Trump — The State of Palestine

If the right questions are not asked before even considering recognition, the status quo will prevail – nothing will change – instability will continue.

Media reports are increasingly suggesting that President Donald Trump favors US recognition of a state for Palestinian Arabs.

Trump has not previously expressed any intention to acknowledge such a state of affairs. During his first term in office, he recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, despite the Palestinians’ claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of a future state under the 1993 Israel-Palestinian peace accords.

The White House is purportedly preparing to unveil a plan that would support the establishment of a State of Palestine – explicitly excluding Hamas, The Media Line reports, citing a Gulf diplomatic source. Such a move, the source claims, could dramatically shift the regional balance of power and pave the way for new normalization agreements between Israel and the Arab states.

Palestine is recognized as a sovereign nation by 147 countries, including Russia and most nations in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. However, most West European countries, the UK, Israel and the US do not officially consider it a sovereign entity.

Some analysts claim that if Trump does recognize a Palestinian state, it will not only mark a diplomatic milestone but also serve as a catalyst for expanding the Abraham Accords – Trump’s US-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab nations introduced in 2020.

Riyadh has repeatedly stated that normalization with Israel is contingent upon a credible roadmap toward Arab Palestinian statehood and an end to hostilities in Gaza. A US announcement recognizing “Palestine” could thus serve as a flexion point, easing Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords and shifting the regional paradigm.

If such a move materializes, it would mark a dramatic turn in US policy and reflect a calculated effort to unlock Saudi-Israeli normalization, for which a credible solution to the Palestinian Arab question remains a precondition and historically – a stumbling block.

Yet, such a move would clash with Israel’s current government, risking a rift between Washington and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, any serious shift toward a two-state solution would require a reset of Israeli domestic politics, potentially leading to internal polarization and upheaval.

In this light, a possible US recognition of a “State of Palestine” is more than symbolic. It is a political act with the power to reshape regional dynamics and recalibrate US alliances – but not without significant costs and risks.

The Missing Piece

What is absent from the current discourse about a “State of Palestine,” however, is crucial to its implementation. Under any scenario – for peace to prevail – two criteria must be fulfilled before the issue of statehood for Palestinian Arabs is pronounced by the US: one, the issue of domicile – where would this purported “state” be situated; two, an understanding that its domicile will not be within the sovereign territory of the Jewish State of Israel. Only after these issues are considered – and most importantly, concretely determined – can the issue of a state for Arab Palestinians move forward with any hope of eventuation.

Short of these criteria being satisfied prior to statehood being recognized, there can be no possibility for its coming to fruition. Otherwise, the inertia of the status quo narrative becomes operative in which the West Bank (ancient Judea and Samaria) remains the default position for Palestinian Arab statehood – and this is untenable.

This brings me to my final point. Two opportunities exist for West Bank Arabs to experience self-determination. First, the 141 sq. mi. of Gaza must be rebuilt. Deliberation on that calculus is already underway.

One possibility is that supplemented with additional land contiguous with Gaza (by Egypt and/or Israel) to reduce population density, a portion of West Bank Arabs could be domiciled in Gaza with the existing population. Both groups profess to be of Palestinian Arab origin.

In addition, as I and others have previously proposed, Jordan would benefit hugely (financially and politically) by being seen as a “savior” to West Bank Arabs. Since some of the latter would opt for a rebuilt Gaza, their reduced number would not be viewed as a threat to King Abdullah II and the Hashemite Kingdom – already home to a demographic purporting to be of Palestinian Arab origin at roughly 70 percent of the total populace. Security guarantees from the Arab League, especially the Saudis, would be crucial to the arrangement.

(Area A-18% and B-22% of the West Bank under Arab control constitute about 873 sq.mi. – roughly 2.4 percent of Jordanian territory).

If the money will be available to rebuild Gaza (and numbers like $30-40 billion are already being discussed) why cannot it be fashioned so as to accommodate both Gazans and West Bank Arabs?

The point is – it can be – the question is why won’t it be?  That’s a question that needs answering.

There is a solution to this 76-year-old problem – but there are those who do not want that to happen any place other than where it cannot happen – in the Jewish State of Israel.

Could it be that the EU (especially France) and Britain do not want stability in the Middle East – because with it they lose influence and power for their own political agendas in the region?

Is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (and now Ukraine) perennially used to distract constituents back home from serious domestic problems, which the ruling elite in the UK and EU are either unable or unwilling to deal with – like domestic unrest, sluggish economies and immigration figures out of control? This question also needs answering.

One final comment must be noted: the Palestinians have been utterly recalcitrant against living peacefully beside the Jewish state. They have rejected the offer of a state at least four discrete times in the past. It seems unlikely that the Palestinians will agree to a state that allows Israel to exist within defensible borders — “from the river to the sea.”