Why Israel must establish a military administration in Gaza

As a ceasefire and hostage deal unfold in the Gaza Strip, and the IDF chief of staff and Southern Command chief announce their resignations, the Israeli security cabinet faces a critical decision that it has so far avoided taking on: whether to set up a temporary Israeli military administration in areas of Gaza that the IDF will likely seize in the future.
Israel’s military achievements against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been devastating since October 7. The IDF has killed some 20,000 terror operatives and likely seriously injured at least 10,000 others to the extent that they cannot fight, representing between 70 to 80 percent of the original fighting force. An estimated 95% of Gaza’s rocket arsenal has been destroyed, as has most of its key underground infrastructure.
Yet despite these gains, which are unprecedented in the history of urban warfare against jihadist non-state actors, Hamas continues to operate as an asymmetric guerrilla force. It would likely take at least another year for the IDF to significantly further reduce the scope of the decentralized terror cells that Hamas swiftly set up in recent months. These cells are intended to replace its mostly destroyed five brigades and 24 battalions. Hamas has ambitious plans to rebuild its strength, to prove to the Middle East that it could survive the war, and to threaten southern Israel once again, with projectiles and ground invasions.
As a hybrid military-civilian entity, Hamas never lost sight of its political ambitions. Throughout the entire war, it has leveraged international humanitarian aid entering Gaza, systematically looting supplies intended for civilians. Aid trucks are hijacked by Hamas and criminal gangs, with resources redirected to sustain terror networks and the remainder sold on markets at extortionate prices. The monopolization of aid distribution is meant to demonstrate to the local population that Hamas remains the only relevant political force.
The government has yet to announce a clear plan for Gaza, but, behind the scenes, it has reportedly wrestled with an IDF General Staff that has adamantly resisted the idea of setting up a military administration. Their opposition appears to be based on arguments of resource limitations, and concerns of how to justify future Israeli casualties that could occur during military administration-linked missions in Gaza. Yet failing to take this step would likely have a far higher cost for Israel in the form of a resurgent Hamas.
All talk of inviting international forces or alternative political frameworks to Gaza is unrealistic so long as Hamas armed cells continue to roam Gaza in significant numbers. Past international missions in the region have proven ineffective against similar threats. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for example, failed to prevent Hezbollah from rearming after the 2006 war. Hezbollah used this period to establish a vast arsenal and convert southern Lebanese villages into fortified military bases.
Similarly, the Palestinian Authority is neither capable nor truly willing to assume control of Gaza. The PA lost control of Gaza to Hamas in 2007 and has since seen its legitimacy erode further among Palestinians. The PA’s ability to hold on to power in its own administrative capital of Ramallah would likely be non-existent were it not for nightly IDF counterterror raids throughout the West Bank.
Right now, the only realistic option for preventing Hamas’s resurgence is a temporary Israeli military administration. Such an administration would allow Israel to secure critical infrastructure, ensure that humanitarian aid reaches Gazan civilians without being intercepted, and begin to stabilize Gaza. By securing hospitals, aid distribution centers, and other vital facilities, Israel could prevent Hamas from exploiting these resources to rebuild its power.
This approach would also send a clear message to Gazans that Hamas is no longer a viable governing force, undermining its influence. At first, that could enable Gazans to find the courage to cooperate with such an administration. Later, it could pave the way for an eventual hand-off to a moderate Gazan civil autonomy backed by the United States and moderate Sunni Arab countries.
While the costs of an Israeli military administration are significant, the consequences of failing to act decisively are greater. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to exploit chaos and re-entrench, and it would likely continue to exist as an underground terror movement, as it does in the West Bank. But it would not have the ability to rebuild a jihadist army that could invade southern Israel, flood Israel’s skies with rockets, act as an Iranian proxy, and challenge the long-term continuity of the Jewish state.