Trump’s Second Term Foreign Policy
President Donald Trump’s foreign policy during his first term marked a radical departure from that of his predecessor, President Barack Obama. Given the policies he implemented during his previous term, along with the statements he and his associates have made throughout the election campaign and following his re-election, what can we anticipate regarding the foreign policy of the 47th President of the United States of America with respect to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Eastern Eurasia?
President Trump’s foreign policy during his first term was characterized, inter alia, by the following basic principles and trends:
Generally speaking, Trump’s foreign policy was guided by the isolationist doctrine of “America First.” This policy, which prioritized first and foremost advancing US interests in the global arena, shaped the Trump administration’s approach towards its bilateral and multilateral relationships. Under the “America First” principle, Trump sought to leverage foreign relations to bolster the American economy and improve its global trade balance. He favored bilateral trade agreements over multilateral ones and, in an effort to reduce the trade deficit, imposed tariffs on imported goods from various countries. Additionally, he encouraged American companies to repatriate their manufacturing operations to the United States. As part of this policy framework, Trump decided to significantly reduce or halt US assistance to various countries and organizations focused on human rights and climate issues, especially when they were critical of US policies. He also sought to cut military assistance to allied nations and reduce funding for military alliances (such as NATO), and avoided engaging in unnecessary military conflicts.
Regarding the Iranian regime, Trump adopted a policy of “maximum pressure,” imposing sanctions on the government in Tehran. However, when significant incidents arose vis-à-vis Iran, he opted against a direct military response. For instance, in June 2019, when Iran shot down a US drone over the Persian Gulf, Trump initially approved a retaliatory airstrike on Iranian targets. However, he called off the attack at the last minute, citing concerns about the potential for high numbers of casualties. In September 2019, Iran and its Houthi proxy in Yemen attacked Saudi Arabia’s main oil facility, Aramco, using missiles and drones. The strike significantly impacted Saudi Arabia’s oil production capacity in a single night. Although Trump threatened that the US intended to respond against the party responsible for the attack, and despite the Saudis providing evidence implicating both direct and indirect Iranian involvement, Trump refrained from ordering any military action against Iran. Similarly, despite repeated provocations by Iran, including disruptions to shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, Trump chose not to deploy the US Navy against Iranian forces. This policy of restraint has raised concerns among US allies in the Middle East regarding the reliability of American commitments to their security. However, in contrast to his general policy of refraining from military action, in January 2020 Trump ordered the US military to eliminate Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. This decision was made in response to Soleimani’s involvement in numerous attacks on American soldiers and civilians.
Trump’s foreign policy during his first term was not always consistent. For example, he made the decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and as part of his Middle East peace plan — “The Deal of the Century” — unveiled in 2020, he supported allowing Israel to annex approximately 30 percent of the West Bank. However, shortly afterward, he shifted his stance. Under pressure from Arab countries and in light of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the Gulf states, he called on Israel to refrain from annexing territories in the West Bank.
Another example of a U-turn in US foreign policy during Trump’s first term as president was his approach to the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran. While Trump initially decided to withdraw from the agreement, toward the end of his term, he declared his willingness to engage in talks with Iran to negotiate a new nuclear agreement that would correct the shortcomings of the original deal.
There is one area in which Trump’s policy appears to have remained consistent throughout his first term, and that is his strong support for the State of Israel. However, here too, following his election loss, Trump’s close relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu faced significant strain, as he felt betrayed by what he perceived as Netanyahu’s undue haste in calling to congratulate President Biden on his victory.
Based on his policies during his first presidential term, as well as his statements and actions prior to entering the Oval Office this month, it is reasonable to anticipate that President Trump will make efforts to resolve the main conflicts preoccupying the world and end the wars and military confrontations in the Middle East, Eastern Eurasia, and the Persian Gulf.
The first goal: Ending the war in the Gaza Strip
President Trump achieved the signing the first phase of the hostage release and ceasefire deal even before his inauguration as the 47th President of the United States. Trump has publicly expressed his firm position on the need to sign a deal for the hostages’ release several times in recent months. On January 7, 2025, he declared, “If the hostages are not back by the time I return to office, all hell will break out in the Middle East.” Notably, Trump did not say that “all hell” would break out on Hamas, appearing rather to suggest that responsibility could lie with multiple parties in the region, perhaps even all sides. Indeed, in a long and decisive meeting between Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and Prime Minister Netanyahu on January 11, 2025, Witkoff delivered a strong message: it was time to finalize a ceasefire deal in Gaza. This determined and uncompromising stance prompted Netanyahu to change his position and instruct the Israeli delegation to head to Doha to reach an agreement. According to the Wall Street Journal, Witkoff also assured Hamas that their adherence to the deal would pave the way for Trump to encourage substantive negotiations in the second phase. Thus, as Trump begins his term, it is likely that he will exert heavy pressure to complete the subsequent stages of the deal and effectively end the war in Gaza. Naturally, this pressure is expected to be directed largely towards the Israeli government, which is interested in resuming the fighting in Gaza at the end of the first phase in order to achieve its stated war goal — “the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities.”
The next phases of the deal will likely hinge on finalizing arrangements for the “day after” Israel’s withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are expected to play a pivotal role in these arrangements and will be called upon to make significant investments in Gaza’s reconstruction.
The second goal: Israeli-Saudi normalization
Saudi involvement and investment in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will be possible in parallel with the warming of Israeli-Saudi ties — facilitated by American mediation — paving the way toward normalization between the two countries. Statements by President Trump and his team both during the campaign and following the election signal that he and his people see normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a central foreign policy goal. Trump’s national security advisor, Mike Walz, stated that achieving a peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is “a huge priority” for the new administration. However, Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it will not proceed with normalization without a step by Israel toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if that step is only symbolic or declarative. (This uncompromising position stems first and foremost from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s need to respond to the sentiments of the Saudi public).
It is therefore reasonable to assume that President Trump will pressure, and perhaps even force, Israel to make a territorial gesture, or at the very least a verbal one, regarding the issue of Palestinian statehood to satisfy Saudi Arabia’s demands. Such a gesture, even if minimal, could endanger the coalition and potentially jeopardize the stability of the Netanyahu government. Perhaps for this reason, and contrary to the expectations of some Israeli citizens, reports from closed conversations between Trump and his associates in November 2024 suggested that formal annexation of territories in the West Bank is not on the agenda at this stage.
The third goal: Achieving stability in Lebanon
President Trump is likely to adopt a firm and decisive position vis-à-vis all parties in Lebanon in order to promote stability in the country. In this context, he will seek to leverage the recent election of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, the shift in the political balance of power in Lebanon, and the weakening of Hezbollah to push for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon while establishing security arrangements that will allow Israel to respond to any violation by Hezbollah in accordance with an Israeli-American monitoring mechanism.
The fourth goal: A resolution in Syria
The takeover of Syria by the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Abu Muhammad al-Julani, with the backing of Turkish President Erdogan, and the subsequent removal of Iranian and Hezbollah forces from the country’s territory, will compel President Trump to swiftly formulate a clear policy regarding Syria’s future. During his election campaign, Trump stated that “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend, and the United States should have nothing to do with it. This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved.” This statement was made after Trump called Erdogan a “very smart” leader with a “very strong, powerful army.” It is likely that Trump will reach an agreement with Erdogan in which he will turn a blind eye to Turkish control of Syria through its proxy, perhaps even at the expense of abandoning American’s Kurdish allies. It is possible that in return for such an American policy, Trump will demand that Erdogan mend ties with Israel and perhaps even coordinate policies in the areas near Israel’s border. In this context, Trump may also seek understandings with Russian President Putin, potentially allowing Russia to take part in Syria’s reconstruction through Russian construction firms.
The fifth goal: Ending the Russia-Ukraine war
During his election campaign, President Trump repeatedly stated his intentions regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, asserting that he was the only candidate capable of ending the war quickly. He even claimed that would be able to resolve the conflict within 24 hours. In order to bring an end to the war, Trump will likely make it clear to Ukrainian President Zelensky that he intends to cease assisting him militarily and politically, pressuring him to accept a territorial compromise with the Russians in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the Donbas and recognize Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Such American pressure will force Ukraine to comply with most of Russia’s demands, thereby bringing the protracted war in the region to an end, possibly with a promise to integrate Ukraine into NATO in the future.
The sixth goal: A nuclear agreement with Iran
As mentioned, at the end of Trump’s previous term as president, and after having withdrawn the United States from the nuclear agreement, he pursued negotiations with Iran in an attempt to secure a new nuclear deal on terms much more favorable to the US and Israel. Although the Iranians were also interested in signing a new agreement, they believed that they held the upper hand and were unwilling to compromise and accede to the American demands. Today, however, the situation is different. Recent military actions against Iran have left it vulnerable. Damage to Iranian proxies in the Middle East and the setbacks to the Shiite axis may prompt Iran to soften its stance and consider a new nuclear deal that would remove the threat of an Israeli or American military strike. In this context, it is worth noting the remarks made by Vice President J.D. Vance in October 2024: “Israel has the right to defend itself, but America’s interest is sometimes going to be distinct. Sometimes, we’re going to have overlapping interests, and sometimes, we’re going to have distinct interests. And our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran.” He further emphasized that a war with Iran would be a “huge distraction of resources” and “massively expensive to our country.” Given this statement, and in light of past experience, it can be concluded that President Trump is not interested in military entanglement with Iran, and will therefore take direct or indirect military action only if he has no other choice.
Some will see this analysis and assessment of President Trump’s potential foreign policy as the beginning of a new world order — a utopian solution to the challenges of the Middle East and global instability. Others will view the projected scenario as a dystopian world that would undermine the interests of US allies and perhaps even endanger the existence of the State of Israel. However, it should be remembered that reality is often far more complex than any scenario or assessment — particularly when the subject is a decision-maker known for his unpredictable behavior and one who sets his sights on the Nobel Peace Prize.