Victory or Defeat in War, Leaders Lose Their Government

Remember what happened to Churchill right after WWII ended? He lost the election. Not to mention Menachem Begin resigning from depression after the First Lebanon War. A lesson for the Israeli and Hamas leadership today: “winning” a war can easily be a pyrrhic victory – “victorious” in battle and defeated in politics. That seems to be the direction Israel’s governing coalition is headed; ditto for Hamas in Gaza.

First, Israel. Until Oct. 7, 2023, there was a decent chance that the Netanyahu government would be able to pass legislation basically freeing almost all ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) from military service. That’s been the case de facto from 1948 onwards but Israel’s High Court of Justice put an end to that, barring specific legislation. So under massive haredi party threat, the government began working to pass such legislation. However, the ensuing brutal war in Gaza has effectively put an end to that, given the IDF’s increasing manpower needs that has also translated into opposition to the (non-)draft law on the part of a few critical coalition parties (e.g., the national religious camp; certain key members of the Likud).

Given the Haredi parties’ threats to leave the government (for them, this is – sorry for the pun – politically “do or die”), and the equally rock-solid opposition of quite a number of coalition members, it is hard to see how Bibi will square this circle. And the clock is ticking, because according to the Basic Law: Knesset, if the national budget is not passed by March 31 (the Haredim won’t support it until they get their law passed), new elections are called automatically. In short, whether one considers Israel to have won “total victory,” partial victory, or “we’ll continue fighting,” the government is in serious danger of falling in six weeks, mainly because of an “ancillary” issue (the draft law) and not due to any war outcome (Churchill lost the election because of the devastated economy – not due to his conduct of the war).

Moving over to Hamas, whatever one thinks of their war outcome (they’re trying to put a brave face on the devastation: “victory”?!?), they too face a governing dilemma – actually a “trilemma”: three basic options, none of which are particularly salutary from their perspective.

First, they could focus on rehabilitating their military capabilities and letting some “technocratic” government actually run civilian services. In effect, this is the Lebanon “Hezbollah Model,” and we know how that turned out for that beleaguered country. Indeed, given the enormously high level of civilian infrastructure destruction it is doubtful that the Gazan population itself would stand for large amounts of money going to rearming. Moreover, there’s almost no one in the Moslem world who would finance reconstruction under such conditions (Iran is the sole possibility—but their economy is in shambles too).

A second approach would have Hamas try to reconcile with the PLA (Fatah) and form a “unity” government, letting Abbas and company run Gaza, with Hamas a power behind the throne, biding its time until it could take over complete control in the West Bank and Gaza. Perhaps with the PLA in “control,” reconstruction financing could be found among some Arab countries – but they would all be very wary. Why? Because as they say in Hebrew: “we’ve seen this movie already.” In 2007 Hamas threw out the PLA from Gaza in a bloody takeover; why would the latter trust Hamas now? In fact, there have been several “reconciliation” negotiations over the past two decades between these two mortal enemies with little to show for them. Among other aspects, Fatah is secular; Hamas is extremely religious.

For such an agreement to work, Hamas would have to give up its weapons – almost unthinkable, as it would be conceding its very reason for being (eliminating Israel). And it’s not as if Hamas is the only militant group out there – there are several who would be very willing to take on the mantle of militancy against Israel.

A third and final possibility would be for Hamas to start from the beginning: try to consolidate its rule over Gaza, signing a truce with Israel for a specific (relatively long) period: no violence during that period. That might perhaps be enough to get Moslem reconstruction financing, although here too: why pay to rebuild Gaza when another war could break out in ten years?

Israel, of course, would not be in any mood for such a temporary truce. But even if it were, over the years Hamas has proven itself to be a far better military force than a civilian governing apparatus. And lacking any serious reconstruction, it is doubtful that the Gazans’ anger at mismanagement could be contained. Thus, going back to the pre-war situation is also not very attractive for Hamas.

Add to all this the growing divide between Gazan (military) Hamas and the overseas (political) Hamas, and one can see the very bad situation that Hamas is left with. Not to mention growing international pressure (Arab and Western) to set up a government in Gaza that shunts Hamas aside.

Altogether then, Israel’s ruling government and Gaza’s rulers are rediscovering the old adage: you know how wars start, but you never can tell how they will end. That’s true militarily – and no less, politically as well.