Things I haven’t Heard About Israel – Part 4

Given the flurry of interest in Palestinian statehood, it makes sense to examine what exactly that would look like and what effects it might have.

The starting point should be the current situation, and we’ll take Gaza and the West Bank separately.

Gaza

Pre-October 7^th, Gaza has been run by Gazans since 2005, when Israel forced all of its citizens out of there and withdrew its army presence.  The Gazans voted a Hamas-led coalition government into power, after which Hamas killed many of its opponents and set itself up as the permanent government.

Because of Hamas’ practice of firing missiles into Israel, Israel took steps to prevent weapons and weapon-making materials from entering Gaza, and both Israel and Egypt policed their borders with Gaza.

What would have been different had Gaza (or Gaza + the West Bank) been granted recognition as a state?  Is there any reason to think its government would have been different, or its citizens?  Would Israel or Egypt have changed its border-control policies?  Would Israel have stopped policing Gazan imports to prevent it from acquiring more missiles (and, later, digging tunnels to be used in war against Israel)?  Would Hamas have declared itself no long interested in destroying Israel and returning the descendants of refugees to their ancestral homes in Israeli cities?  There have been those who, incredibly enough, deny that international law provides Israel a right to defend itself against Gaza (if you’re dubious – and you should be – you can see some examples here).  One reason given is that Gaza isn’t a state.  So, would those people then accept Israel’s right to counterattack?  (I’m going to guess not.)

The West Bank

Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is split into three areas – A, B and C.  The Palestinian Authority has full control over Area A.  In Area B, it has administrative control while Israel has security control and in Area C, Israel has full control.

The overwhelming majority of Arabs live in Areas A and B.

Israel controls all the borders.

Were the PA recognized as a state and these arrangements remain in place, then almost by definition nothing would change.  Clearly, that’s not what’s intended.  Rather, the call is to extend PA authority for security as well to Area B at least, and probably Area C – with perhaps adjustments made for the hundreds of thousands of Israelis living there.  There are also calls to join Gaza and the West Bank into a single polity, perhaps with a corridor joining them, and for the PA state to control its border with Jordan.

What would be the effect, then, of this statehood?

Well, for one thing, all the Israelis living in Area B would have to either be evicted (as the PA demands) or would be subject to Arab attack with no support from the IDF.  More importantly – with all due respect to the people whose lives would be uprooted – Israel’s security would be severely compromised.  Arms could be brought in freely and erstwhile enemies would be untouchably over the border.

Analysis

Enfranchisement

I first looked at the current situation because I’m in favor of people being enfranchised.  Thus, if statehood were a matter of enfranchisement, that would be a strong point in its favor.  What we see here, though, is that Gazans already had the franchise, if not for the fact that their government turned into a dictatorship (something that statehood would not change) and the Arabs of the PA likewise.  In both cases the reach of their self-government is constrained by Israel’s insistence on protecting its citizens – something that, in the case of Gaza, is unlikely to be changed by statehood.  For the PA, at least some of those constraints would disappear.

It’s worth noting, and will come up in the Conclusions section, that there was no impetus for a Palestinian state as long as the territories in question were in Arab (Jordanian and Egyptian) hands.  If enfranchisement were the goal, one would have expected it to be promoted already then.

Borders

Next we come to borders.  The talk has, at least until the Trump Administration, been about the ’67 lines.  That talk assumes one subscribes to the idea that the PA has some prior right to that territory.  I do not subscribe to that (here’s a point of entry into my position) and I think that it’s a terrible policy.  Even according to those who claim that the law forbids acquiring land through force even when fighting a defensive war, one has to ask, does that make sense?  Do we prefer a world order where an aggressor can be pushed back all the way past his own borders and then return to the status quo ante?  Shouldn’t we prefer that the aggressor lose something, if possible?

And once we’re talking about borders, let’s talk about the idea that the West Bank and Gaza should form a single state.  It’s not clear why (I’m sure the UN General Assembly can bring out a folding chair, if necessary).  There are already 22 Arab states; is there some reason it can be 23 but not 24?  To be clear:  I don’t care one way or the other, but this is the kind of thing you’ll hear diplomats chant like a catechism without ever hearing why, which should make us uneasy about all their statements.

But let’s say it’s one state – why do the two pieces have to be contiguous?  Alaska isn’t, not to mention Hawaii.  I remember someone, maybe it was President Obama, saying that it wouldn’t be “viable” otherwise, which just begs the question, “Why not?”  Even before that, “How are we defining viability?”  Based on current trends, this would literally be a “welfare state”, meaning the whole state would continue to subsist on welfare.  The PA’s GDP per capita is under $2,000 and Gaza’s is less than half that.  (For reference, Israel’s is $52,000).  I’m sure there are those who will say that Israel is tamping these economies down, but there’s no theory of how it’s doing that, so we won’t waste time on it.

Security

Even if they don’t accept, as I do, that Israel has at least as much right to these territories as the Arabs, the people promoting Two States tend to always add something like “Living in Peace and Security”, so they should have to account for the security aspect.

How is that supposed to work?  If Israel doesn’t control the borders, what’s to stop the Arabs from bringing in SAM batteries and cruise missiles?  They have spent the last hundred years showing that they can’t be trusted, so a mere agreement isn’t an option.  UN monitors are a non-starter, given that UNIFIL was in South Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from arming itself there and early on said “Oh, we’re not going to do that.”  There are other historical examples of “peace-keeping” forces that lasted up until the Arabs decided to make war.  NATO troops are no good, either, because Israel doesn’t want them risking their lives for her, they can’t be absolutely trusted to risk their lives for Israel and were it to come to a shooting war, they’d be in the way.  Effectively, human shields.

But let’s assume, however improbably, that we’ve solved that problem.  Nothing is going to guarantee that somebody with a history of doing such things doesn’t start firing missiles into Israel.  In fact, I’d put down good money that somebody will.  What happens then?  A strongly-worded letter to the Secretary-General?  That won’t cut it.  An invasion?  To do what, exactly?  Return to the current situation?  But we’re told that’s an impossible one (though it’s never clear why;  I mean, it’s the existing situation and has been for many years).  Does Israel bomb the source of the launches?  It’ll naturally be next to a school or a hospital.

Two Staters might simply say that once the Arabs have a state in Gaza and the West Bank, they’ll be satisfied and willing to live in peace, so there’s no reason to worry about attacks.  The problems with that are

1. It runs counter to their entire history
2. It runs counter to the overwhelming results of their polling (and even those who say they want peace have to be questioned about what that means to them, as evidenced by this analysis)
3. It runs counter to their beliefs
4. By the time Israel finds out it was wrong, a lot of Israelis will be dead

Conclusions

• The Palestinians are not particularly interested in a state; they’re interested in the destruction of the Jewish state. (For one explanation with supporting facts, see Einat Wilf.)
• Drawing the borders on the ’67 lines, besides being inherently unfair and promoting bad behavior, further encourages the Palestinians to expect Israel’s destruction
• There’s no reliable way to maintain Israel’s security if its current arrangements are upended by a Palestinian state, with its own security and border control
• Without its current security arrangements, one can assume Israel will be attacked from within the Palestinian state
• Israel will not likely be able to respond to such an attack in a way that will deter future attacks

Really, though, the single most important conclusion is that the experts promoting the Two State Solution either don’t know what they’re talking about, are ignoring all sorts of inconvenient data and probabilities, or are intentionally hiding things from the public.  Possibly more than one of the above.

What, then, can be done to promote a better future for both sides?

• UNRWA needs to be closed and Palestinians no longer considered “refugees” (as would long since have happened without UNRWA’s bespoke rules for Palestinians, contra all other refugees in the world)
• Primary and secondary education can be instituted to promote prosperity and peace, rather than grievance and the promise of Israel’s destruction
• The Western powers can make clear to the Arabs that
  • The Jewish state is permanent
  • There will be no “Right of Return”
  • The Palestinians are expected to develop a real economy and civil society
  • Any future sovereignty depends on prolonged peaceful behavior

None of these points is either complicated or necessarily difficult (though replacing UNRWA in Palestinian society will take some legwork).  The West has already made a good start by not forcing Israel (yet) to abort its campaign against Hamas.  If Hamas and the PA internalize that they can’t count on that intervention, one may assume that they’ll be very hesitant to provoke Israel.