The Kurdish Role in Three Rival Regional Agendas: Israeli, Turkish, and Iranian Visions

In light of political developments in the region following the October 7, 2023 war, three major political agendas or projects have clearly emerged in the new Middle Eastern landscape: The Israeli agenda, the Turkish agenda, and the Iranian agenda.

While the Iranian and Turkish agendas predate 2023, the October 7 attack and its aftermath have significantly impacted both. In contrast, the Israeli agenda is a more recent development, emerging directly in response to the terrorist attack of October 7. These three agendas largely operate in opposition to one another.

The Israeli agenda aims to safeguard national security and establish conditions that prevent future hostile attacks against Israel—such as those carried out over the past year and a half by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraqi Shiite militias supported by Iran), and Iran itself.

The Iranian agenda seeks to expand Tehran’s regional influence, primarily through Shiite militias and forces, as well as certain Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This network is often referred to as the “Axis of Resistance” when it includes both Shiite and Sunni militias, and as the “Shiite Crescent” when composed solely of Shiite elements. The project contributes to regional instability, state fragmentation, and weakened governments, and is characterized by a militant and often terrorist nature. This agenda is broadly aimed at opposing Israel and American interests in the region.

The Turkish agenda blends nationalism and Islamism, aiming to assert influence through groups aligned with Turkish nationalist ideology and Islamist movements—particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, which is heavily supported by Qatar. This agenda occasionally takes on a terrorist dimension, especially through its support for militias such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed factions in northeastern Syria and the Kurdish regions of Rojava. These groups are designated as terrorist organizations by several international entities, including the United States and the United Nations.

Following Israel’s devastating strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah, along with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, the Iranian axis has suffered a major setback and is considerably weaker than it was prior to 2023. This decline has been counterbalanced by the growing influence of Israel and Turkey, particularly in the Syrian arena. However, it is still premature to conclude that the Iranian project in the region has come to an end.

All three political agendas have their own supporters, though the nature and type of support vary. The Iranian project is backed by Shiite groups and some Sunni factions across the region. During the Assad era, Syria supported it directly.

The Turkish project, meanwhile, is supported by Turkish-nationalist minorities in the region—particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan—as well as by Islamist groups, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, which represents the core of its ideological backing. Qatar is the most prominent regional supporter of the Turkish project. Notably, Turkey, Qatar, and the Iranian axis all share common ground in their support for Hamas.

In contrast, the Israeli project is primarily supported at the international level, especially by the United States. While this support is highly influential, the lack of local or regional allies may limit its impact on the ground. In other words, while the Iranian and Turkish agendas benefit from local support networks, the Israeli agenda currently lacks this dimension. Although countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not hostile to Israel, they have yet to provide explicit or effective support for its broader strategic vision.

So, how can Israel address this deficiency? Does the absence of Jewish minorities or movements in the region necessarily mean it cannot build local support?

The answer is no. There are important strategic opportunities for Israel to resolve this impasse, one of the most significant being the Kurds. Israel should recognize the strategic importance of the Kurds—who constitute the largest stateless nation in the world and represent a key demographic across the region. The Kurds do not harbor hostility toward Jews or Israel, and they are present in four major regional powers: Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq—all of which are strategically and competitively sensitive to Israel. The Kurds maintain the strongest military group in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and have an official autonomous region in Iraq—the Kurdistan Region—both of which are US partners. This unique positioning gives the Kurds substantial potential as a regional partner. Engaging with them more actively could enhance Israel’s ability to build a network of local allies—thus strengthening the long-term sustainability and influence of the Israeli project. While there have been positive official Israeli statements in this regard, they must now be translated into concrete and practical actions.

Furthermore, despite their differences and rivalry, the Iranian and Turkish agendas converge in their opposition to Kurdish ambitions, as well as in their support for Hamas and hostility toward Israel. This shared threat should serve as an additional reason for Israel and the Kurds to pursue strategic cooperation and rapprochement.

Through its unique relationship with the United States, Israel can provide various forms of diplomatic and political support to Kurdish entities—such as the Kurdistan Region and Rojava—as well as to Kurdish aspirations in other parts of Kurdistan, particularly in Turkey and Iran, where Kurds have long suffered, and continue to suffer, from oppression and a lack of power and support. For example, though not exclusively, Syria presents significant opportunities for cooperation between Israel and the Kurds. The Kurds in Rojava (northeastern Syria) rely heavily on the continued US military presence to maintain their de facto autonomy, which protects them from attacks by Turkey and its allied militias. In this context, Israel could play a vital role by leveraging its influence in Washington to advocate for a sustained American military commitment in Syria.

Moreover, a strong Kurdish presence in Syria would serve as a buffer against Turkish expansion and influence—an emerging strategic concern that could, in the future, pose a threat to Israel comparable to that of Iran. In short, the Kurds have the potential to diminish the influence of both Turkish and Iranian agendas while strengthening Israel’s position in the region. Aware of the potential for Israeli-Kurdish cooperation, Turkey has acted swiftly in an attempt to undermine any such alignment. One notable example is Ankara’s rapid initiation of peace talks with the Kurds—an apparent attempt to distance them from Israel, disarm their forces, and weaken their regional position. Therefore, Israel and the Kurds—especially in Syria—must begin cooperation, dialogue, and realistic, practical steps in this regard before it is too late.