Ukraine, Russia, Europe: War of Attrition or Return of Reality?
The uncomfortable question that will not be discussed at the G7 Summit in Evian: Hormuz is much closer to Paris than maps suggest, and Moscow lies almost within Europe’s own backyard.
Prologue
The signals are multiplying, suggesting that something has changed.
They are coming first from the leading figures of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing.” The German Chancellor is in a very difficult position. France is not faring much better. The United Kingdom is as divided as ever.
President Zelensky has just declared that he is prepared—or perhaps eager—to meet Vladimir Putin face-to-face “to end the war.”
Does Europe still possess the political, economic, demographic, and institutional resources necessary to simultaneously support its own recovery, Ukraine’s reconstruction, and a prolonged confrontation with Russia? The conflict with Iran only increases the stakes for Europe, which cannot maintain its current posture indefinitely.
Behind the ongoing fighting in Ukraine lies a question far larger than the fate of the Donbas or Crimea alone. The war has become a revealing test of the weaknesses and contradictions running through the European continent as a whole. Persistent corruption in Ukraine, Europe’s economic slowdown, the energy crisis, accelerated rearmament, agricultural tensions, and growing uncertainty about American commitment are all factors that, taken together, could push the conflict in a direction very different from what was envisioned at the outset of the war.
THE STRATEGIES AT PLAY
The real question may no longer be who will win the war, but which system can sustain its political, economic, and social costs the longest.
Russia and the Strategy of Time
For Putin, the gains achieved in 2014 are not merely territorial acquisitions.
Crimea has become a central element of Russia’s security architecture, its control of the Black Sea, and the national political narrative constructed over more than a decade.
For the Russian leadership, relinquishing Crimea would amount to acknowledging a major strategic defeat. Such an outcome appears highly unlikely today, regardless of the Kremlin’s future political evolution.
The Russian president now seems to be betting on a strategy of attrition.
His calculation is relatively straightforward: Western democracies are constrained by elections, budgetary pressures, and fluctuations in public opinion. Moscow is wagering that time may gradually weaken Western support for Ukraine.
This does not mean Russia is immune from difficulties. Sanctions, military spending, and human losses also weigh heavily on the country.
Yet the Kremlin appears convinced that its adversaries may tire before it does.
Ukraine: Between Resistance and Structural Weaknesses
Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience.
Yet beneath this national determination lies a persistent vulnerability: corruption.
Since 2014, genuine progress has been made. Specialized institutions have been established, investigations have targeted influential figures, and Western partners continue to exert pressure for greater transparency.
However, recent scandals involving the energy sector, public procurement, and reconstruction projects serve as reminders that oligarchic networks inherited from the post-Soviet era have not completely disappeared.
This issue is far more than a moral concern.
Corruption represents a major strategic risk.
It can undermine public trust, discourage investment, complicate reconstruction efforts, and above all raise concerns among Western donors financing a substantial portion of Ukraine’s war effort.
The Afghan experience remains present in many minds. When Western publics begin to believe that funds are disappearing into opaque networks, political support tends to erode.
In the long run, Ukraine must win two battles: defending its sovereignty against Russia and modernizing its own system of governance.
Historical Narratives and Moral Attrition
In this context of prolonged exhaustion, Ukrainian authorities have also multiplied memorial initiatives aimed at strengthening national cohesion.
The recent repatriation of the remains of several historical figures of Ukrainian nationalism—some of whom remain controversial because of their past proximity to Nazi Germany or their alleged involvement in violence against civilian populations—fits within this broader effort.
Beyond the historical debate itself, these initiatives reflect the search for unifying symbols in a society facing a long war, heavy human losses, and growing uncertainty regarding the outcome of the conflict.
A EUROPEAN UNION CONFRONTED WITH ITS OWN CONTRADICTIONS
The war comes at a time when the European Union is already facing an accumulation of challenges, including the Iranian crisis and its potentially major energy consequences.
Weak growth, declining industrial competitiveness, demographic aging, costly energy transition policies, rising defense spending, and budgetary tensions have created an especially difficult environment.
The possible accession of Ukraine—even if it remains a distant prospect for now—adds yet another layer of complexity.
Ukraine is one of the world’s major agricultural powers.
Its integration into the European Union would inevitably disrupt the balance of the Common Agricultural Policy.
For France, Poland, Romania, and Spain, the consequences could be significant. Redistribution of subsidies, increased competition in grain markets, and greater budgetary requirements could generate new tensions.
The European Union already struggles to reach compromises among twenty-seven member states.
Integrating a country as large, populous, and costly to rebuild as Ukraine would likely represent the greatest institutional challenge in the Union’s history.
The Ukrainian question is therefore not merely geopolitical.
It directly affects the future of the European project itself, colliding with difficulties that Europeans have thus far been unable to resolve.
AN AMERICA LESS AVAILABLE
Since 2022, American support has been one of the essential pillars of Ukraine’s resistance.
But Washington’s strategic priorities are evolving.
Competition with China, public debt, domestic political tensions, migration issues, and reindustrialization now occupy an increasingly central place in American debates.
If this trend continues, Europe may be required to assume a growing share of the financial and military burden of supporting Kyiv.
This raises a fundamental question:
Does the European Union truly possess the means to replace the United States over the long term?
The answer remains uncertain.
HORMUZ, MOSCOW, AND THE RETURN OF GEOGRAPHY
This may be the most underestimated variable of all.
Since 2022, the European Union has undertaken a major effort to reduce its energy dependence on Russia.
But this strategy comes at a cost.
European industry—particularly German industry—must now operate with energy prices that are likely to remain significantly higher than those that contributed to its economic strength for decades.
Chemicals, metallurgy, fertilizers, automotive manufacturing, and several strategic sectors are seeing their competitiveness decline relative to the United States, the Middle East, and Asia.
This situation could become even more acute in the event of another global energy crisis.
A closure of the Strait of Hormuz, prolonged instability in the Middle East, or a surge in liquefied natural gas prices would directly affect European economies.
In many ways, Europe is already feeling the impact.
Under such circumstances, some governments could face a difficult choice: continue indefinitely on a path of strategic rupture with Moscow, or prioritize the economic and industrial survival of the continent.
A gradual resumption of certain energy ties with Russia could then emerge not as an ideological choice, but as an economic necessity.
Such a development would represent a major geopolitical shift.
It would likely entail a reassessment of sanctions, partial normalization of economic relations, and a redefinition of European strategic priorities.
For Moscow, it would serve as confirmation that time and attrition are working in its favor.
ATTRITION AS THE FINAL ARBITER
The true actor in this war may ultimately be time itself.
Attrition affects armies, public finances, institutions, public opinion, and alliances simultaneously.
It gradually transforms political objectives.
A war launched with the ambition of total victory can end with a compromise that none of the parties originally envisioned.
Today, none of the actors is prepared to yield.
Ukraine refuses to abandon its sovereignty.
Russia refuses to relinquish what it regards as its strategic gains.
The European Union hesitates between political solidarity and economic constraints.
Yet when one combines persistent corruption in Ukraine, a Europe under budgetary pressure, an America increasingly focused on its own priorities, a prolonged energy crisis, and a Russia convinced that time is on its side, a particular scenario becomes conceivable.
Not a total victory for one side over the other.
But a compromise imposed by attrition, economic realities, and the return of geographical constraints.
Conclusion
History shows that wars rarely end when one side achieves everything it originally sought.
They usually end when economic, demographic, and political realities become stronger than the ambitions that launched them.
The real question may no longer be who will win the war, but which actor will reach its threshold of strategic exhaustion first.
Hormuz is much closer to Paris than maps suggest, and Moscow lies almost within Europe’s own backyard.
Governments come and go. Alliances evolve. Conflicts eventually burn themselves out.
Geography endures.
Such is our world.
