Yochanan Schimmelpfennig

The Power to Make Tomorrow Impossible

How a government can lose its majority and still determine what its successors will be allowed to change

A government can lose its parliamentary majority and still win the future. It does not have to remain in office forever. It only has to make its final decisions too expensive, too dangerous, or too difficult to reverse. Elections can remove politicians. They cannot automatically restore the possibilities those politicians have destroyed. And this may be the most serious democratic problem Israel now faces: not simply whether Benjamin Netanyahu will leave office, but how much of Israel’s future can still be decided after he does.

On November 18, the Knesset voted 63–47 to advance legislation reversing two central elements of Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul. The proposals would undo changes increasing political control over judicial appointments and weakening the attorney general’s independence. A separate preliminary vote targeted the government’s controversial broadcasting legislation. These were not final repeals. Committees and three further readings are still required. Nevertheless, the political meaning was unmistakable: a new parliamentary majority had begun trying to reverse decisions made by the outgoing government.

Almost simultaneously, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara halted the process of opening tenders for 1,234 housing units in the E1 settlement project, between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, until a new government is formed. Supporters describe the project as strengthening Israel’s presence in a strategically important area. Palestinians, European governments, and Israeli opponents of settlement expansion warn that it could severely damage the territorial continuity necessary for a viable Palestinian state.

These two developments appear to concern entirely different matters: judicial legislation and construction contracts. In fact, they expose the same underlying problem. Who has the authority to determine which political choices will remain available to the people who come next?

Consider the difference between repealing a statute and reversing a territorial transformation. A parliamentary majority can initiate the repeal of legislation. It may restore earlier procedures, replace institutional rules, or establish new ones. The process can be legally demanding and politically costly, but the mechanism exists.

A settlement is different. Once roads are constructed, infrastructure installed, homes occupied, and populations established, reversal ceases to be a simple legislative operation. It becomes a confrontation with accumulated material, legal, political, and human consequences. The physical landscape begins to sustain decisions taken by an earlier government.

Parliament can repeal a law. It cannot repeal geography with three readings.

This is why E1 cannot be understood merely as another dispute over housing. Its significance lies in the political possibilities its development could foreclose. A project may be presented as an ordinary administrative decision while changing the conditions under which an entirely different constitutional and territorial future could be pursued.

One does not have to support a particular peace proposal to recognize the problem. Those who oppose Palestinian statehood are entitled to defend that position politically. Those who support it are entitled to argue for its feasibility. But transforming contested political choices into accomplished territorial facts is not the same as winning an argument about them. It may mean ensuring that the argument can no longer produce certain outcomes.

The future has not been defeated through persuasion. It has been made harder to choose.

Here we encounter a distinction that democratic theory too often leaves insufficiently examined. There is the power to make decisions within an existing political order. And there is the power to change the conditions under which future decisions can be made.

The first is ordinary government. The second may amount to governing beyond one’s own tenure.

These powers are not identical, even when exercised through the same ministries, legal procedures, and administrative instruments. A government may lawfully pursue policies whose consequences outlast its term. No serious political system could prohibit all long-term commitments. Infrastructure, education, diplomacy, security, and public investment require continuity.

But precisely because some decisions shape the future, their legitimacy cannot be assessed solely by asking whether the government possesses the formal competence to make them. We must also ask what they prevent its successors from doing, how difficult their consequences will be to reverse, and whether an immediate public necessity justifies imposing those consequences now.

This distinction becomes especially important when a government continues exercising power after an election.

Israel’s Basic Law: The Government provides for the outgoing government to remain in office until a successor is formed. That continuity is necessary. A country cannot suspend administration, diplomacy, or national security while coalition negotiations proceed.

But continuing to exercise authority is not equivalent to possessing an unrestricted mandate to determine the country’s long-term direction.

Israeli jurisprudence has recognized this difficulty. As the Israel Democracy Institute explained on November 16, a caretaker government retains its ordinary legal powers but must exercise them with particular restraint. That restraint becomes especially important after elections. The central concern is not that every action by an outgoing government is illegitimate, but that decisions with lasting consequences may constrain the government that will ultimately be responsible for them.

National security makes the problem more demanding, not less. An outgoing government cannot refuse to respond to an immediate threat simply because its parliamentary position has weakened. But decisions involving military force can have consequences no subsequent election can reverse. The duty to act when necessary therefore cannot become an unlimited justification for avoiding scrutiny of necessity, procedure, and consequences.

The greater the practical irreversibility of a decision, and the weaker the government’s current democratic mandate, the heavier the burden of justification should become.

This is not an argument for judicial government. It is an argument against confusing the continuity of the state with the unlimited continuation of a particular government’s political project.

There is another remarkable feature of Israel’s present situation. Gadi Eisenkot’s bloc holds 48 seats. With support from Ra’am and the Joint List, whose parties together hold another 19, it can assemble parliamentary majorities against elements of Netanyahu’s legislative legacy. Yet the ability to pass preliminary repeal votes has not translated into an agreement capable of producing a new governing coalition.

Israel thus finds itself in an unusual position: there is a parliamentary majority capable of attempting to undo some decisions of the outgoing government, but not yet a governing majority capable of replacing it.

The distinction matters. A majority may exist for rejecting a particular institutional arrangement without agreeing on what should replace it. This is not necessarily a democratic defect. Parliamentary systems frequently produce different majorities for different questions. It becomes dangerous, however, when the uncertainty surrounding government formation allows the executive to continue taking decisions that limit what any future majority could realistically accomplish.

The outgoing government continues acting in the present while its possible successor struggles to acquire the authority to act in the future.

And this is where the corridors become decisive. In the Knesset chamber, majorities are counted. In its political corridors, the effective routes of power are often arranged: committee control, coalition assurances, transfers of administrative competence, budgetary dependencies, and procedural deadlines that determine which decisions can actually be carried out. This is not a conspiracy; it is the less visible anatomy of parliamentary power. E1 gives the word “corridor” a second, literal meaning: control over territorial passages can determine which political alternatives remain geographically practicable. A vote may change the law. A corridor can change what the law can still accomplish.

Even successful repeal is not necessarily restoration. Changing the law governing judicial appointments does not automatically reverse appointments already made under different rules. Restoring safeguards for the attorney general does not undo every decision adopted while those safeguards were weakened. Reversing media legislation may not reconstruct every institutional practice, financial arrangement, or concentration of influence that developed under it.

These distinctions should also trouble Netanyahu’s opponents. If an Eisenkot-led government eventually takes office, its democratic legitimacy will not consist in possessing a moral exemption from the constraints it demands of its predecessor. It must accept the same principle: political victory authorizes government, but it does not confer ownership of the future.

The temptation to consider one’s own project historically necessary is hardly exclusive to one political camp. Every government can explain why its reforms must endure. Every coalition can declare that the institutions it controls must be protected against the mistakes of its successors. Every leadership eventually discovers that temporary authority would be much more convenient if its consequences were permanent.

Democracy was invented, in part, to make that convenience difficult.

Its purpose is not to ensure that political decisions leave no enduring traces. That would make government impossible. Its purpose is to preserve the meaningful possibility of replacing those who decide and changing the direction of collective life.

This requires more than elections. A ballot has limited political significance if the decisions it authorizes the next government to make have already been deprived of practical effect.

Consider an election in which voters reject a particular policy. If the defeated government’s final actions make that policy almost impossible to reverse, the voters may obtain new ministers without obtaining a genuine opportunity to change political direction.

Formally, the government has changed. Substantively, essential parts of its predecessor’s project continue governing through consequences that no longer require its presence.

This is the political significance of a future made inaccessible.

It does not require a conspiracy. It does not even require anyone to announce an intention to defeat democracy. It can arise from perfectly recognizable administrative practices: tendering, procurement, appointments, regulatory deadlines, institutional restructuring, and the creation of obligations that succeeding governments cannot simply disregard.

Precisely because these practices are ordinary, their cumulative effects deserve extraordinary attention.

The danger is not that every long-term decision is suspect. The danger is that political authority can be used to make a particular future appear inevitable before the democratic process has finished determining whether that future is wanted.

The E1 dispute makes the point with unusual clarity. The attorney general’s intervention has delayed a specific tender process, not settled the future of the West Bank. The legality of that intervention may itself be contested. But postponement preserves something important: the possibility that the next government, once formed, will confront a decision that has not yet advanced through this additional administrative stage.

A delay can therefore have democratic significance beyond the number of days it lasts. It can prevent an outgoing government from converting an unresolved political question into a commitment its successors must inherit.

This is not a universal argument for postponement. Delay itself can inflict harm, and some urgent decisions cannot responsibly wait. The decisive question is whether immediate action serves a demonstrable public necessity or primarily entrenches a political project after its parliamentary foundations have weakened.

Israel’s current transition offers a rare opportunity to formulate this distinction openly.

Netanyahu’s opponents should not be satisfied with reversing selected laws. They should establish a broader constitutional principle that would constrain them as well: the authority to govern must not be confused with the authority to eliminate the meaningful choices of those who will govern afterward.

Such a principle would require serious public justification for decisions that are difficult to reverse, especially during transitions of power. It would demand attention not only to formal legality, but also to material consequences, institutional continuity, the rights of affected populations, and the availability of alternatives. It would apply to appointments, settlement policy, regulatory restructuring, and decisions of exceptional security significance according to their distinct legal requirements.

And it would make one point unmistakable: the democratic legitimacy of an action cannot be measured solely by the ability of today’s government to carry it out.

A government that has lost its parliamentary majority does not cease to exist. But it should not be permitted to confuse the necessity of remaining in office with a mandate to settle questions that the next government may have been elected to reconsider.

The central question of November 2026 is therefore larger than whether Netanyahu can remain prime minister or Eisenkot can construct a coalition. It is whether Israel’s institutions can distinguish the legitimate continuity of government from the attempt to give temporary power permanent consequences.

An election should not merely determine who will occupy the offices of state. It should preserve the possibility that a different political decision can still make a difference.

The most consequential abuse of power may not be forcing people to live under decisions they reject today. It may be arranging the world so that, even after they vote for something else tomorrow, the alternative is no longer realistically available.

Democracy does not require the future to remain empty. It requires the future not to become the private property of those who happen to govern the present.

Yochanan Schimmelpfennig

About the Author
Yochanan Schimmelpfennig is a Sephardic philosopher and independent researcher with academic training in political science, the social sciences, and philosophy (university level). He developed the Possest–PQF framework (Philosophical–Quantitative Filtration) and is co-author, with Andityas Matos, of Kabbalah Antision. His work examines language as a political instrument, exile and belonging, Jewish identity, and the procedural mechanisms through which modern institutions sort legitimacy, visibility, and dissent. He writes in a deliberately mechanistic register, treating culture and politics less as “opinions” than as operational systems that shape what can still count as real, permissible, and shared.
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