The Sharaa enigma
Ahmed al-Sharaa, Abu Muhammad al-Joulani. The new leader of the transitional government and a former jihadist. Since the fall of the Assad regime, developments in Syria have moved at a rapid pace. While Iran’s role seems to be played out, Türkiye is encroaching from the north and Qatar is positioning itself as well. And after all this time, it is still difficult to gauge what Sharaa’s plans for Syria are.
Domestic developments
Sharaa has displayed impressive political skills ever since he took the reins in Syria. As former American diplomat Alberto M. Fernandez argues, Sharaa’s skills were already apparent during the Syrian civil war, as he was selected to set up al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. At that time, he was still in his early 30s. With the passing of time, he would sever ties with Daesh, after al-Baghdadi proclaimed the Islamic State and demanded that al-Joulani pledge allegiance. Instead, he pledged fealty to al-Qaeda. After a few years, he would sever ties with al-Qaeda too, as he transformed al-Nusra into a Syrian Islamist group called HTS. Based in Idlib, Sharaa would go on and conquer or destroy rival groups. And political scientist Christopher Phillips adds that Sharaa tried to stay out of Erdogan’s orbit, but eventually accepted Turkish protection, due to Assad’s expanding power. The jihadist part of Sharaa’s story shows that he possesses impressive political acumen, not to mention a knack for propaganda, which was gladly broadcast by al-Jazeera throughout the years. In addition, Sharaa’s media savvy is noticeable too, as he consistently appears calm and collected in the interviews he gives, very different from the bombastic shouting we are used to from all Hamas representatives, the thundering speeches of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah or the odd theatrics displayed by Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree. Indeed, Sharaa does not seem to be cut from the same cloth.
Domestic achievements and concerns
Since taking the reins, Sharaa has managed to increase government control of parts of Syria through negotiations, instead of violence. He has signed agreements with the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces Mazloum Abdi, has managed to address concerns of the Syrian Druze community after unrest in Jaramana, and recently succeeded in convincing the 8th Brigade to disarm. More importantly, several gestures have been made to reassure Syria’s non-Sunni and non-Muslim minorities, such as the freedom for Christians to celebrate Christmas openly or Syrian Druze clerics visiting a holy shrine on the Israeli side of the Golan. And a delegation of Jews with Syrian roots has visited the country. Finally, the newly installed government seems to be an amalgam of the mosaic of Syrian society, including a female Christian minister, as well as Kurdish and Alawite representatives. All of this seems to be rather positive and a clear signal to Western countries whom Sharaa is trying to court, attempting to convince them of the moderate attitude of Syria’s new rulers.
Nonetheless, worrisome and disturbing developments have taken place as well. After the claim that Alawites loyal to Assad had attacked government forces, the response was chilling with over 1,000 Alawites being massacred, most of them civilians. Sharaa has promised to conduct an investigation and bring the perpetrators to justice, though that remains to be seen. In addition, school books have been adjusted, removing references to evolution and painting the era of Ottoman rule in Syria in an exceedingly positive light. The government seems to be a reflection of Syrian society, but key ministries such as defense, domestic affairs, and foreign affairs are manned by former members of HTS. Moreover, the constitutional declaration that supports the transitional government includes vague references to the rights of all minorities in Syria, though nothing seems to safeguard against the re-emergence of an autocratic system along the lines of the former Assad regime. For instance, it is stated that the president has to be Muslim. Finally, the Ministry of Information is led by a man who is a close friend of Azmi Bishara, a former Israeli MK who was suspected of spying for Hezbollah. This man fled Israel and is now a close adviser to the Qatari emir Tamim. Therefore, these examples show that the political future of the Syrian people is potentially dangerous.
The international arena
The military fatigues are gone and next to reverting to his given name, Sharaa now wears a suit and tie, probably intended to put minds at ease as well. He has traveled throughout the region and received foreign dignitaries and heads of state, too. He has paid visits to Ankara, Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, recently. In addition, he has attended a summit of the Arab League, received ministers from Western countries and settled border clashes with Lebanon through diplomacy. Moreover, he has stated time and again that Syria does not seek conflict with its neighbors – not even Israel. Simultaneously, he has pledged that Syria will not serve as a base for foreign actors to launch attacks on other countries. Moreover, Sharaa initially professed understanding for Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria. And after a while, he called on Israel to retreat from the buffer zone, stop striking targets in Syria and pledged his willingness to honor the 1974 agreement and let UN observers return. So far, he has tried to apply pressure on Israel by requesting Israel’s allies to urge Jerusalem to vacate the buffer zone.
On the other hand, the defense pact that Sharaa will sign with Türkiye could be considered an ominous sign, considering the various threatening statements the latter’s leader has made against Israel over the past year. In addition, Qatar’s support for Sharaa is disconcerting as well, considering its open support for Islamist groups throughout the region and the virulent anti-Israel rhetoric displayed in its media, which aligns with the country’s foreign policy. And both Türkiye and Qatar support Hamas, despite its aim to destroy Israel.
Israel and its unexpected new neighbor
All of these examples make it difficult to gauge what Sharaa’s aims truly are. Is he really the moderate al-Sharaa he wishes to show the world or is that a mask to hide al-Joulani? Considering Turkish support for Hamas, its beyond aggressive rhetoric towards Israel and Erdogan’s perennial musings about Ottoman nostalgia, the defense pact with Syria is a cause for concern. Moreover, it seems rather clear that President Trump wants to pick up where he left off during his first term and continue repatriating American troops from Syria. This development would affect Israeli and Kurdish interests, but it seems that lobbying for a delay or reduction in the number of troops removed is the most realistic scenario. Couple this with the defense pact and Sharaa looks like a Turkish vassal, a different version of Bashar al-Assad. But what if he is not?
As has been argued by Fernandez, Sharaa is a skilled politician and he has shown this as the leader of HTS, the fact that he has managed to become Syria’s first post-Assad president, and his successful meetings with leaders in the region. Moreover, the choices he has made are significant as well. He chose as his first destination for a state visit Saudi Arabia, not Türkiye. He has made a visit to the UAE, a country that abhors Islamism, but it seems to have gone well. While Syria had more or less become a pariah state under Assad, an Arab leader who became an Iranian vassal, allowed his country to be used as a highway for Hezbollah, and flooded the Middle East, especially the Gulf region, with Captagon, Sharaa seems keen to restore ties with fellow Arab states. Moreover, Sharaa knows that he has something to offer. He has severed the link between Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah and even publicizes the confiscation of arms shipments destined for the Iranian proxy. He has destroyed vast amounts of Assad’s Captagon stores, but will probably need years to shut down the operations completely. And it now emerges that the OPCW believes that many chemical weapons are still stored in Syria. In an attempt to restore ties with Western countries and lift international sanctions, Sharaa could show willingness to destroy these stores in cooperation with international actors. Moreover, he has practiced restraint in recent tensions with Israel and has not threatened the Jewish state with violence. Of course, this does not mean that he is open to normalizing ties with Israel, I think that would be a bit of a stretch. In his HTS days, Sharaa made statements in support of Hamas, and schoolbooks in Syria are still filled with virulent anti-Israel rhetoric. I would guess that he has spoken with members of the Hamas politburo behind the scenes, but he is clever enough to not have any photo ops with high-ranking members yet. Conversely, he argued that Hamas could be active in Syria as a political organization only. But after all is said and done, Israeli ministers have threatened Sharaa with military action, while he has practiced restraint. It makes Israel look like the aggressor and it shows that the new Syrian leader plays the political game well.
The need for an Israeli diplomatic effort
Sharaa is a product of the Syrian civil war who, ostensibly, has softened his rhetoric throughout the years. One clear pattern, however, does emerge. Sharaa is indeed a skilled political actor, but does not seem to be comfortable subordinating himself to anyone. He severed ties with al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda and resisted Turkish overtures for a long time. As Phillips argues, Erdogan approached him, not the other way around. Moreover, Sharaa saw firsthand how Assad had turned Syria into a larger version of Lebanon. It seems that he is determined to prevent this from happening again. One could argue that his diplomatic offensive in the Gulf is meant to assuage the latter’s fears, but good ties and a Gulf stake in rebuilding the Syrian infrastructure and economy also would lead to balance, making sure that Syria will not become dependent on Türkiye and Qatar alone. On the domestic front, the Western world should not hold its breath about the potential blossoming of a Syrian democracy. Sharaa seems to prioritize rebuilding Syria, maintaining its territorial integrity, and thus ending Iranian influence. Considering Syria’s recent autocratic history, it would not surprise me if he will rule Syria for many years to come. The lack of a democratic process would be a loss to the Syrian people, but after thirteen years of devastating civil war, the majority would probably welcome calm. And if Sharaa can provide this, they will support him.
While Israel is engaging with Türkiye about a deconfliction mechanism, the arrival of Turkish bases on its border is something that the country will not accept. Considering Erdogan’s rhetoric, this is hardly surprising. However, demanding a demilitarized southern Syria is unlikely to be acceptable to Sharaa either. It would mean a power vacuum, while Sharaa is trying to establish the state’s monopoly on violence throughout the country. While there is a good chance that this is already happening behind the scenes, one would hope that Israel would lobby its new Gulf allies, such as the UAE, for support on this matter. By extension, Saudi Arabia would prefer to limit Turkish influence in the region as well. Therefore, the UAE could lobby on Israel’s behalf, by trying to convince Sharaa that Turkish bases should not be established in Syria’s southern provinces. Moreover, Israel could use the buffer zone as a bargaining chip, considering that he has stressed that Israel needs to retreat.
Trust has to be earned and considering the new Syrian ruler’s past, it is only natural that Israel should treat him with suspicion. However, Sharaa promised that he did not want to enter into conflicts and, so far, he seems keen on keeping that promise. Moreover, tensions between Israeli troops and locals in the buffer zone have been rising, which could lead to a much more difficult situation in the near future.
Israel has no need for another war and neither does Syria. Therefore, diplomacy, whether direct or indirect, should be given a chance.