The War and the Movement to Delegitimize Israel

As the Israel-Hamas war approaches two years, there are a number of elements that are unique in the history of Israeli battles.

Most notably is its length, now easily the longest war in Israel’s history. And it is the first battle that sees as a primary war goal the release of hostages, originally over 250.

And, while hardly the first war where members of the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community have not served, the anger of the larger populace about that reality while their kids serve and die has never been so high.

In many ways, however, the larger unique element of this conflict is that its origins and evolution center around or have resulted in questions around the legitimization and delegitimization of Israel in unprecedented ways.

When trying to understand the timing and motivation of Hamas in committing its atrocity on 10/7, it is widely agreed that the primary motivation was the widespread reports that Saudi Arabia was closer and closer to joining the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco in the Abraham Accords. As significant those events had been to the region – particularly because these agreements, unlike the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, had become a warm peace with new relationships — a similar development with the Saudis would fundamentally change Israel’s place in the region. And in particular, the Palestinian issue would lose its power to affect Arab actions.

In sum, the belief was that Hamas decided it had to commit a crime so vast that any talk of Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel would be put aside.

Once the dastardly event took place, rather than sympathy for Israel, which suffered its worst day in its history with over 1,200 murdered and over 250 taken hostage, an unanticipated reaction around the world emerged immediately — even before Israel had decided on a military reaction to the massacre.

A surge of delegitimization rose to the surface on the streets of Western cities and on university campuses in Europe and America. Themes that represented a rationalization and even defense of what took place on October 7 bled into a justification of denying the legitimacy of the Jewish state. Tacit in many of the protests was the notion that Israel got what it deserved on October 7. It was said explicitly in signs saying, “By Any Means Necessary” and “From the River to the Sea.”

What came to be understood was that Israel and the Jewish people were paying a price for the growth in recent years of a movement on campuses and elsewhere in the name of liberalism and social justice that, in fact, represented something qualitatively different – illiberalism in the name of liberalism.

Liberalism had been a blessing to America, a blessing to American Jews and a blessing to Israel.

Instead of liberalism, an ideology cropped up that divided the world into oppressors and oppressed, into white imperialists and people of color, with many seeing Israel fitting neatly into the category of white oppressors. So much so that when October 7 happened, the prevailing sentiment in certain quarters was that the oppressors got what they deserved and this should be the beginning of the delegitimization of the Jewish state.

The other factor that came into play with this hostility was the fact that Israel had been shown to be vulnerable unlike any time in its history.

Hostility toward Israel and its very legitimacy had existed toward the Jewish state since its birth, reflected in the invasion of five Arab armies in 1948, and, after the War of Independence, in the Arab League boycott of Israel. These early efforts to delegitimize the new state did not succeed. As the years passed, Israel got stronger militarily and economically, hopes of delegitimizing it diminished.

And then came October 7. With the failure of the Israeli military and intelligence units, the idea sprung up that Israel’s invincibility may be a fantasy after all, and with that reemerged the wellspring of hostility with a passion. Now, the thinking went, the oppressor is getting his comeuppance and deservedly so. Delegitimization was back on the table.

At first, these themes had an impact on those already susceptible to these messages, but less so on longtime friends of the Jewish state.

However, as the war has dragged on, as Israel got mired in more questionable policies affecting the civilian population in Gaza, a new phenomenon is stirring even among longtime friends of the Jewish state.

That is the notion that Israel, by continuing its assault, is beginning to disqualify itself as a legitimate entity even in more friendly countries. We are seeing this in across the board critical reactions to Israel’s decision to continue the war in Gaza City, in particular the German decision to withhold arms shipments, and similar actions around the democratic world, which can’t be simply attributed to anti-Jewish or anti-Zionist sentiment.

In sum, these past two years reflect the complexity of the complexity of Israel and the standing of the Jewish community worldwide.

The fact that Israel was being more accepted and normalized in the region was at the root of the massacre. The hostility that followed was a product of certain ideas poisoning the well for a number of years and now finding an opportunity for explosion with the massacre. And lately an element of extremism in Israeli conduct has widened the opportunity for delegitimization.

Never has so much complexity in Israel’s situation emerged in any of its wars. The Jewish Diaspora must now figure out new ways to cope with this complexity.

Most of all, Israel has to take all this into account as it tries to figure out how it can return to a place of strength and acceptance rather than vulnerability and rejection.