Why Did It Take So Long to End The War in Gaza

Donald Trump is probably the most popular person in the State of Israel. From Hostages Square to the Knesset and throughout the length and breadth of the country, American flags were raised in his honor. Almost the entire population embraced this anti-democratic president. Netanyahu even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, although the prime minister himself is perhaps the single greatest obstacle preventing a Middle East peace deal.

We seem not to mind that at home, Trump behaves like a dictator – arresting immigrant children, dispatching the military forces to cities under the control of the Democrats, indicting political rivals, retaliating against “blue” states by withholding funds, and threatening mass layoffs.

It was hardly surprising that he stood behind the podium in the Knesset far longer than planned – the man reveled in the flattery and the applause that those present in the hall lavished on him. The entire public, except for the extremist Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit parties, was grateful for the pressure he exerted on both sides, which led to the return of the hostages and the end of the war. Joe Biden, who succumbed to Netanyahu’s manipulation, failed to achieve this feat.

The Israeli right supports him because they admire his reliance on power and brute force. The left is pleased that he pressured Netanyahu to stop the war and credits him with reintroducing concepts like “peace” and “political horizon for the Palestinians” back into our lexicon.

However, the question of why it took so long remains largely unanswered. Why did Trump allow Bibi to restart the war this year, causing death and destruction, including hostages and soldiers, before applying the necessary pressure to bring the war to an end?

The answer to this question was given by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner on CBS’s 60 Minutes program: it was the reckless Israeli attack on Doha that convinced Trump to act. They expressed their feeling of betrayal. Only then did Trump realize that the “absolute victory” Netanyahu and Dermer had been selling him was nothing more than a cover for continuing endless fighting designed to facilitate the political survival of Netanyahu. There would be no agreement unless Trump imposed one.

The erosion of support for Netanyahu’s policies within Trump’s political base also convinced him to act. There is a growing resentment of Israel’s reliance on the United States among young Republicans and some prominent MAGA voices. Moreover, the timing of the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize winners also likely created a sense of urgency.

Upon finally realizing his manipulation, Trump left Netanyahu with virtually no options. The agreement, despite its many flaws that are becoming more apparent as time goes on, has led to the return of twenty living hostages and, so far, some of the deceased. We still need to guarantee the burial of all the deceased victims in Israel. While the agreement is an achievement whose importance cannot be overstated, the question remains: Could this deal have been reached earlier?

As early as May 2024, President Biden proposed a framework for a ceasefire in exchange for the release of the hostages. Netanyahu purported to agree to the framework, but at the same time was actively undermining it by claiming he could still restart the war at will. The Biden framework may have been better than Trump’s 20-point plan, but Biden failed to turn it into reality because he refrained from using his leverage to bring the war to an end. He seemed content with seeking merely to improve the conduct of the war by insisting on orderly evacuation and humanitarian aid rather than stopping it altogether and bringing the hostages home.

For the first ten months of his term, Trump, too, provided the tailwind for the never-ending war that Netanyahu sought to impose. “Bibi would call and say, ‘Can you give me this and that weapon?’ – and I hadn’t even heard of some of them, but we provided them, and they knew how to use them well,” Trump revealed in his Knesset speech.

Both Biden’s and Trump’s willingness to provide almost limitless and unrestricted weaponry to fuel Netanyahu’s war was seriously mistaken when twinned, as it was, with a prime minister ready to do anything to stay in power, even at the cost of perpetuating the war, abandoning the hostages, and sowing unimaginable destruction in Gaza.

Trump and Biden provided Netanyahu with a political, diplomatic, and military umbrella that allowed him to continue fighting without personal or political consequence. Understanding dawned in the White House somewhat belatedly, and the human cost proved catastrophic.

The events of the past few weeks should serve as a lesson for future administrations: Trump did the right thing by forcing the end of the war, albeit after a significant delay. From Israel’s perspective, it may have been more beneficial if a Democratic administration had achieved this, as it would have been better equipped to prepare a serious plan instead of one filled with deficiencies like the Trump Plan; it could have done so much earlier and imposed it on the involved parties.

The Biden Administration’s failure to grapple with the situation and its meek approach to its junior partner was a major missed opportunity – one that had devastating human, strategic and political consequences. Future Democratic leaders should take heed of this lesson.