism, and even basic cultural rights. Without reciprocal measures from the Turkish state—or any third-party guarantees or binding legal frameworks—this shift risks being less a genuine step toward peace and more a unilateral concession. The Kurdish side places its trust in vague promises made behind closed doors, which, historically, have contributed to the systematic erasure of Kurdish identity, both political and cultural.

The author took this image during a rally in 2025 held in solidarity with the Kurdish population in London.

To grasp the depth of this risk, one must take a glance at the troubled history of the recent Kurdish-Turkish conflict. Since the early 1990s, the PKK has undergone a radical ideological and political transformation—most notably when it succeeded in compelling then-President Süleyman Demirel to acknowledge, for the first time since the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the existence of a “Kurdish reality” within Turkey. The galling irony is that this treaty had long served as the legal foundation for the denial of any Kurdish reality. Demirel’s successor, Turgut Özal, took further steps in 1993 by opening a line of indirect dialogue with Öcalan. In response, Öcalan declared a ceasefire and emphasized his commitment to resolving the Kurdish question through peaceful negotiation. However, this process quickly unraveled due to internal opposition within the Turkish state. The aftermath was brutal: Kurdish communities faced unprecedented waves of violence, displacement, and repression. Following his capture and imprisonment in 1999, Öcalan again sought a peaceful resolution by advocating for the disbandment of the PKK and its transformation into a non-violent political entity. He called on PKK fighters to withdraw from the Kurdish region in Turkey and for a small delegation to surrender in a symbolic gesture of peace. Yet the Turkish state’s response was unrelenting: over 500 Kurdish fighters were killed during the withdrawal process. The Turkish state met the promise of peace not with dialogue but with ambushes. Tragically, this pattern repeated itself in 2009 and again in 2013–15. Each time, the Turkish regime entered negotiations with Öcalan while simultaneously undermining the very peace process it had ostensibly embraced. And each time, the consequences were devastating for the Kurdish people. This risk remains very real today and must not be overlooked. While the Turkish state appears to engage in dialogue, it may once again be luring the Kurds into a trap—one that could result in even more tragic consequences. If Öcalan and other Kurdish actors fail to recognize and respond to this recurring strategy in time, the repercussions could be profound—placing an even greater historical burden on the Kurdish people and endangering countless innocent lives.

As this bitter cycle threatens to repeat itself, the stakes are higher than ever before. The emergence of Rojava in northern Syria and the broader transformation of the Middle East, especially in the wake of the October 7 atrocities, have amplified the regional and international dimensions of the Kurdish question. In this new context, any unilateral disarmament, or any political concession, without a formal treaty may not only fail to bring peace; it may irreparably damage the Kurdish political struggle and undermine the legitimacy of their cultural and political claims. Real peace requires more than the renunciation of arms. It demands mutual recognition, legal guarantees, acceptance of international mediation, and political will—none of which are currently forthcoming from the Turkish state. Without these, Öcalan’s latest call for the dissolution and disarmament of the PKK, along with the abandonment of core Kurdish political demands, risks being remembered not as a step toward peace but as a miscalculated submission in a long and painful history of Turkish betrayal.

Turkey’s Broader Strategy on the Kurdish Question

The Turkish state appears to be pursuing a calculated strategy to erase the Kurdish question by promoting, through Öcalan, a narrow set of democratic and socialist demands that fall far short of addressing core Kurdish aspirations. While it is true that the PKK emerged during the Cold War, the roots of both the PKK and the broader Kurdish mobilization run much deeper. These stem from the longstanding denial of Kurdish identity and rights and the systemic oppression and marginalization suffered by Kurds, beginning in the 1920s with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. To divert attention from these historical injustices is to serve the domestic, regional, and international strategy of the Turkish regime.

Domestically, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s so-called “Turkey-Terror-Free Process” is less about peace and more about consolidating power. Erdoğan aims to co-opt Kurdish political support for a new constitution while simultaneously sidelining and repressing opposition forces, including the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP). If Erdoğan is sincere in his promises of democratic reforms for the Kurdish community, one must question why democratically elected Kurdish mayors in major cities like Istanbul continue to be imprisoned and why the Turkish opposition is systematically marginalized. 

Regionally, Ankara is determined to prevent Kurdish political actors in Syria and Iraq from capitalizing on the weakening of Iran’s regional alliances and the fall of the Assad regime. The Kurds in Rojava (northeastern Syria) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have not only become formidable military forces that defeated ISIS and similar jihadist groups but may also have forged strategic alliances that influence geopolitical developments and pursue economic and energy interests across the Middle East. The Kurdish role in the fight against ISIS is crucial for legitimizing recognition of the Kurdish reality in the region. Yet Turkey’s ambitions go beyond erasing Kurdish gains; Ankara also aims to reshape the region through a neo-Ottoman framework—asserting itself as a dominant Muslim power with geopolitical reach stretching from Iraq, via Syria, to Jerusalem.

On the international stage, Erdoğan portrays Turkey as a powerful and stable state that has “resolved” its Kurdish conflict and therefore possesses the credibility to mediate and influence global conflicts, such as the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. This image is part of Turkey’s broader bid to elevate its position far beyond its immediate neighborhood. In reality, however, the Turkish state’s approach obscures unresolved and deeply rooted Kurdish grievances. Without genuine recognition and a meaningful political solution, Erdoğan’s strategy risks perpetuating instability rather than securing lasting peace—both within Turkey and across the wider region.

Cautious Optimism and Deep Frustration among Kurds Following the PKK’s Decision

Across the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the PKK’s dissolution has sparked a complex and deeply ambivalent response. For the first time in decades, major Kurdish political factions—including the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, as well as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in Syria—have taken a unified stance, supporting the process with cautious optimism. The end of armed struggle removes one of Ankara’s primary justifications for military incursions into Kurdish-held areas such as Rojava and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

The Turkish military has long carried out indiscriminate bombings of Kurdish territories and civilian areas, framing these attacks as counterterrorism operations. As a result of this continued hostility, numerous villages and towns have been evacuated, leaving civilians caught in the crossfire. These state-sanctioned narratives have served to legitimize what many see as Turkey’s illegitimate agendas while simultaneously delegitimizing the Kurds’ political and cultural claims—claims widely regarded as legitimate by both Kurdish communities and international observers. For instance, the KDP views the PKK’s dissolution as an opportunity to facilitate the return of displaced populations, advocate for the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from the Kurdistan Region—many of which are stationed in an extensive network of bases—and prioritize economic relations with Turkey, free from the burden of ongoing conflict. The PUK similarly hopes that, without the pretext of armed struggle, Ankara will no longer justify economic blockades on PUK-controlled areas, potentially boosting cross-border trade and cooperation. In Syria, Kurdish politicians have welcomed the move as a way to eliminate Turkey’s fabricated justification for bombing Kurdish cities and civilian infrastructure in Rojava. They also believe that a peaceful climate within Turkey could enhance their relationship with Damascus—currently heavily influenced by the Erdoğan regime—and contribute to broader regional stability.

Yet despite these hopeful signs, Kurdish actors may be mistaken in believing that the PKK’s dissolution will earn Ankara’s goodwill. Turkish state policy has long been rooted in containing Kurdish national ambitions—and, at times, in the outright eradication of Kurdish people and the colonization of the Kurdish homeland—rather than in cooperation or coexistence. The Turkish regime is likely to find new pretexts to intervene in and destabilize Kurdish regions, regardless of the PKK’s evolving status or the fate of its affiliated sub-organizations. Kurdish political actors may remain wary of endorsing a process driven solely by Turkish initiatives, especially in the absence of meaningful guarantees for their Kurdish brethren in Turkey. This cautious optimism is tempered by deep frustration among the Kurdish masses. Many fear that the political compromises made by Öcalan and the PKK may come at the cost of core national aspirations, risking the loss of a rare opportunity—perhaps for another century. They ask themselves: what has the immense sacrifice of Kurdish lives, the destruction of entire towns, and the depletion of resources ultimately achieved in the long struggle for Kurdish rights?

The Real Test Begins Now

To conclude, the PKK’s dissolution may mark the end of one chapter in the Kurdish struggle, but it leaves the central question unresolved: Will the Turkish state—and the international community—finally address the Kurdish issue as one of justice, dignity, and democratic recognition, rather than merely as a security threat framed as terrorism to be neutralized? If not, this so-called “new chapter” risks becoming yet another tragic episode in the Kurds’ century-long history of denial and repression. The Kurdish question will not vanish with the dissolution of the PKK or with Öcalan’s calls to renounce demands for Kurdish status; it will merely be deferred and reshaped—until a genuine political solution is achieved. This moment presents a test—not just for Turkey, but for all international actors who claim to uphold peace, stability, and human rights. Will they press Ankara to implement meaningful reforms and engage Kurdish demands through democratic means? Or will they continue to turn a blind eye? The answer will determine whether the PKK’s dissolution becomes a true turning point—or just another missed opportunity in a long history of shattered hopes.