Türkiye–Kurdish Peace Talks: Reasons, Objectives, and Obstacles

Key Takeaways:

• A primary reason for initiating peace talks in Türkiye is the shifting geopolitical landscape in the Middle East following the outbreak of the war on October 7, 2023.
• One of Türkiye’s main objectives in this peace process is to disarm and dismantle the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in north-eastern Syria (Rojava), not just the PKK within or near its borders.
• The peace talks face significant obstacles, making the proposed process unlikely to succeed.
• There are likely differences of opinion between the PKK leadership and Öcalan’s statement regarding disarmament and the party’s dissolution.

According to sources, in early 2024, Turkish authorities began discreet negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), regarding a potential peace process between Türkiye and the PKK. On October 22, 2024, the first public indication of these talks emerged from Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally in Erdoğan’s ruling coalition. In a remarkable statement, Bahçeli suggested that Öcalan should address the Turkish parliament to announce the dissolution of the PKK. This stance came as a surprise, given that the MHP had previously opposed all peace efforts. The development ultimately led to Öcalan’s so-called historic statement on February 27, 2025, in which he accepted the peace proposal and called for the PKK’s disarmament and dissolution.

The Reasons and Objectives

The first question on the minds of most observers of Turkish affairs and the Kurdish issue regarding the peace talks and Öcalan’s statement is: “Why now?” Some believe that one of the main motivations behind Erdoğan and his allies’ peace efforts is rooted in presidential politics. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is currently serving his second term, the maximum allowed under the amended constitution, making him ineligible to run in the 2028 elections. The only exception is if parliament calls for early elections, which would grant the president the right to run again. However, this requires 360 out of 600 votes in parliament—a number that Erdoğan and his allies currently do not have. Otherwise, a constitutional amendment would be necessary. Reconciliation with the Kurds is seen as one way to circumvent this restriction. Kurdish support could help secure enough votes in parliament, either for early elections or for amending the constitution to allow Erdoğan to run again.

This reason is plausible, but it does not fully explain the timing of this process. If this were the primary motivation, it would have been more logical to start years ago, as the peace process is complex and requires considerable time. Moreover, Erdoğan and his allies have long been aware of the constitutional obstacle to his candidacy for another term—it is not a new issue that arose in 2024. Additionally, a constitutional amendment requires both a parliamentary vote and a referendum. Under the current circumstances, securing a majority of public support for such an amendment such would extremely difficult. While the Kurds may play a role in voting on the decision to hold early elections in parliament, their influence is not decisive.

The primary driving the Turkish peace process is likely the external factor and geopolitical developments in the region following the events of October 7, 2023. The two most significant milestones in this process so far are Devlet Bahçeli’s speech and Öcalan’s statement. Bahçeli’s speech on the peace process occurred less than a month after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, during an Israeli operation dubbed Operation “New Order“. This event marked a major shift in Israel’s conflict with the Iranian axis and the region as a whole. Öcalan’s statement followed less than three months after the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024—one of the most pivotal turning points in the region’s political landscape.

Turkish officials have expressed concern that the conflict between Israel and the Iranian axis could escalate into a regional war involving Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. They are likely considering how best to shield Türkiye from potential repercussions. A key concern is the Kurdish issue, particularly in north-eastern Syria, which is controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Türkiye fears the emergence of a second Kurdish autonomous region along its borders, following the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Such a development could pave the way for an independent Kurdish state in the future, which Türkiye views as a significant threat to its national security and territorial integrity. This aligns with successive statements from Israeli officials emphasizing the importance of protecting minorities, including the Kurds, and calling for closer ties with them in Syria after Assad’s fall. These statements have heightened Türkiye’s concerns about the Kurdish issue in Syria. Taken together, these factors make a Kurdish-Israeli alliance in Syria a realistic possibility, given their significant shared interests.

A number of experts and observers believe that Türkiye is using Öcalan’s statement on the peace process as a strategy to prevent a Kurdish-Israeli alliance, especially since Öcalan calls in his statement for “All groups must lay their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself” Many, particularly in Türkiye,  interpret “all groups” as a call to dismantle the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG) in Rojava, which form the core of the SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi. This interpretation persists despite Abdi’s rejection of the claim that the statement is directed at the SDF. This may have been a driving factor behind the recent eight-point bilateral agreement between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Syrian president for the transitional period. One of the key points of the agreement involves integrating the SDF into the Syrian army. Such integration could sever all ties between the PKK and the SDF while also shielding the SDF from the “all groups” disarmament demand mentioned in Öcalan’s statement. Moreover, Öcalan’s statement does not advocate for autonomy or explicitly political rights for Kurds in Türkiye or the broader region. This has led some to suspect that Öcalan is under Turkish pressure and saying what Türkiye wants him to say.

The Obstacles

There are many internal and external obstacles to the success of the peace process. On Türkiye’s part, there is no clear and serious intention to provide a just and realistic response to the Kurdish issue. For example, what the Kurds and many others call the “peace process”, Türkiye refers to as a “process to eliminate terrorism“. Furthermore, there is still no clear indication of what Türkiye will offer the Kurds in exchange for disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK. Even Öcalan’s statement does not mention this matter.

As mentioned above, the main reasons behind these talks are external factors preventing the Kurds from potentially benefiting from political developments in the region or temporary internal factors related to the extension of Erdoğan’s presidency. In other words, the issue of peace itself is not a driving factor in this peace process.

On the PKK’s part, two days after Öcalan’s statement—despite its positive reception and the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire— the PKK’s response stipulated that Öcalan himself should chair and lead the party congress for the disarmament and dissolution process. This condition further complicated the process. How could Öcalan lead a congress while in prison? How could Türkiye accept such a condition?

Later, the PKK’s rhetoric regarding Öcalan’s statement and the peace process shifted. Murat Karayılan, co-founder and acting leader of the PKK, stated in his latest interview that some party leaders were still unconvinced by the idea of disarmament and dissolution and sought further clarifications. He added that the PKK would not disarm unconditionally or without guarantees, emphasizing that Türkiye must take serious steps toward the peace process.

In addition to the obstacle posed by Iran’s influence over the PKK, given their longstanding relationship, Iran may attempt to persuade the group not to comply with Turkish demands or Öcalan’s statement. This possibility becomes even more likely given the acute tensions in Turkish-Iranian relations over Türkiye’s role in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, an Iranian ally. Not to mention the role of Israel, which has become a major player in the region and believes that the success of a Kurdish-Turkish agreement would have repercussions in Syria, favoring Turkish influence while undermining Israeli influence. Israel may also have leverage over the SDF and, through this influence, could attempt to create obstacles to the process.

Conclusion

The peace process in Türkiye appears to be driven more by geopolitical shifts resulting from the October 7, 2023, war than by a genuine desire for peace. Türkiye aims to prevent the Kurds, particularly in Rojava, from gaining any potential advantages stemming from political changes in the region and has used Öcalan’s statement as a strategic tool to further this objective.

There are significant obstacles to the success of this process. Within Türkiye, there are no clear indications of a commitment to granting the Kurds political, cultural, or national rights. Moreover, the PKK leadership’s response to Öcalan’s statement remains ambiguous. The party likely does not wish to implement the statement’s demands unconditionally or without compensation. While this may not entirely derail the process, it would likely prolong it. Externally, the process faces further challenges due to the influence of regional actors such as Iran and Israel.

It is worth noting that during Erdoğan’s rule, there have been two failed attempts at a peace process with the PKK in Türkiye: the first between 2009 and 2011, and the second between 2013 and 2015. Given the current circumstances, a third failure seems likely.