Turkiye and Great Game in Syria

It has become common knowledge in recent days that the parties who “won a lot” in the overthrow of the Asad family in Syria are Erdogan and Türkiye. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or HTS, which is the “leading group” in the “surprise attack” in Damascus has been Turkey’s proxy all this time, which has made Erdogan since 2016 (since HTS separated from ISIS) have a complicated relationship in Syria, both with Russia, Iran, Saudi, UAE and Qatar, as well as United States (including of course Israel).

As is known, the approval for HTS to expand its military grip on Allepo province in October 2024 came from Ankara, with logistical support and providing access to use the Syrian and Turkiye borders, so that HTS troops and their allies, especially the Syrian Military Army (SNA) could maneuver without feeling anxious about clashing with Turkiye border guards. Even as long as HTS was in power in Idlip Province, Turkey was the main protector of HTS from attacks by government troops (Asad).

In other words, the game of the great powers in Syria is actually quite complex. So the success of Turkiye and its proxies, whether they admit it or not, can be said to be quite clever this time.  The great game occurred after the Arab’s Spring turned into a civil war in Syria, like in Libya and Iraq. In fact, to this day, these two countries have not shown any signs of stability. In Syria itself, Bashar Al Asad in the last ten years has no longer been very effective in running the government because of these shocks.

The legitimacy of his power was at its lowest point, not only because of the conflicts and bombings that have occurred in the last ten years, but also because of the very acute economic problems. Almost 90 percent of the Syrian people are categorized as economically poor, which means that the Syrian people’s hopes for Asad are slowly disappearing. A very large number have also become asylum seekers and immigrants in developed countries, such as Europe and US, who in recent days have celebrated the victory of “freedom” for Syria in these countries.

What keeps Asad on the throne was Iran and Russia. When the Asad regime almost collapsed and was almost surrounded by ISIS in 2015, Russia was Asad’s real savior, not just a narrative. Russian troops entered Syria to help Asad fight ISIS, which then made Obama misguided to join in “playing” in Syria directly, a year after Russia’s “little green army” took over Crimea from Ukraine.

Putin’s actions in 2015 clearly made Erdogan’s position awry, because several groups supported by Türkiye took a position in direct opposition to Asad. This means that, like US, Türkiye with all the factions it supports in Syria must refrain from being too visible in Syria, because it will face Russia on the ground. However, this does not necessarily mean that Türkiye is on the same side as US. Because US has also determined its position of support, namely the Kurdish militia, YPG, which apparently is not Erdogan’s alliance, but his “enemy”. This was one of the beginnings of the complexity of Turkiye’s position in Syria.

For Erdogan, the Kurds certainly have far more “enemy” status than Russia and the factions it supports in Syria. So, to suppress the movement of Kurdish militias in Northern Syria, the Syrian border area with Turkiye, Erdogan finally asked for approval from Putin in 2019 to expand his military reach into Syrian territory. Putin also gave the green light, considering that the Kurdish militias (both YPG and PKK) were also a threat to the Assad regime.

This widening of Turkey’s activities coincided with Donald Trump’s decision (first period) at that time to reduce the “presence” of American troops in Syria. The withdrawal of some American troops, which was greeted with a widening of Turkiye’s military influence, finally made Trump somewhat angry and imposed sanctions on Ankara.

This then became the geopolitical “background” for why Turkiye agreed to a contract to purchase Russia’s M400 weapons several years ago, as part of a dialogue with Washington which imposed sanctions on Ankara. Of course, this contract agreement automatically, even though it ultimately failed, worsened Erdogan’s relations with US and other NATO members at that time.

Well, the situation began to change somewhat after Russia decided to go to war with Ukraine (and its allies) in 2022. Putin’s focus on Syria reduced drastically. Rather than having the potential to provide support, Putin now needs help more. Meanwhile, since the war broke out between Hamas and Israel, then later with Hesbollah, Iran’s focus on Syria has eroded significantly. Moreover, stability in Tehran has begun to be disturbed since its president was killed. The consolidation of new power in Iran will take time.

As a result, as was known some time ago, to neutralize Syria’s vulnerability, Putin initiated a geopolitical movement to bring Syria closer to Arab countries, such as Saudi and the UAE, including Turkiye itself. And Turkiye read the movement as an opportunity, because it contained a sign that Russia and Iran were starting to loosen their grip on Asad. So, Turkiye began to calculate with precision that the end of 2024 is the right time to break the deadlock in Damascus on the one hand and to prove that Russia and Iran were not ready on the other hand.

In fact, Turkiye’s calculations don’t seem to be too wrong. Ankara’s October approval to occupy Allepo bore fruit, so that HTS and its allies have a strategic territorial base to continue their advance towards Damascus from Allepo. And Asad was really unprepared when the “surprise attack” came. The life of his regime, which is very dependent on support from Russia and Iran, has been very vulnerable since two major events occurred, namely the Russia Ukraine war and Hamas – Hesbollah vs Israel. And that fact was proven by Asad’s unpreparedness this time

The Great Game played by Turkiye certainly created a feeling of “betrayal” in the Kremlin’s top ranks. Even the Russian philosopher, who is one of the philosophers who give Putin philosophical legitimacy, Alexander Dugin, openly condemned Turkiye’s behavior as treason. Even Turkiye, he said, to be precise, Erdogan must be prepared to receive retaliation from Moscow and Tehran, in the form of the overthrow of the Erdogan regime in Ankara in the future.

This feeling of betrayal is certainly understandable. The Assad regime is one of the regimes that solidifies Russia as a Great Power (regional), apart from the central Asia countries, the Caucasus and Georgia. The collapse of the Assad regime means the erosion of Russia’s Great Power status on the one hand and strategically reduces Russia’s access to send aid to the factions it supports in Libya, which incidentally also differ from the factions supported by Turkiye there.  Meanwhile, for Iran, the collapse of the Assad regime also means the same thing, namely the reduction of Iran’s access to providing assistance to Hezbollah and Hamas, because so far all assistance has had to go through Syria.

So what about US and Israel? For Donald Trump, who will be inaugurated on January 20, this could be a great opportunity to continue his intention to withdraw troops from Syria, as he did in 2019. From Donald Trump’s latest statement, he said that Syria is not US’s business. So it only takes a simple deal with Erdogan that the new government in Syria will be active in suppressing the movement of ISIS (a long-standing request ignored by Turkiye), then US can easily get out of there, even though the Democrats on Capitol Hill will fight tooth and nail to criticize Trump later.

And for Israel, on paper HTS is of course still a terrorist like ISIS which is very anti-Tel Aviv. But what is more important than that, securing the Golan heights area, if necessary expanding into Syria, is the first priority. Because, firstly, the opportunity is good. Second, because widening the buffer zone on the Golan Heights will be a strategic decision for Israel’s security. The wider the buffer zone, the more spacious Tel Aviv will be. Just like Putin expanded Russia’s territory in Eastern Ukraine.

And third, expanding Israel’s territory to the Israel-Syria border in the Golan Heights means increasing control of “resources” for Israel, especially water and several other natural resources. This is exactly the decision that Israel takes today where IDF troops have pushed into Syria via the Golan Heights.

So what are the prospects for Syria after this? Turkiye’s attitude and diplomacy will greatly determine Syria’s future. Erdogan’s diplomacy with Russia and Iran, as well as with US, could be one of the strategic steps that will ensure Syria’s sustainability in the future, in addition to the real government practices shown by the new regime in Damascus. If the new government is even more brutal than the previous government, brutal to minorities and civil movements, aka Erdogan fails to control Abu Mohamad Al-Jaolani, then Syria will be a disaster for Erdogan. Syria could end up returning to the way it was before, namely like Libya and Iraq, unstable with a protracted conflict.