Ukraine, ‘Coalition of the Willing’

DID YOU MEAN REASSURANCE? An unpredictable Venture in the unknown  

26 countries of the coalition of the willings, allies of Kyiv, have declared themselves ready to participate in this new form of security cordon, version 2025. The only land border that separates the two belligerents is more than 1,500 km long. Measures must therefore also be added in the air and at sea.

Since no details of this formula have been disclosed, we can only speculate – is it a version similar to UNIFIL in the Middle East, which has proven completely ineffective since its deployment in Lebanon in 1978, or an African-style version like MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, present since 2010, where the number of victims and millions of displaced people keeps rising? This demonstrates the UN’s powerlessness to deal with the conflict between Russia, as permanent member of the Security Council, and its neighbor. This explains why the United States and Europe try intervening outside a UN mandate.

What We Think We Understand

The United States must still provide assurances in the event of a ceasefire or peace agreement, which still seems very far off. Especially after Moscow has just stated that “the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine would be considered hostile and therefore legitimate targets, and treated as such.”

The coalition can only be a complementary and useful part for Washington if President Trump manages to bend Russia, its fellow member on the Security Council. He has made it clear that the coalition would bear the full weight of this initiative. This aligns with the coalition’s position that considers its initiative vital for Europe. This automatically implies significant financial commitments for a Europe in which some countries clearly cannot afford such security ambitions.

WHO PAYS AND HOW

On May 27, the Council of the European Union (which has no military function within the EU) decided to create a defense fund of 150 billion euros. This instrument, called SAFE (Security Action for Europe), will allow the EU to raise capital on financial markets to grant loans to member states and finance strategic equipment mainly bought in the USA.

It is part of the 800-billion-euro “ReArm Europe” plan aimed at equipping Europe with a genuine defense industrial base. Since 2024, military budget expenditures have literally skyrocketed. Europe leads this growth with $639 billion, in line with the American demand that these budgets reach 3% of GDP, while NATO, of which France is a member, has set its ambition at 5%. Only by resorting to massive borrowing with rising interest rates will states be able to finance these objectives, which are in complete opposition to the economic and social problems Europeans are facing.

WHAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD BE COMMITTING TO

The concept of reassurance in terms of borders, in a political/diplomatic context, or rather in a more concrete sense (physical border security, control, military).
The diplomatic stage has already been crossed.

What comes next

The coalition intends to be present as a complement to American assurances, which remain unknown at this time:

1. General definition
   Border reassurance aims to:

• Deter any violation or external aggression.
• Prevent cross-border tensions (migration, trafficking, armed infiltrations).
• Reassure regarding the state’s ability to protect its territory.
  It is both a defensive function and a political signal.

2. Means of security reassurance x3: on land, in the air, and at sea
   a) Military presence and security forces

• Deployment of additional troops in sensitive border areas.
• Establishment of rapid reaction forces.
• Organization of patrols.

b) Infrastructure and surveillance technologies

• Construction or modernization of border posts (customs, checkpoints).
• Use of video surveillance, drones, sensors, and radars to monitor flows.
• Installation of physical barriers (walls, fences, anti-intrusion systems) where the threat is high.

c) Bilateral and multilateral cooperation

• Integration into broader frameworks (except NATO or the EU, for military deterrence).

d) Existing political and psychological measures

1. Strategic objectives
2. Internal stability: prevent local tensions and reassure border populations.
3. External deterrence: send a clear signal to state or non-state actors tempted to test border vulnerabilities.
4. Crisis prevention: avoid border incidents escalating into armed conflict.
5. Strengthening sovereignty: show that the state exercises effective and continuous control over its territory.
6. Limits and challenges

• Very high cost: infrastructure, technology, and military deployments represent heavy budget burdens.
• Relative effectiveness: a “watertight” border does not exist; trafficking and infiltrations always find alternative routes.

4. Concrete examples

• European Union (Frontex), with very mixed results.
• NATO (Eastern Europe): deployment of troops and equipment in Poland and the Baltic states to reassure against the Russian threat.
• Sahel region in Africa: establishment of joint forces (G5 Sahel). Massacres continue.
• Middle East: failure of UNIFIL. Israel deploys technological barriers to limit infiltrations.
• Negative political effects: over-militarization of a border perceived as provocation. This has already been announced and rejected.

5. Recommended actions

Short term (immediate, 0–6 months)

• Reinforce visible presence: deployment of additional forces (military, gendarmes, border guards) at sensitive points.
• Mixed patrols (armed forces).
• Vulnerability assessment: updated mapping of weak points (unsupervised areas, clandestine routes, trafficking corridors).

Medium term (6 months – 2 years)

• Technological modernization: surveillance drones, radars, thermal cameras, sensors.
• Border infrastructure: rehabilitation of border posts, improvement of access roads for forces.
• Bilateral/regional cooperation: intelligence agreements and joint operations (Frontex or G5 Sahel model revised and improved?).

Long term (2–5 years)

• Integrated security approach: combine local economic development (jobs, public services) with military security.
• Institutionalization of cooperation: creation of joint commands or cross-border coordination centers.
• Rapid reaction capacity.
• Strengthening alliances: integration of national systems into multilateral frameworks.

FINANCING THROUGH DEBT

Who pays? Who decides who pays, and how much it will cost? The people have not been consulted and have decided nothing.

Here are the updated figures (early 2025) on the public debt-to-GDP ratio for the largest European countries, including Greece and the United Kingdom, source: European Commission:

Public debt (% of GDP) before the Coalition of the Willing

• Greece retains the highest debt rate in Europe, around 152% of GDP, although slightly improving. (European Commission, Reuters, Economy and Finance)
• United Kingdom has an estimated ratio of about 95.5% early 2025, close to the 100% of GDP threshold. (ons.gov.uk, The Times, Reuters, Statista)
• Italy (~138%), France (~114%), Spain (~103%) are all above the European average, but far behind Greece.
• Germany, with ~62%, remains well below the average and one of the most solid profiles.

Main buyers of European debt (sovereign bonds such as French OATs, German Bunds, Italian BTPs, etc.) are divided into several large categories:

Buyers of public debt – Europe (comparative profile)

Conclusion

Reassurance, in a security perspective, is both a military instrument and a political message. However, it only makes sense and is effective in direct relation to the yet-unformulated assurance of the United States and the actual means implemented. Moreover, it is not intended to be the front line but rather in support. Given the multiple conditions to be met and the new constraints it will create in all the countries involved, it is a vicious circle that can only translate into new challenges and just as many uncertainties about Europe’s ability to obtain and maintain a peace whose form and real price no one yet knows.