Trump’s Chance to Make Peace in Israel

Donald Trump has an opportunity to do something that Israeli politics has repeatedly failed to achieve: bring bitter rivals together in the name of national security. If Israel’s next election produces another political deadlock, the American president could attempt to broker a unity government between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot, built around a common objective of confronting Iran. Such a deal would be politically fraught and difficult to enforce. But with Israel’s security challenges mounting and public confidence in its leadership under strain, Trump may be uniquely positioned to turn an electoral stalemate into a strategic opening.

A deadlocked election could give the American president an unexpected opportunity to broker a deal between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot, uniting Israel’s political rivals around the Iranian threat.

The morning after the election

If the polls are even approximately correct, Israeli polling stations will close on Tuesday night without resolving the country’s most pressing political question: who can govern?

Neither Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc nor that of Gadi Eisenkot is expected to secure a parliamentary majority. Israel could therefore find itself confronting another period of political paralysis, with coalition negotiations going nowhere and the prospect of yet another election looming.

President Isaac Herzog would have the formal responsibility of consulting party leaders, weighing their recommendations and deciding who should receive the mandate to form a government. He might also attempt to broker a compromise to spare Israel another round of elections and the corrosive political instability that preceded the October 7 attacks.

But Herzog would not be the only president with a potentially decisive role to play. Donald Trump could have considerable influence over what happens next.

His endorsement of Netanyahu this week, just days before Israelis head to the polls, was revealing. The American president did not simply express support for a familiar political ally. He tied that support to a strategic objective: confronting Iran.

Netanyahu, Trump argued, was the partner he needed to finish the job and topple the Iranian regime. With another Israeli leader in office, he suggested, America might have to complete the task alone — an outcome he would prefer to avoid.

Whether Netanyahu is indispensable to that mission is debatable. But Trump’s intervention made one thing clear: he sees Israel’s election not merely as a contest over who governs the country, but as a decision with consequences for American strategy towards Iran.

That creates an intriguing possibility. If neither Israeli political bloc can assemble a majority, Trump could try to turn the resulting deadlock into an opportunity for national unity.

A deal made in washington

Consider a scenario in which the election produces no clear winner. As coalition negotiations stall and politicians explore increasingly desperate arrangements to secure a majority, Trump invites Netanyahu and Eisenkot to the White House.

Netanyahu would have every reason to welcome the invitation. Eisenkot, the leader of Yashar, would be considerably less enthusiastic. He has already ruled out a rotation agreement with Netanyahu, and entering negotiations under the American president’s watch would carry substantial political risks.

Yet refusing the invitation might prove difficult.

Trump could present the two men with a straightforward proposition: form a national unity government, confront the Iranian threat and provide Israel with the political stability needed to pursue its security objectives.

For Netanyahu, such an arrangement could offer another term in office and the endorsement of an American president whose support he values enormously. For Eisenkot, the calculation would be more complicated. Entering government alongside Netanyahu could alienate voters who have rejected the prime minister’s leadership and undermine his own political credibility.

Trump would therefore need to offer more than an appeal to patriotism or strategic necessity. He would need to provide credible assurances that the agreement would be honored.

The price of political trust

One possible arrangement would involve a national unity government with a fixed timetable for transferring the premiership from Netanyahu to Eisenkot.

Trump could press for Netanyahu to serve for no more than 18 months, with Eisenkot taking over thereafter. The agreement could include clearly defined milestones, a public commitment from both leaders and an agreed mechanism for managing disputes over the transition.

Trump could also offer to act as a political guarantor, using his relationship with Netanyahu to discourage any attempt to renege on the deal.

He could not legally compel an Israeli prime minister to surrender office on a particular date. Nor could a promise made in the White House eliminate the risk of political manoeuvring in Jerusalem.

But breaking an agreement personally brokered by Trump would carry costs. Netanyahu would risk embarrassing an American president whose backing he considers important to Israel’s security, while damaging a relationship that has considerable strategic value.

Trump’s leverage would be political rather than constitutional. Whether it would be sufficient is another question.

The obstacles are formidable. Netanyahu and Eisenkot have little reason to trust one another, and their political differences cannot be erased by a presidential invitation. A unity government could quickly become another arena for rivalry rather than an instrument of effective government.

Still, the prospect should not be dismissed outright. When domestic politics produces an impasse, outside diplomacy can sometimes create incentives that the parties themselves struggle to generate.

For Trump, the potential reward would be considerable: a more stable Israeli government, a reliable partner on Iran and an opportunity to demonstrate that his influence extends beyond military pressure and personal alliances.

Iran and the election gamble

There is, however, a more immediate problem. Any attempt to unite Israel’s political leadership around Iran would require a degree of public trust that the country currently lacks.

In the final days before the election, Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasized the danger posed by Tehran. His warnings have raised concerns that Israel could be preparing to strike Iran, or that escalating tensions might prompt Tehran to launch an attack of its own.

The underlying threat is serious. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and development of long-range ballistic missiles pose substantial challenges to Israeli security. The question is not whether those dangers deserve attention, but how urgently military action is required.

That judgment depends on intelligence that is not available to the public and may be known in full only to a small circle of political and military decision-makers.

If Iran is approaching an imminent nuclear breakthrough and intelligence indicates that the opportunity to prevent it is rapidly closing, Israel’s leaders might conclude that military action cannot wait until after the election.

But if the threat is unlikely to change materially over the coming weeks or months, restraint would be prudent.

The timing is politically explosive. An Israeli attack could be justified on strategic grounds and still be interpreted by much of the public as an attempt to influence the election. Netanyahu’s warnings, however sincere, are unlikely to persuade all voters that national security is his only consideration.

That creates a dangerous dilemma. A government may have compelling reasons to act, yet find its decisions undermined by public suspicion about its motives.

The credibility deficit

Israel’s crisis is not simply one of political fragmentation. It is also a crisis of confidence.

When citizens distrust their leaders, even a necessary military operation can deepen divisions rather than unite the country. Decisions that might otherwise command broad support become entangled in arguments over political survival, electoral advantage and the credibility of the people making them.

The consequences extend beyond Netanyahu himself. Public suspicion could also undermine confidence in the Israel Defense Forces, particularly if military action is perceived as serving the interests of a political leader rather than the country.

This is where American involvement could prove valuable.

If the United States concluded that another military operation against Iran was necessary and chose to participate, its involvement would provide an additional indication that the threat had been assessed as serious by a key Israeli ally.

That would not settle every argument over the timing or necessity of an attack. Nor should American participation automatically be treated as proof that every Israeli decision was justified.

But a shared assessment by Washington and Jerusalem would make it harder to portray military action as solely an electoral manoeuvre by Netanyahu. It could lend greater credibility to a decision that might otherwise be viewed through the prism of domestic political rivalry.

The value of American involvement would therefore be diplomatic as well as military. Washington could help establish a broader strategic rationale for action, reducing the extent to which the decision depended on the personal credibility of Israel’s prime minister.

The General’s word

Another figure could prove even more important to Israeli public confidence: Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, the IDF’s chief of staff.

Appointed under Netanyahu, Zamir is not generally regarded as a political loyalist. He has demonstrated a willingness to challenge the government when he believes that Israel’s security interests are at stake.

His responsibility is not to endorse Netanyahu’s electoral arguments. It is to protect the country, advise the government on military matters and preserve the integrity of the armed forces.

A public statement from Zamir, explaining as much as operational security permits about the nature of the Iranian threat, its urgency and the military considerations behind any decision to strike, could help address the current deficit of confidence.

There would, of course, be limits to what he could disclose. Intelligence assessments cannot always be made public without compromising sources, methods or military plans. Nor should the armed forces be drawn into partisan political disputes.

But a clear explanation of the military assessment, delivered independently of the prime minister’s campaign rhetoric, could help the public distinguish strategic necessity from political calculation.

Such reassurance would not eliminate disagreement. It could, however, establish a more credible basis for national debate at a moment when the stakes are unusually high.

Trump’s opportunity

Trump cannot resolve Israel’s political divisions by presidential fiat. He cannot guarantee that Netanyahu and Eisenkot will trust one another, that a unity government will endure or that an agreed transfer of power will take place on schedule.

Yet he possesses something that few other foreign leaders can offer: a close relationship with Netanyahu, considerable influence in Washington and a direct strategic interest in the outcome of Israel’s confrontation with Iran.

Those advantages give him an opportunity to encourage a compromise that Israeli politicians might otherwise reject.

A unity government would not automatically produce better policy, and confronting Iran should not become a pretext for ignoring Israel’s domestic political problems. Any agreement would need credible safeguards, a clear timetable and a commitment to govern in the national interest rather than simply postpone another election.

But if the alternative is prolonged paralysis at a time of heightened regional danger, an imperfect compromise may be preferable to another cycle of political deadlock.

Trump’s challenge is to turn his influence into something more durable than an endorsement or a dramatic White House meeting. He would need to persuade Netanyahu and Eisenkot that cooperation offers greater strategic and political rewards than continued confrontation.

If he succeeds, he could help Israel emerge from its electoral impasse with a government capable of addressing the Iranian threat and restoring some measure of public confidence.

For a president who has made peacemaking a central part of his political identity, that would be a significant achievement. It would also demonstrate that diplomacy can sometimes accomplish what electoral arithmetic cannot: bring rivals together when the costs of division have become too high.