The Rubicon is Crossed? Non-States Hamper Israel’s End War Strategy

The news is changing the world around us. For the most part, since 1945, the world has been dealing with interactions between states with non-state actors playing a secondary role. However, regarding the October 7th War, while Iran has played the puppet master role, all recent developments involve non-state actors. These actors are pulling strings and impacting Israel’s ability to end the current round of hostilities smoothly. Fresh thinking about the meaning of “states” is needed for Israel to successfully come out ahead.

ICC Issues Arrest Warrants on Behalf of a Non-State

On November 21, 2024, the long-awaited decision from the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was announced.

Now, neither leader can touch down in the 124 states that have ratified the Rome Statute without fear of arrest. The ICC arrest warrant is also likely to reignite worldwide delegitimization efforts. Additionally, it may exacerbate Netanyahu’s predicament as Israel’s “Mr. Security.” While he may seem capable of hitting Hezbollah hard, he is now unwelcome in much of the world.

The ICC’s decision symbolizes a conflict that has crossed a Rubicon of sorts. Historically, the Rubicon was a river in ancient Italy that no Roman army was allowed to cross—until Julius Caesar’s legions did so in 49 BCE, triggering a series of events that led to end of the Roman Republic.

The ICC’s decision may represent such a pivotal moment. By recognizing the State of Palestine in 2015, the court, originally meant to deliver justice for the world’s worst crimes, became a political pawn. It recognized a state that does not exist de facto and applied its mandate to a state that never ratified the Rome Statute: Israel. The court thus undermines the theory of state sovereignty by enforcing its will on a state that never consented to its jurisdiction.

Palestine is not a de facto state, nor does it fulfil the full criteria of statehood: land, government, population, and recognition. It more closely resembles an international Frankenstein than a legitimate state.

If Palestine is recognized, why not recognize or be involved in cases of other non-states against actual states? The court, meant to be based on principles of International Law surrounding states has become mired in politics which will impact its ability to fulfil its mandate. This undermines the world order.

As a result, Netanyahu is barred from much of the world. This damage will not be easily undone and will create political turmoil wherever it touches ensuring that the impact of Gaza’s War will not end soon.

A Ceasefire That Will Create More War

There is ample discussion about a ceasefire, with U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein rushing to Beirut in hopes of reducing tensions with Hezbollah.

However, there is a significant problem. The Lebanese state does not oppose ending the war with Israel. In fact, some factions, particularly the dominant Christian party, support peace. The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri—currently acting as President due to a political deadlock caused by Hezbollah—welcomes the idea of ceasing hostilities with Israel.

Yet, few consider Hezbollah’s stance. As a non-state actor backed by Iran and Lebanon’s dominant power broker, Hezbollah’s ultimate goal remains the destruction of Israel. To them, Israel is “Occupied Palestine,” and any temporary truce, or “hudna,” would primarily serve to rearm and recover from the massive damage Israel has inflicted in recent months.

While Tel Aviv faces sporadic rocket fire every few days, causing minimal casualties and limited damage, southern Beirut and most of southern Lebanon are beginning to resemble Gaza. Meanwhile, senior and even middle-ranking Hezbollah commanders are being eliminated regularly. The talk of a ceasefire exists only because Israel maintains significant military pressure.

Since Hezbollah controls Lebanon, Israel cannot negotiate with Lebanon on its behalf. Consequently, Israel will likely have no choice but to continue targeting Hezbollah. A ceasefire now may bring temporary quiet, especially in the north, allowing Israel to rebuild towns like Metulla and Kiryat Shmona. However, without clear guarantees, another war is inevitable—quiet would merely be borrowed time as Hezbollah rearms for a more lethal future round.

As long as Hezbollah is not brought under control by Lebanon and as long as Iran has a hand in the Lebanese pie, there will not be any chance of lasting quiet along the Northern frontier.

A Refusal to Occupy Gaza Allows It to Continue as Hamastan

In another controversial development, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant offered an interesting perspective on why Israel must avoid securing humanitarian aid for Gaza. He wrote on X, formerly Twitter:

“The discussion about the ‘distribution of food to the residents of Gaza by private companies under the security of the IDF’ is empty rhetoric leading to the start of a military government. The blood price will be paid by IDF soldiers, and the State of Israel will bear the cost due to a poor prioritization of security tasks.”

“Everything depends on the prior preparation of an alternative entity to replace the IDF in securing the territory. Otherwise, we are heading toward a military government. Aid will be shared by private companies, guarded by the IDF, and we will all pay the price.”

“A military government in Gaza is not a goal of this war but a dangerous and irresponsible political act.”

Historically, armies occupy territories in war. International conventions on warfare, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, were designed around this necessity, granting rights to both belligerents and civilians.

However, the October 7th War takes a different approach. Reluctant to reoccupy Gaza and expose soldiers to the risks of governing a hostile population, the IDF has adopted a strategy of repeated invasions and withdrawals. For example, Jabalya has been invaded three times, and Khan Younis multiple times. Shifa Hospital in Gaza City was besieged twice, the second time resulting in extensive destruction.

This cycle of entry and withdrawal has left 101 hostages languishing in Hamas’ dungeons.

Gallant’s strategy has faced criticism, particularly from far-right Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who argued:

“For an entire year, Gallant imagined a non-existent ‘alternative entity’ to do the work for us, preventing us from taking responsibility for humanitarian aid distribution. It’s not humanitarian aid or military governance that will lead to casualties. It’s the fear of total victory and the refusal to seize necessary territory.”

Some within Israel’s military hierarchy seem reluctant to occupy Gaza. Instead of launching a proper invasion, pacifying the area, and swiftly ending hostilities, the military opts to “mow the lawn,” resulting in hundreds of military deaths and prolonged conflict.

A year later, Gaza remains far from pacified, and further years of war may lie ahead.

This approach, avoiding occupation to prevent prolonged military governance, rewrites the rules of modern warfare and allows Hamas to persist as a non-state actor. In past wars, such as in 1956 and 1967, Israel quickly occupied Gaza, ending conflicts more decisively despite casualties.

If Israel refuses to occupy Gaza, even temporarily, Hamas will remain a persistent threat.

Why, then, is the Middle East’s most powerful military so reluctant to occupy Gaza and finish Hamas? This is a question that demands serious reflection.