The Blogs: USA, Iran, Israel, Beirut: Historic Principles of Sovereignty and Non-Interference

In recent weeks, public debate in Israel has focused primarily on one aspect of the emerging agreement between the United States and Iran: Lebanon.

Critics of the agreement have argued that provisions relating to Lebanese sovereignty and the cessation of military operations could limit Israel’s freedom of action against Hezbollah. These are important concerns that deserve serious discussion. Yet alongside this debate, another aspect of the agreement has received far less attention:

What exactly does the agreement require Iran to stop doing?

According to the framework document known as the “14-Point Agreement,” signed by the President of the United States and the President of Iran as the basis for the current negotiations, the parties and their allies commit to the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. They further undertake not to initiate war or military operations against one another, to refrain from threats or the use of force, and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

Most discussion in Israel has focused on what these provisions could mean for Israel.

Far less attention has been given to what they may mean for Iran.

For more than four decades, Iran’s regional strategy has been built on a combination of military deterrence, support for proxy organizations, and ideological confrontation with Israel. Iranian leaders repeatedly spoke of the eventual disappearance of the “Zionist regime.” In 2015, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that Israel would not survive the next 25 years. In 2019, he clarified that Iran’s objective was not the destruction of the Jewish people but the end of the State of Israel as a “Zionist regime.” At the same time, support for Hezbollah, Palestinian militant organizations, and, in recent years, the Houthis in Yemen became central pillars of Iran’s regional policy.

Against this background, an Iranian signature on a document committing the country to end the state of war, refrain from threats and the use of force, and respect the sovereignty of neighboring states represents a significant political development in its own right.

One may argue, of course, that the real question is not what is written in the agreement but whether Iran will actually honor it. That is a legitimate concern. History is filled with agreements that were only partially implemented or interpreted differently by the parties involved.

Yet agreements also carry significance in themselves.

For many years, Israel argued in international forums that Iran’s nuclear program could not be separated from the threats repeatedly voiced by its leaders against Israel. The concern was not only about technological capability but also about declared intentions.

The current framework appears, at least on paper, to address both issues simultaneously.

Article 8 reportedly commits Iran not to possess nuclear weapons. Article 1 commits it to ending the state of war and refraining from threats or the use of force. Article 14 reportedly provides for the final agreement to be brought before the United Nations Security Council, giving it a broader international framework and legitimacy.

However, there is another aspect of the agreement that is rarely mentioned in the Israeli debate: the connection between political change and economic incentives.

Article 6 reportedly calls for the establishment of a $300 billion assistance fund for the Islamic Republic of Iran in cooperation with regional partners. Article 7 addresses the removal of economic sanctions imposed on Iran over the years. Critics often present these provisions as major concessions by the West. In reality, their implementation is far from automatic.

Economic benefits on such a scale would require significant legal and political steps within the United States and, in many cases, the involvement of Congress. Moreover, they remain subject to existing American laws that restrict foreign assistance and financial transfers to states or entities involved in terrorism or threatening U.S. allies.

This means that the full implementation of Articles 6 and 7 would require more than agreement on nuclear issues. It would also require behavioral changes that could be presented credibly to American lawmakers and the international community. It is difficult to imagine unprecedented levels of international investment or broad sanctions relief being justified if Iran continues to pursue policies of confrontation, threats, or support for armed groups operating against other states in the region.

In this sense, Articles 6 and 7 are not merely economic incentives. They may also serve as long-term mechanisms of oversight and pressure, linking Iran’s future conduct to its ability to enjoy the benefits of the agreement.

If these provisions remain part of the final agreement, the result would be something broader than a nuclear deal.

Unlike the 2015 nuclear agreement, which focused primarily on uranium enrichment, inspections, centrifuges, and sanctions, the current framework appears to link nuclear restrictions with a broader commitment to regional de-escalation, respect for state sovereignty, the reduction of military threats, and a pathway for Iran’s reintegration into the international economy.

None of this guarantees success.

Negotiations are still underway, many details remain unresolved, and several issues are likely to remain controversial for years to come.

Yet precisely for that reason, another question deserves to be asked—one that is rarely heard in the Israeli discussion:

If Iran is formally committing itself not to possess nuclear weapons, to end the state of war, to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors, and to abandon the rhetoric of threats that characterized much of its policy over the past four decades, is that not in itself a significant political and psychological shift worthy of recognition?

The real test may not be what is signed today, but what happens in the years ahead. Nevertheless, the transition from a language of perpetual confrontation to a formal commitment to non-aggression is a historic development that deserves serious consideration.

The debate over the agreement is important. But to conduct it fully and fairly, we must examine not only the limitations it may impose on Israel, but also the changes it demands from Iran. If implemented, the agreement’s greatest achievement may ultimately lie not only in the nuclear sphere, but in its attempt to reshape patterns of conflict that have defined the Middle East for decades.