Trump’s Gamble on Bagram Risks Repeating History
President Trump’s sudden embrace of Pakistan’s military brass is a dangerous gamble that risks trapping the United States in the very same cycle of overreach and betrayal that defined Washington’s past entanglements in the region.
In recent weeks, Trump has pressed the Taliban administration to hand Bagram Air Base back to the Pentagon, warning Kabul that “bad things” would happen if it refused. Bagram, once the nerve center of America’s 20-year war, represents Washington’s attempt to regain strategic depth after Israel’s recent strike on Iran’s nuclear program highlighted America’s thinning reach in West and Central Asia. While Bagram will provide an option to the US against Iran, it also provides closeness to China’s nuclear interests.
But the region’s response has been swift and coordinated. China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan issued a joint statement at the UN General Assembly rejecting any return of U.S. troops to Afghanistan. That Islamabad aligned itself with Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran — while simultaneously courting Trump behind closed doors — shows the duplicity at the heart of Field Marshal Asim Munir’s strategy.
Munir, Pakistan’s de facto ruler, is desperate. His country is economically bankrupt, politically fractured, and beset by an emboldened Taliban across the border. Once Pakistan’s proxies, today’s Taliban openly shelter militants who attack Pakistani forces. The ethnic dimension is glaring: a largely Pashtun Taliban defying a Punjabi-dominated Pakistani army, while Pakistan’s most prominent Pashtun leader sits in prison.
To offset these domestic weaknesses, Munir is marketing Pakistan abroad. He touts the Saudi-Pakistan defense pact as an “Islamic response” to Israel’s counterterror operations, dangling the “Islamic nuke” as deterrence, and whispering promises of access to Trump’s White House. Yet this playbook is not new. Like General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s, Munir cloaks himself as a defender of Islam while maneuvering to secure foreign cash and legitimacy to shore up his own power.
For Washington, the warning signs could not be clearer. Pakistan’s simultaneous participation in the anti-U.S. bloc with China, Russia, and Iran — while seeking favor in Washington — is a reminder that Islamabad is not an ally but an opportunist. A U.S. base in Bagram would not restore American leverage; it would embolden the Taliban, diminish Pakistan’s utility, and risk dragging U.S. forces into Pakistan’s internal crises and Saudi Arabia’s regional wars against Iran or the Houthis. Infact renewed Saudi interest in Pakistan as a defence partner, could very well be the Saudi Crown price, planning a second push against the Houthi’s with whom he shares a land border and who have used cheap Iranian technology to shut down Saudi refining in the past.
The United States has been here before. Billions poured into Pakistan during the Cold War and the “War on Terror” bought Washington little but duplicity: intelligence leaks, militant safe havens, and double-dealings with China. Repeating this mistake under Trump would not just waste resources; it would sabotage the fragile architecture of the Abraham Accords and destabilize Central Asia at the very moment Israel and moderate Arab states are seeking to contain Iran.
Washington must understand this: relying on Munir’s Pakistan for strategic depth is not a solution — it is a trap. Bagram may look like an asset, but in reality it risks becoming the gateway to another endless entanglement.
