To occupy or to liberate? THAT is the question!
The reality we find ourselves in today, with the two-year anniversary of the October 7 atrocities just around the corner, and as we remain stuck in the “Gazan quagmire” without a real solution in sight, presents Israel with a very complex dilemma: to occupy or to liberate? Is the central goal of the government these days to occupy Gaza or to liberate the hostages?
The government’s decision to occupy Gaza was not made in a vacuum—the local and international political reality leads to various considerations for and against a full occupation. Some are more legitimate than others. But what seems almost certain is that the cost of such an occupation will be massive, both in human lives and on the international stage (even before we start to discuss the enormous budgetary costs).
The occupation will first and foremost come at a human cost: soldiers, hostages held in tunnels for nearly 700 days, and Palestinian civilians not involved in the fighting will be harmed by the continued and prolonged actions needed to complete and maintain the occupation. While some readers may not consider the lives of Palestinians a significant factor, it is crucial to understand that during an occupation, Israel and the IDF will effectively assume the role of the governing authority in Gaza. Therefore, the protection of Palestinian lives will be primarily our responsibility, and IDF soldiers will be required to perform law enforcement duties alongside combat operations, which will only expose them to increased risk.
The occupation will also come at a heavy price on the international stage. It is important to note that, in the view of significant parts of the international community, including the UN and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Israel has never ceased to be the occupying power, even after the disengagement. While I do not agree with this view, I recognize its implications. Up to now, the lack of an Israeli presence has allowed Israel to stand firm against the claim of occupation and to eloquently explain in various forums that the occupation had ended, along with Israel’s responsibility for what happens in Gaza. However, full Israeli control of Gaza would require Israel to fulfill all the obligations imposed on an occupying power.
Violations of these obligations, including the demarcation, transfer, and expulsion of residents from the occupied territory, will expose Israel to serious accusations on the international stage of war crimes and crimes against humanity. One of the heaviest prices on the international stage will be paid by IDF soldiers and reservists, who will become victims of international persecution. In addition, we are already seeing signs that friendly countries will halt trade with Israel. Initially, this will be security trade (see the decisions in the Netherlands and Germany), and later it will be economic trade, which would lead to an uncontrollable spiral and international isolation, similar to that of Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Some may argue that all the above arguments ignore the most important thing—Israel’s security. However, it’s important to understand that the costs presented are not disconnected from the security aspect but are an integral part of it. True security is not achieved solely through the use of force, but also through international legitimacy, internal stability, and the maintenance of strong international relations, especially with friendly countries. All of these are already on shaky ground, and with the implementation of an occupation plan, the situation will only worsen.
There is another perspective, which claims that the decision to occupy is actually a step in negotiations with Hamas, which is showing a willingness to release hostages (some or all). This is a game theory maneuver aimed at bringing a swift end to the fighting and the immediate release of all hostages held in Gaza. For this move to be effective, it must appear and feel real. The problem is that if this move goes too far, it could stop being a “trick” and gain momentum of its own. When such moves are made, one gambles on a “point of no return,” after which there will be no choice but to actually occupy Gaza. We must ask ourselves, if this is truly the approach, will the government be able to handle the international pressure while promoting this move? And at the same time, will the government be able to handle the internal pressure to stop the move before it passes the “point of no return”?
The image the world sees from Gaza is difficult and problematic. It’s very easy for the world to ignore the Israeli side and cling to populist accusations like “genocide,” just as it’s very easy for Israelis to ignore the harm to Gazans. The truth is always more complex. Ultimately, when the government must decide how to act in the dilemma between occupying and liberating, it is crucial that it works for the release of the hostages and an end to the war as soon as possible, and not for the occupation and deepening of the Gazan quagmire.
