Trump’s Middle East Moment

Political defeat does not necessarily produce a diminished presidency. Sometimes it forces a president to abandon the ambitions that Congress can block and concentrate on the powers that remain almost entirely his own. For Donald Trump, the midterm elections may have closed some doors in Washington. They may also have opened one far more consequential: the possibility of using the remainder of his presidency to reshape the Middle East and secure the diplomatic legacy he has long coveted.

Trump’s foreign-policy opportunity

The midterm elections have altered the political arithmetic in Washington. With Democrats controlling both chambers of Congress, Trump’s domestic agenda will face a formidable barrier during the final two years of his presidency. Investigations, partisan conflict and legislative gridlock are likely to consume much of Washington’s attention.

Foreign policy is different. The president retains substantial authority to negotiate, pressure allies, strike bargains and set America’s strategic direction. And there is perhaps no arena where that authority could produce a more consequential result than the Middle East.

Trump has repeatedly said that he wants to be remembered as a president who ended wars rather than merely managed them. His first administration established the Abraham Accords, bringing Israel into formal diplomatic relations with several Arab states. That was no small achievement.

Yet the accords did not resolve the central political problem of the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained frozen, only to erupt catastrophically after the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023.

Trump now has an opportunity to finish what he started.

But an updated version of the Abraham Accords should mean considerably more than adding Saudi Arabia to the list of countries recognizing Israel. The objective should be a broader regional settlement—one combining Israeli security, Palestinian statehood, Arab normalization, economic integration and a new security architecture.

If Trump could achieve that, his midterm defeat might become an afterthought.

From normalization to transformation

The Middle East has spent decades treating its conflicts as permanent features of the landscape. Trump could instead attempt to make them the starting point for a new regional order.

The emerging Israeli political landscape may provide an opening. A government led by Gadi Eisenkot or another coalition capable of moving beyond Benjamin Netanyahu’s long-running approach could offer Washington a new partner.

But simply replacing one Israeli government with another would not be enough. The strategic question is whether Israel is prepared to move from managing the Palestinian conflict to resolving it.

That does not mean compromising Israel’s security. Quite the opposite. A durable settlement would have to begin with an uncompromising recognition of Israel’s right to security, alongside Palestinian self-government and a credible path to statehood.

Trump is uniquely positioned to make that argument because he has demonstrated a willingness to pressure allies as well as adversaries.

The message from Washington should be straightforward: America will remain firmly committed to Israel’s security, but security cannot be the permanent substitute for political strategy. The expansion of settlements, unchecked extremist violence and indefinite occupation cannot constitute a sustainable regional policy.

The objective should be an Israel that is safer because its neighbors have a stake in its security, rather than an Israel that remains permanently surrounded by unresolved conflicts.

A Palestinian reset

There is an equally important problem on the Palestinian side.

Palestinian politics has been deprived of democratic renewal for years. The Palestinian Authority has not held presidential elections since 2005 or legislative elections since 2006. That democratic vacuum has weakened political legitimacy and helped produce a system increasingly disconnected from the people it claims to represent.

A serious peace strategy therefore cannot simply negotiate with the existing Palestinian leadership and hope for the best.

Washington, working with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and European allies, should press for credible Palestinian elections in the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza when security conditions permit.

The purpose would not be to manufacture a preferred Palestinian government. It would be to give Palestinians the opportunity to choose one.

That distinction is crucial to the legitimacy of any future Palestinian state.

A new Palestinian political leadership could commit itself to democratic government, institutional reform, economic development and diplomacy rather than armed struggle. It could also provide the basis for a single Palestinian authority governing both Gaza and the West Bank.

The principle should be simple: one government, one legal system and one legitimate security authority.

Gaza cannot remain under the armed control of Hamas. Nor can it remain indefinitely under direct Israeli military rule. The alternative is legitimate Palestinian governance supported by regional and international partners, accompanied by reconstruction and security reform.

That would be difficult. But the Middle East has already demonstrated the cost of leaving difficult problems unresolved.

Saudi Arabia holds the key

Saudi Arabia may be the most important piece of the puzzle.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has the economic resources, regional influence and strategic incentives to help construct a new Middle Eastern order. Saudi-Israeli normalization would be one of the most consequential diplomatic developments in the region for decades.

But Riyadh will find it difficult to make such a bargain politically sustainable if the Palestinian question is simply pushed aside.

The answer is not to make Palestinian statehood a condition that prevents normalization indefinitely. It is to incorporate Palestinian political and economic aspirations directly into the agreement.

Imagine the possibilities.

Israel and an independent Palestinian state living alongside one another. Saudi Arabia establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel. American, Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Emirati and Israeli cooperation on regional security. Gaza rebuilt with international and Arab financing. Palestinian institutions reformed. New trade and investment agreements connecting the region to global markets.

This would be more than another peace process.

It would be a regional reorganization.

The economic dividend

The economic component could prove as important as the diplomatic one.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, offers a potential framework for linking India with the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Europe through transportation, energy and digital infrastructure.

Ports, railways, power networks, telecommunications and technology investment could turn the Middle East into one of the world’s great commercial crossroads.

Palestinians should be included in that economic architecture rather than left outside it.

A prosperous Palestinian economy would not guarantee peace. Economic development alone cannot resolve political disputes. But prosperity can create constituencies with something substantial to lose from renewed conflict.

The broader strategic prize for America would be significant as well.

A more integrated Middle East would strengthen America’s alliances, expand commercial opportunities for American companies and provide a counterweight to China’s growing economic influence.

It could also reduce the need for repeated American military intervention. A regional system in which allies share responsibility for security is more sustainable than one in which Washington repeatedly intervenes whenever the region catches fire.

The Republican opportunity

There is another reason for Trump to pursue such an ambitious strategy.

A Middle East settlement could offer something increasingly rare in American politics: an achievement capable of attracting support across party lines.

Democrats and Republicans may disagree about almost everything else. But Israeli security, Arab-American partnerships, Palestinian self-government and regional economic integration need not belong to one party.

Trump’s political instinct has always been to pursue deals that can be presented as transformational. A comprehensive Middle East agreement would fit that instinct perfectly.

It would also allow him to return to one of the defining themes of his first presidency: that American power should be used not simply to fight wars, but to force entrenched interests to consider bargains they previously regarded as impossible.

The Trump test

Such a strategy would require Trump to challenge friends as well as opponents.

Israel would have to accept that permanent occupation is not a viable substitute for a political settlement.

Palestinian leaders would have to accept that independence requires accountable government, the rule of law and the end of competing armed authorities.

Arab governments would have to convert diplomatic promises into financial and political commitments.

And America would have to provide the diplomatic weight needed to keep the entire structure together.

Trump would also have to resist the temptation of announcing another grand initiative without the machinery required to implement it.

The Middle East does not need another declaration of principles. It needs a plan with a destination, enforceable commitments, financing, security arrangements and a timetable.

That is where Trump’s transactional instincts could become an advantage. A president who regards diplomacy as negotiation rather than ceremony may be unusually well suited to extracting commitments from governments that have spent decades avoiding them.

A legacy bigger than the midterms

Trump has less than two years remaining in the White House. The clock is running.

His domestic agenda may now be constrained by a hostile Congress. His foreign-policy authority is not.

That creates a curious possibility: the political setback of the midterms could push Trump toward the arena in which he has the greatest opportunity to define his historical reputation.

The Abraham Accords demonstrated that the region’s diplomatic map could change. The next step would be considerably harder: turning normalization into a genuine regional order.

If Trump could help produce Israeli-Palestinian coexistence, Saudi-Israeli normalization, Palestinian political renewal, regional economic integration and a durable security framework, the achievement would transcend another presidential election cycle.

It would also vindicate one of the central propositions of Trump’s foreign policy: that seemingly permanent conflicts can sometimes be disrupted by leaders willing to reject the conventional limits of diplomacy.

The midterms may have reduced Trump’s room to maneuver at home.

They have not necessarily reduced his capacity to make history abroad.

His greatest deal may still be waiting in the Middle East.