Without Churchill
Winston Churchill’s defeat in the first parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom after World War II still raises eyebrows: how could the British fail to support the man who had effectively saved their country—and later much of Europe—from Nazi occupation?
But the answer to this question is quite simple. Throughout his career, Churchill was an outstanding statesman, focused on the long term—but at the same time a marginal politician, unable to align himself with the logic of voters. In the end, it was precisely this marginality that allowed him to become prime minister after his predecessor, the truly prominent politician and public favorite Neville Chamberlain, suffered a fiasco. What would have happened if a politician sensitive to electoral expectations—like Chamberlain—had led the British government after his resignation? Perhaps the Conservatives would have won the elections. But it is just as likely that by then Britain would already have lost the war.
I was reminded of this striking example when I read the warning by Israel’s Chief of the General Staff, Eyal Zamir, about the need to expand conscription into the Israel Defense Forces. Wars for Israel have changed, threats have grown, and the era of “short wars and long peace” has become a thing of the past. It would seem that those who govern Israel understand this perfectly well. But at the same time, they understand that their voters will not support them in the next elections if they make unpopular decisions. So they hesitate, while the sand in the hourglass of history keeps running out. A clear paradox emerges: society recognizes the challenges and is ready to resist, yet a significant part of it does not support the unpopular decisions necessary for that resistance. And politicians, trapped in the cage of reelection—simply afraid of losing power—cannot ignore the views of that significant part of society.
What applies to Israel also applies to Ukraine. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi warned about the potential problems that could arise if difficulties with mobilization were not overcome—already at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Yet electoral logic continues to shape the actions of those in power. And this is the same paradox: society is ready to resist, but not ready for the unpopular decisions that alone can sustain and strengthen that resistance. Society comforts itself with expectations of an inevitable end to the war, while politicians comfort themselves with the inevitability of elections. And as long as neither happens, the authorities refrain from decisions that could undermine their electoral prospects.
From the point of view of winning elections, this is the only rational approach. The problem is that in countries that disappear from the political map, elections do not take place.
