Washington’s Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan Needs Rebalancing

Will Trump be the president to lose Ukraine or will he take the steps necessary to ensure its autonomy going forward?

This increasingly appears to be the question facing the White House as talks are underway on the 28-point peace plan — largely supporting Moscow’s terms– negotiated in Miami by Putin’s special envoy Kirill Dmitriev and U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

According to U.S. National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the plan is a “living, breathing document” that has undergone revisions over the past 48 hours and is subject to additional changes.

The proposal — which calls for Ukraine to halve its military forces, relinquish land it already controls, agree to receive no weapons aid from the West and to deny outside military support on Ukrainian soil– caves to nearly all of Moscow’s demands and is a non-starter for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

In the plan’s original form, NATO membership is ruled out for Kyiv and leaves Ukraine as a diminished state with undefined security guarantees from its supporters. Additionally, Ukraine would be required to withdraw from the areas of Donetsk that it currently controls, while Russia would take Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea as well as the areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson that it currently possesses.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s military forces would be forbidden from expanding, the NATO alliance would be restricted to its current size and Moscow would have a say in where NATO positions its forces in Europe.

Other aspects of the plan include putting Russia on a path for reengaging the U.S. on economic cooperation agreements, returning Moscow to the Group of 8 nations and granting sanctions relief and amnesty for Russian war crimes.

It bears saying that it is Moscow, not Ukraine, that refuses to stop wartime operations. Political scientist Ian Bremmer attributes this in part to Mr. Trump’s support of the 28-point peace plan and due to the divisions within the European Union on Ukraine war policy.

This environment allows Russia to continue its aggression and has put Russia in a stronger military position than just last year.

If such a Moscow-friendly deal were enacted, the U.S. and Taiwan would be at greater risk from Chinese aggression. Beijing would likely conclude that President Trump and his team do not have the will to defend the island.

Mr. Trump’s favorable treatment of Putin is understandable, even commendable in some ways. His desire to end the war, to reset relations with Moscow, to renegotiate nuclear arms control agreements and to create a flourishing commercial relationship benefiting the American and Russian peoples is arguably good.

Nonetheless, positive relations with Russia should not come at the cost of Putin conquering democratic Ukraine nor accepting invasions of other friendly countries’ borders. Similar past conflicts on European soil were factors in pulling the U.S. into two world wars.

To remedy these unbalanced terms for Ukraine, the White House should consider the following:

• To prevent a Putin victory on the battlefield now and to deter future invasions, Ukraine needs to have the freedom to purchase weapons in adequate supply. A lack of access to offensive and defensive systems will leave Ukraine vulnerable to a takeover by Russia.

• Give Ukraine Tomahawk missiles to use against Russian gas and oil facilities for the purposes of further damaging Russia’s economy. By limiting Putin’s ability to export its liquid gold, less revenue will fill Moscow’s coffers to fund its war. The 1,000-pound precision Tomahawk warheads that travel at the speed of sound ought to be used against energy installations, drone factories and military airfields across Russia.

• Continue providing American intelligence to the Ukrainian military to improve the targeting of military and energy sites within Russia and to monitor Putin’s attacks on Ukraine from the skies.

• Washington needs to provide Kyiv with a NATO-like Article 5 security guarantee following the conclusion of the current war. While controversial, this measure is needed to keep Russia at bay after present hostilities have ceased. Putin’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances — which pledged not to attack Ukraine in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its nuclear arsenal– shattered trust and must be met with military deterrence on the part of Washington and Europe.

Additionally, a clear, ironclad promise of security to Ukraine will provide another key element for striking a peace deal: it will persuade President Zelensky that he must cede territory already lost to Russia as part of an agreement to end the war.

• Security assurances will require long-term attention spans on the part of America’s policymakers for the purposes of dissuading future invasions by Moscow and building sustained peace in Eastern Europe. Regular engagement of Moscow, Kyiv, EU and NATO states will be necessary in the years ahead to maintain both deterrence and communication among all parties.

• Washington needs to assert pressure on Belgium, Slovakia and the EU to release the US$160 billion in frozen Russian assets to support the Ukrainian wartime economy. In doing so, the Trump administration should provide assurances to Brussels that it will work to protect it from potential Russian reprisals. The prospect of using Russian state assets should also be used as leverage in negotiations with Moscow to end the war.

• Despite periodic eruptions at White House meetings, Zelensky will need to come to Washington again for negotiations with President Trump on striking a ceasefire deal along current lines of battle while not ceding to Russia land that Moscow does not control. Zelensky will need to repeatedly demonstrate gratitude to Mr. Trump and go to great lengths not to antagonize the American president.

Part of Zelensky’s task will be to demonstrate that it is Ukraine — not Russia– which is the party working with the Trump administration to achieve a peace compact.

To appeal to Mr. Trump, Zelensky would be well served to advocate for a continuation of the PURL program, which is the profitable weapons assistance arrangement that sells American-made weapons to NATO allies for use by Ukraine.

• In spite of current difficulties with U.S.-China relations, Mr. Trump will need to be in regular consultation with Xi Jinping about increasing pressure on Putin to end the war.

• Strong sanctions against Russia are in order. Although Putin’s ability to fund his war in Ukraine has been waning with its national sovereign wealth fund decreasing from US$135 billion in 2022 to US$35 billion today, further pressure on Moscow’s ability to fund the war is needed.

U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham’s “Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025” — which puts a 500% tariff on Russian goods and on nations (notably China and India) that purchase Russian energy– ought to be passed by Congress and signed by President Trump. Although Senator Graham’s bill is being used as a stick to bring Putin to the negotiating table, it ought to be passed into law without delay as a demonstration of resolve and support for ending hostilities.

Ultimately, it is Vladimir Putin who set out to conquer Ukraine and who initiated this humanitarian tragedy. Putin’s insistence that Kyiv forfeit land that Russian forces have been unable to seize demonstrates disrespect for the Ukrainian and American peoples, President Trump and European partners.

Putin needs to be matched with steadfastness to convince him that it will be too costly to continue his war, and Europe must continue providing a financial lifeline to Kyiv during this critical phase.

Now is the time to arm Ukraine, preserve the territory it currently possesses, strike Russian energy infrastructure and drive a hard bargain in negotiations.