Who Needs a Nuke when Hormuz Works Just Fine?
Iran is unlikely to relinquish its control over the Strait of Hormuz anytime soon. HOWEVER, this weapon aimed at the world economy can facilitate an agreeable security for the Middle East, including Israel. The chokehold can be core to serious negotiations and solutions.
There is an opportunity for a comprehensive and lasting agreement between America and Iran BECAUSE of Iran’s hold on the Persian Gulf, a weapon more far-reaching, flexible, and functioning than a nuclear bomb. Thanks to Netanyahu and Trump’s attacks on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz weapon is now tested and proven amazingly effective. Unlike the nuclear option, it requires no construction and costs little to maintain — a missile launched from the handlebars of a bicycle can prevent multimillion-dollar ships and cargoes from entering the critical passage.
The Trump administration must get real with negotiations. This is NO quick “Deal”
America must harness the Hormuz weapon for its own objectives before talks with Iran begin in earnest. So far, the Trump administration has participated in a twenty-one-hour high-ranking face-to-face with Iran in Pakistan, yielding few memorable results. A ping-pong of demands, threats, and bluster from both sides has since followed. With neither America nor Iran particularly willing to return to all-out combat, a ceasefire was achieved. However, it’s precarious and continues amid a dual blockade of the strait –- itself volatile. Certainly, this standoff is preferable to continued bombing, but progress toward a political solution must take hold before further outbursts of military action make negotiations even more difficult. They will take foresight and time, likely beyond Trump’s imagination and patience. Also, clever and dedicated diplomacy is essential to fashion the many parts into a workable and lasting agreement.
The Hormuz weapon can be the core around which all the settlement’s complicated parts revolve. It can offer essential stability, particularly during the negotiations, as the Iranian occupation of the Strait prevents the overwhelmingly militarily powerful America from bludgeoning Iran at every impasse of negotiation.
Iran’s own defense must be a factor in any agreement. Much like Hamas, Iran will agree to NO proposal to lay down its weapons
The military capability of Iran has been seriously diminished because of the Israeli and American attacks on its nuclear facilities in June 2025 and the assassinations of leaders and widespread destruction of its military in February 2026. Regardless of the awfulness of the Iranian administration, the security of the region (including Israel) is linked to the security of Iran. Paradoxically, an inadequate defense can pose more risk. Denying a nation (or territory) an adequate defense not only invites leisurely attacks from neighboring nations or factions (the June 2025 and February 2026 Israeli/ American attacks were an example of this), but also can cause internal chaos, which is toxic to the region. Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Gaza, and others have all struggled, suffered, and have become victims and liabilities to others when their defenses were inadequate (the Lebanese government became hostage to Hezbollah in part because its defenses opposing Israel were weak).
The control of the Strait of Hormuz is arguably a more desirable defense for Iran than a nuclear bomb and lessens the need for regional buffers such as those provided by Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. The Hormuz weapon needs neither building nor testing, and militarized proxy states can commit rogue actions counter to Iranian interests (Hamas’s horrific October 7 attack on Israel is arguably an example of this).
Unfortunately, a resolution to the decades-long hatred, vengeance, anger, fear, and mistrust between Israel and Iran, honed by their respective leaders for decades and recently intensified by Netanyahu and Trump’s war, is a Herculean task that will demand imagination, patience, discipline, and relaxation of preconceived notions. But if an abundance of pragmatism can be sought, mustered, and maintained, progress to greater regional security and prosperity can be achieved.
Today’s relative quiet on the Iran/American front will not last, and we must quickly move to a more stable path
The American side is especially adrift: Trump’s administration appears to be waiting for some wind or tide to sweep the American president to victory and return home. Alas, such a miracle is less likely to occur than a new eruption of violence, given the precarious standoff.
From Trump, there is more than a hint of denial that a war has taken place and that leaving the scene is perfectly reasonable. New York Times correspondent David Sanger described Trump’s downplay of the war as a mini-war, an excursion, and, most recently, a detour from which he can return to his real interest elsewhere, which may be beautifying Washington.
America beginning serious talks with Iran is the viable, clear-headed option. A return to military attacks is unlikely to budge Iran in a more conciliatory direction. An American attempt to force open the Strait appears off the table — probably wise given the major undertaking, risks, and expense, and little public support for such involvement.
America must move beyond Trump’s demand tactics and present plausible goals and strategies involving time, skill, and effort
Iranian nuclear ambitions (and maybe its use of proxies) can be tempered in exchange for Iran retaining passive control over the Strait of Hormuz. This path requires concessions from both sides, but capitulation or surrender of Iran’s key defense capabilities will NEVER occur, and demanding such would render a solution all but impossible. Similar to holding an atomic bomb, the Hormuz weapon would exist as a powerful deterrent to outside attacks but not be deployed.
We should dispel the notion of a quick “Deal” and prepare for a strenuous, lengthy, and detailed negotiation with the Iranian leadership, which will entail substantial trade-offs (the JCPOA took years of dedicated work). Finding the State and National Security Departments would be a start. And from there, engaging a team of knowledgeable and clever people for specific aspects, possibly including those who successfully participated in the original nuclear 2015 agreement. Donald Trump, a golfing buddy and a son-in-law, can’t achieve a comprehensive and lasting US/Iran security agreement by themselves.
An excellent voice on the dangerous standoff between America and Iran is Danny Citrinowicz, interviewed by Fareed Zakaria, GPS on May 10, 2026.
