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Simon Kupfer

The six political fires that could sink Netanyahu

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leads a government conference at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem on September 27, 2023. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leads a government conference at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem on September 27, 2023. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

Netanyahu’s government rests on a precarious foundation. Since his return to power in 2022, his coalition’s survival has depended almost entirely upon a delicate balance between far-right and Haredi parties. Especially now, as the chains that hold his coalition begin to weaken, his political dominance – long a feature of Israeli politics – now appears increasingly fragile. His judicial reforms, security oversights, and coalition stresses have left Netanyahu politically vulnerable. There are, though, six political crises that currently threaten to bring down his government, the reasons why his political survival, and the survival of his government, is now under serious threat.

His judicial overhaul, firstly, remains his most politically explosive decision. His proposed reforms to weaken the Supreme Court and its reach triggered a series of some of the largest protests in the history of the State of Israel. Politically, this was not the smartest of moves. The reforms are a naked attempt to consolidate executive power, and in doing so, undermine the very democratic foundations Israel was built upon. The outcry against them reached even across political divides: centrist figures like Yair Lapid and some moderate conservatives condemned Netanyahu – even the Biden administration applied some pressure. For Netanyahu to retreat from the more extreme elements of the overhaul was less of an ideological decision than a tactical, political decision – to push it forward, in all of its aspects, was to guarantee an almost certain political collapse.

The fragility of the Prime Minister’s coalition, the second issue, stems largely from the presence of extremist parties – Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism, et cetera – in his political alliance; men such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, notorious for their hardline, unyielding stances, wield a shockingly disproportionate influence over the policy of the Israeli government. Ben-Gvir, serving as National Security Minister, having been reappointed earlier this month, advocates openly for the annexation of the West Bank. To do so, aside from merely sparking further international condemnation – if there wasn’t enough as is – would potentially spark a third intifada.

Ben Gvir is no stranger to contentious policies and acts: In 2022, one of his visits to the Temple Mount triggered riots across the West Bank and a round of rocket fire from Gaza. Smotrich, not to be outdone by his colleague in terms of sheer insensitivity, has pushed for expanded settlement funding. Such a dynamic as this leaves Netanyahu politically trapped: alienate the far right, and risk losing the coalition; appease them, and face diplomatic backlash even more serious than the current level.

The third issue is the hostages and the security failures that led to their abduction: the disastrous intelligence and operational lapses on October 7, 2023. Hamas’ ability to infiltrate Israeli territory, massacre civilians, and take hostages exposed truly severe weaknesses in Israel’s vaunted military and intelligence apparatus. It was the first invasion of Israeli territory since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, beginning with a barrage of at least 4,300 rockets launched into Israel, along with later vehicle-transported and powered paraglider incursions into 21 kibbutzim and communities closest to the Gaza-Israel border.

According to a report from the IDF that aimed to revise the estimate on the number of assaulters, 6,000 Gazans breached the border in 119 locations; 3,800 from the elite ‘Nukhba forces,’ and 2,200 civilians and other fighters.

Netanyahu’s deflection of the blame, instead electing to point fingers at military and intelligence chiefs, drastically backfired. A growing chorus of Israelis, including the families of hostages, demand his recognition of personal accountability. Military reservists, historically a pillar of the Prime Minister’s support, now stage public protests to call for his resignation. He is a political coward, and the worst thing for a nation almost constantly at war is to have a weak man as its leader.

There is a fourth issue – Haredi conscription to the military. As I wrote a few days ago, the IDF’s growing need for manpower, given its circumstances concerning national security, leaves no room for ideological stubbornness. Haredi communities have traditionally been exempt from military service, and, with Israel’s National Economic Council predicting that Haredi citizens will comprise a third of the total Israeli population by 2050, such exemptions are no longer viable. The Supreme Court’s ruling that Haredim must serve in the IDF threatens to fracture Netanyahu’s coalition; however, if the Prime Minister should be successful, there won’t be a Supreme Court – or, at least, one powerful enough to pass legislation as momentous as this.

Haredi parties like Shas and United Torah Judaism have made it clear that they will withdraw from the government if the draft law is enforced. Haredi politicians, being heavily dependent on the confidence of their constituents to remain in power, have now weaponised their resistance to conscription as a political tool. The draft reform is, to their minds, a direct assault on the religious freedom of their children. Any shift Haredi leaders would make on the matter, therefore, risks damaging the very basis of their power – and, if a politician has no power, who will want to vote for him?

Netanyahu knows this. He knows that to displease the far-right or the Haredi parties in his coalition – or both – would drastically destabilise his government. For him to negotiate a compromise would be profoundly difficult if he wishes to satisfy the international community as well as those in his own country.

Violence in the West Bank represents yet another destabilising factor: settler attacks on Palestinian villages have increased sharply, often with the tacit approval – or, at least, the indifference – of far-right ministers, such as the likes of Ben-Gvir. Palestinian militants, displeased, have responded with increased shootings and bombings, only to be exacerbated by the IDF’s heightened presence in the West Bank as nightly raids quickly become a common occurrence.

The cycle of violence Israel finds itself in not only strains Israel’s security resources but erodes diplomatic relationships with key Arab states: Jordan and Egypt, both of whom maintain fragile peace treaties with Israel, have warned in the past that continued aggression in the West Bank would likely undermine what little regional stability the area has left. Clearly, this is not the solution.

The last, the sixth of the issues: Netanyahu’s corruption trial. The Prime Minister faces charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. His political survival almost certainly depends on the outcome of the cases, with his legal troubles already affecting his policy decisions – the judicial overhaul being one of them, most likely a preemptive strike against a judiciary that might convict him. And, in the meantime, whilst he battles more immediate matters than destroying Israeli democracy, he has elected to pursue the easier targets that may find him guilty: the Attorney General, Gali Baharav-Miara, and the Head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar. His Qatari money suspicions certainly do little for him, either. Even an acquittal would not guarantee his survival – Likud’s internal factions, sensing weakness, could move to replace him.

Netanyahu has built his career on political survival. I wrote this article in response to Yedidia Stern’s post, A sober look at the 5 wedge issues setting Israel ablaze — one I believe was entirely correct, but failed to address the issues of Haredi drafting to the IDF. These issues, while not exhaustive, converge to create a host of smaller legal, security and political crises. The Prime Minister’s capacity to hold together a fractured coalition, while navigating growing domestic and international pressure, will almost certainly define the future of Israeli politics. His government’s collapse is now beyond a remote possibility – it is a looming reality. Netanyahu’s house of cards is about to collapse.

About the Author
English writer exploring Zionism, diaspora, and what makes a democracy. Contributor to the Times of Israel, Haaretz and other platforms.
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