The Syrian tightrope
A month has passed since the massacres in Suwayda. A local conflict between Bedouin tribes and Druze communities, not exceptional in a long history of troubled relations, escalated rapidly last month, ending with an intervention by Israel. A fragile ceasefire has been implemented which has barely held. And the international community was swift in its condemnation of the party considered responsible for the escalation: Israel. But solely blaming Israel, however easy that might be, is terribly misleading.
Sharaa’s tarnished image
An interesting interview was published in the Jewish Journal. Though not a very critical article, it offered Sharaa an opportunity to introduce himself to the global Jewish community. According to the author he was soft spoken, calm, and explained with a sense of urgency the dire situation in Syria and what was needed to overcome years of strife, trauma, and mistrust. He affirmed the value of Syria’s minorities and stated that the Druze were an integral part of the country. Their security was non-negotiable.
Despite Sharaa’s rhetoric and perhaps a genuine desire to keep his country from descending back into brutal civil war, his transitional government has been damaged ever since it was installed. First of all, Sharaa is the head of the government and its concomitant Constitutional Declaration has given him full control over all three branches of government. Moreover, promises related to the rights of Syria’s minorities were vaguely included. In addition, Alawites have been massacred, Damascus nightclubs have been attacked, and the Mar Elias Church was targeted by a jihadist suicide bomber. And in March tensions boiled over based on a doctored clip, falsely portraying a Druze cleric insulting the Prophet Muhammad. Each time Sharaa condemned, but problems continued to mount. Legally, the Syrian President has to be Muslim; foreign fighters have been allowed to stay; Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) fighters have received high ranks in his new army, sparking outrage as many are known to have committed atrocities. All of this has happened during his short reign and that formed the backdrop to the violence in Suwayda.
In July, the Middle East Institute uploaded Charles Lister’s analysis of the violence in Suwayda. While commending the government for building diplomatic ties, he criticized actors who were unwilling to integrate into the new Syria and considered Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri one of them, explaining that many of his fighters had been part of the Assad regime – Hijri himself had been a loyalist, too – and accused them of being involved in the Captagon trade. MEMRI’s Alberto M. Fernandez called Hijri a volatile figure as well. And in discussing day-to-day developments of the violence, Lister blamed Hijri and Israeli intervention for the failure to reach a ceasefire sooner and commended American, Turkish, and Arab diplomacy for preventing further escalation by negotiating a ceasefire.
London-based Asharq al-Awsat published an article which offered some insight into Druze history in Syria, as well as the community’s fear of persecution, providing an explanation why relations with Damascus were tense. Also, it provided some background on the history of Bedouin tribes and their complaints about marginalization. Indeed, after government forces had retreated Druze militias had decided to retaliate against the Bedouin communities, leading to killings and displacement. Several outlets in the region and in the West have mentioned this tragedy. However, blaming Hijri and Israel is far too simplistic.
First of all, Hijri initially welcomed the arrival of government forces, only to issue distress calls afterwards and stating that they were committing massacres against the Druze. This is a detail ignored by Lister in his analysis. Even now, in one of his latest comments on X, he mentions Druze militias attacking government forces, yet fails to mention that the fragile ceasefire has been violated by both sides multiple times since July. And zooming in on the violence is useful, but ignores the fact that Druze militias have several reasons to be wary of Damascus. Secondly, just as Hijri’s past links to Assad will lead to distrust, jihadist attacks on Druze during the civil war – whether the Qalb Lozeh massacre committed by Sharaa’s HTS in 2015 or Daesh’s brutal attack on Suwayda in 2018 – have not been forgotten. Also, the government’s actions in Latakia have put minorities on alert. Thirdly, minorities in Syria, especially the Kurds and Druze, have suffered from marginalization and attacks on their communities. The civil war offered them some modicum of autonomy, so giving that up to a government led by a former jihadist is difficult. It takes time and energy to build the type of trust that is needed. And when Syrian government forces and their auxiliaries entered and sided with Bedouin militias in Suwayda, suspicions that were already present simply became amplified.
An opportunity to demonstrate leadership presented itself during Sharaa’s two televised addresses. While praising his forces, thanking international mediators, lauding the honor of the Bedouin tribes, and reiterating that the Druze were part of Syria’s national fabric, he referred to Druze militias as outlaws and criticized the “Israeli entity” at length. Moreover he called on Druze leaders to “come to their senses.” Instead of reaching out, he decided to blame the Druze – a missed opportunity.
Israel: vague foreign policy goals and a strong bond with the Druze
It starts with Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar in November 2024, before Assad was toppled, as he articulated Israel’s foreign policy goals: strengthening ties with regional minorities. Sa’ar mentioned the Druze and Kurds, specifically. With Iran still entrenched in Syria to buttress Assad back then and Türkiye controlling border areas in the north, it made sense to make bolstering ties with these communities a priority. Iran’s axis and its hostility are known, but Türkiye is a serious cause for concern. Despite not having severed ties with Israel completely, Türkiye hosts Hamas and praised it after October 7th, calling them mujahideen; it is the backer of numerous Islamists in the region, including Sharaa; its leader waxes nostalgic about Ottoman history on a permanent basis; and Erdogan’s vitriolic statements directed at Israel have become eerily similar to Iran’s.
The issue with Sa’ar’s stated goals, is that the contents were vague. What does strengthening ties mean? Military support? Humanitarian aid? Economic ties? Diplomatic support? Maybe all of the above? It was not clear to me, but after Assad had been toppled, it would be tested. After Sa’ar had strongly condemned Sharaa and his forces for the Alawite massacres, clashes in Jaramana came, which involved the Druze. As tensions escalated, Israel’s policy was put to the test – and it showed Damascus that it was serious.
Thus, Israel’s actions in Suwayda did not come as a complete surprise. Simultaneously, despite harsh rhetoric, Israel kept negotiating with Damascus behind closed doors, even face to face. Lack of trust on both sides is an issue, but maintaining communication proves that Israel had an interest in pursuing an agreement. In fact, while tensions escalated in Suwayda, Israel was negotiating with Syria in Azerbaijan. What remains interesting, is that the claim has been made that the US and Israel had intimated to Sharaa’s government that Suwayda was no longer a red line. If true, that was a curious decision, considering Israel’s demand for a demilitarized southern Syria.
But whether or not the Syrian government believed it had the green light to intervene in the escalating violence in Suwayda, the conduct of its forces soon caused an outrage. What tends to be forgotten in Western analyses, is the important kinship ties among Druze communities in the Middle East. These transcend borders. And when government forces and their auxiliaries entered Suwayda and started flooding social media with footage of their atrocities, one can certainly understand the feelings of Israeli Druze. There are many shocking examples, which remind one of October 7th. When this became clear, Druze calls to intervene increased in Israel. Protests were staged, roads blocked, and Druze were preparing to cross the border to aid their brethren, if the IDF would not intervene. Let us not forget that Druze in Israel have the highest enlistment rate. They have fought on and since October 7th alongside their Jewish compatriots and paid a heavy price. In addition, the relationship with the State of Israel has been damaged, with the Nation-State Law and Kaminitz Law causing serious grievances and understandably so. Within this context, Syrian Druze were attacked in Suwayda. Thus, Israel’s decision to act was born out of a sense of duty, as well as necessity.
Regional silence and Türkiye’s influence
Most of the world blamed Israel after the violence, but that fails to understand its complexity. Sharaa accused Israel, using it as a tool to rally the people and forge some sense of unity. However, his own forces have done much to damage those prospects this year. It has not gone unnoticed among the SDF either. Perhaps he knew exactly what his forces were going to do in Suwayda. Perhaps he has much less control over them than we think. After all, we speak of an army, but it would be much more fitting to speak of a loose coalition of militias, many of whom are known jihadists. However, Sharaa himself is influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, who considered the Druze heretics. In any case, he uses these forces and is therefore responsible.
Arab countries severely criticized Israel, while remaining silent about massacres committed against the Druze. But the most comical have been Türkiye’s lamentations. Since July, it has accused Israel of trying to divide Syria and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan even had the audacity to characterize Turkish foreign policy as “good.” Yet while Türkiye accuses Israel of dividing Syria, its military footprint in Syria’s northwest has been growing. Border areas, such as Afrin and Tel Abyad, are under direct Turkish control, where school curricula are Turkish and local institutions answer to Ankara. Its notorious proxy SNA has been involved in numerous atrocities. Finally, without any Western condemnation, Türkiye’s footprint in northern Iraq has been growing as well, at some points penetrating 40 km deep into Iraqi territory. There, military installations exceed 130 and its so-called “safe zones” have produced hundreds of Kurdish civilian deaths – so much for its “good” foreign policy. In short, Türkiye has already divided Syria, by de facto annexing northern areas. Moreover, Turkish concerns over the Kurds, as always, take center stage. For those who have forgotten, Erdogan threatened Iraqi Kurdistan with invasion, due to a referendum on independence in 2017. Because that is the issue: Kurdish self-determination is unacceptable to Türkiye. It could lead to Kurds having similar ideas within its own borders.
Close to the brink
Most Druze in Israel consider Sharaa a jihadist in a suit, while the Druze in Jordan, however, have mostly remained silent. In Lebanon, Druze leaders recently have issued condemnations in reaction to horrifying footage from Suwayda’s National Hospital and demanded an investigation. And former minister Wiam Wahhab has even shifted his position on Israel. Excerpts from a televised interview showed him issuing a stern warning to Sharaa. Dejected, he ended by stating that he now understood why Lebanese Christians had allied with Israel in the past. And in Syria, young Druze leader Laith al-Balous has become a marginalized supporter of Damascus. The shocking footage seen by Druze in the region and the unanimous support offered to Sharaa by Arab states have had a sobering effect. Regardless of what one might think of Hijri, support for him has grown, not waned. And two important events have taken place recently.
First, two Druze spiritual leaders originally critical of Hijri, Youssef Jarbou and Hammoud al-Hanawi, have joined him in opposition against the government – a clear sign that Damascus is no longer trusted. Second, Hijri has set up the Supreme Legal Committee in Suwayda, which will be responsible for governance in the province. It could be temporary or the first step towards lasting autonomy. Damascus has already responded with condemnation.
Türkiye has made its stance clear as well. Recently, Hakan Fidan held a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shibani. Again, Fidan accused Israel of being the cause of all problems in Syria and his sentiments were echoed by al-Shibani.
As of this writing, protests have erupted in Suwayda, with Druze openly calling for government forces to be held accountable for their atrocities. Moreover, calls for autonomy and even independence have been issued. Flags of Israel were spotted and the country was thanked by several for standing with the community. Just as August 2023 protests against Assad in Suwayda returned the struggle against him to the fore, so now Suwayda has become the site of the first significant protests against Sharaa. Diplomacy could still have a chance, but at this point it would mean that all parties would have to settle for maintaining the status quo and Damascus would need to start a meaningful national dialogue to build trust. Alas, Sharaa has already responded by, once again, blaming Israel, while dismissing the possibility for autonomy or federalism.
Balancing on the Syrian tightrope has become very dangerous.
