What Would You Have Israel Do?

Since October 7, the conflict involving Israel, the United States, and Iran has generated no shortage of commentary and concern. It has also generated a striking absence: a serious answer to what should be done. Commentary and concern, however sincere, are not enough.

Criticism has been abundant—of leadership, rhetoric, timing, temperament, political consequences, and global repercussions. These critiques may be valid, but they share a common evasion. They rarely answer the question that actually matters: What would you have Israel do?

Much of the international discussion has also collapsed into a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu. He is an easy target—polarizing and often his own worst messenger. Reasonable people can object to his conduct and motives; I do. But even if every criticism is granted, it does not answer the question at hand. Leadership can be replaced. The constraints cannot.

So the question remains: what would you have Israel do?

This is not a rhetorical device. It is the dividing line between analysis and avoidance. Any position that cannot answer it—clearly, and under real-world constraints—is not a strategy. It is a critique without consequence.

Start with Gaza. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew—removing every soldier, every settlement, every civilian presence. The territory was left with the opportunity to develop into self-governing entity.

It did not.

Instead, Gaza became a base of operations for Hamas—a designated terrorist organization—sustained financially, militarily, and ideologically by Iran. Resources that might have gone into civil infrastructure were diverted into tunnels, rockets, and indoctrination. The outcome was not ambiguous. It culminated in the atrocities of October 7.

So again: what would you have Israel do? Recreate the conditions that led here? Withdraw again and expect it to work this time?

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has articulated—consistently and publicly—its objectives: the destruction of Israel, hostility toward the United States, and the export of its revolutionary Islamist ideology. These are reflected in both rhetoric and sustained state action.

Operationally, Iran has pursued these aims through what Israeli analysts have long described as a “ring of fire”—a network of proxy forces including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militant factions among the Palestinians. This is strategic encirclement. That network did not remain theoretical: it activated almost immediately after October 7, with Hezbollah attacking from the north on October 8 and the Houthis launching long-range missiles later that month.

At the same time, Iran has advanced a ballistic missile program and, according to numerous international assessments, maintained a nuclear program marked by obfuscation, partial compliance, and periods of restricted access to international inspectors. Debate persists over Iran’s nuclear intent—but uncertainty does not stabilize deterrence. It destabilizes it.

So the question becomes unavoidable: what would you have the United States do?

Accept a nuclear-threshold Iran and rely on deterrence? Trust a regime with a decades-long record of proxy warfare to behave as a status-quo power? Continue negotiations that have produced delay rather than resolution?

Or take action—imperfect, risky, politically costly action—to degrade that capability before it fully matures?

None of these options are clean or guaranteed to succeed. All carry consequences.

The counterarguments are serious. They hold that military action risks regional war, strengthens Iranian hardliners, and may delay rather than prevent nuclear capability. They argue that deterrence, containment, and time remain viable alternatives. They also reflect concern about Israel’s standing and the human and economic costs of the war.

These concerns are real, and they are widely shared. But without a defined alternative, they remain objections—not a plan. They do not answer the central question: how to confront a regime that has articulated genocidal intent and acted in pursuit of it, and how long Israel can be expected to absorb ongoing attacks without responding decisively.

One often-heard alternative is straightforward: “If Israel would just withdraw to the 1967 lines and recognize a Palestinian state…” But Israel has already tested that premise. In 2005, it withdrew completely from Gaza. The results are not theoretical. They are measured in years of continued terror.  The question is unavoidable: are you asking Israel to do the same thing again—and expect a different outcome?

More broadly, this is not a new problem, and prior approaches have not resolved it. These concerns, however well intentioned, do not address what measures would actually stop the violence. What is the alternative policy that addresses—rather than sidesteps—the reality of October 7, the structure of Iran’s proxy network, and the trajectory of its strategic capabilities?

If you can’t offer an alternative, it’s not a disagreement or a debate. It’s a demand.

And if we won’t answer the question, we’re asking someone else to carry the risk—right now, that means Israel.