A Diplomatic Horizon

In Israeli society and public debate, it is common to hear that the two-state solution is off the table. Even if you’re on the left, it is unfathomable for the average Israeli to think of peace with the Palestinians after October 7. However, as the numerous wars Israel has waged since 2023 demonstrate, ceasing hostilities does not equal peace. Or quiet, for that matter, which Israelis are more concerned about.

The current government, of course, has its own political/expansionist/ideological reasons to prolong these conflicts and block a negotiated end to them. But in the scenario that a new coalition forms, with the current state of Israeli society and the current American administration, what kind of diplomatic end is actually feasible or desirable?

Perhaps the public isn’t ready for peace, but it yearns for normalcy. While proceeding into phase 2 of the Gaza deal might cause a stir in Israeli politics, the general public has moved on from the war. A majority of Israelis, scarred by October 7, want the government to atone and take responsibility – open an official inquiry into the failings of that day. Most do not, however, wish to go back to war in Gaza.

There is then scope to aggressively promote a more permanent end to this conflict. Hamas will continue to be a bad-faith actor, but at the moment, Israel is not even posing a semblance of effort. It is actively ignoring any type of future other than prolonging the current situation, which is untenable, first for the citizens of Gaza who are still in unlivable conditions, and second for the national security of Israel.

As opposed to other Western allies of the US, Israel gleefully joined Trump’s Board of Peace – it didn’t have much choice. But nonetheless, it played ball. It fostered closer relations with the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, since the Abraham Accords and more so since the recent war with Iran, in which Israel provided the UAE with Iron Dome batteries. These relations, too, should be leveraged for regional cooperation. Instead of creating an image of (and acting like) a rogue state, Israel should strengthen the axis that is willing to balance against the influential Turkey/Qatari alignment and cooperate against Iran and its regional non-state proxies.

More importantly, Israel has peace treaties with two bordering countries, which the current government has decided to neglect. Egypt and Jordan, both American allies and beneficiaries of American aid, are the most crucial allies Israel has in the region. That these peace treaties have endured the conflict since 2023 is a testament to the durability of negotiated agreements. It shows that lasting regional realignment is more likely through diplomacy rather than (only) military might.

Now, Israel was cornered into a Trump-pressured, Iran-influenced deal with Lebanon. Israel has never had a counterpart in the Lebanese government as open to cooperation as the current one. There is a mutual desire to mitigate Hezbollah, and yet the Israeli government shows no enthusiasm to work towards any solution. Instead, it maintains a buffer zone similar to the one Israel occupied until 2000. One that cost countless lives of soldiers to no avail. The previous iterations of Israel’s wars in Lebanon have been, aptly, colloquially referred to as the Vietnam War of Israel. And yet, as if the country has amnesia, it has once again marched on the Beaufort.

Israel, not privy to the negotiations between Iran and the US in Switzerland, is in talks in Washington with Lebanon. Both talks, happening concurrently, undermine Israel. Iran has conditioned the MOU with the US on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, meaning the fate of the conflict on the northern border is decided at two locations simultaneously, in which Israel has a less significant say due to Iran’s current leverage in the Strait of Hormuz.

Now Netanyahu postures as a tough guy in the buffer zone and threatens to be a spoiler for the Americans and Iranians. Other than proving that Israel can continue to push into southern Lebanon, that policy approach achieves little.

As in anything in Israeli politics, the occupation of the West Bank is lurking in the back, always there, getting tenser every year. Even mainstream Israeli media has given up on ignoring the settler violence of recent times. There may not be any grand agreement in the near future for Israelis and Palestinians, but it seems that this government has chosen to deliberately make the situation in the West Bank worse time and time again with every policy and executive order they make.

Tightening cooperation with the PA, abandoning plans to settle area E1, curbing settler violence at a much harsher scale – that, at minimum, has to happen. Beyond that, Israel ought to shift its priorities to securing towns on the Gaza, Lebanon and Syrian borders, lest another October 7 occur. To defend its citizens against the various threats it faces in the region, the defense forces cannot be preoccupied with continuous policing and occupation of other people. The more it can be mitigated, the more stability the West Bank can attain, and the more the IDF can focus its resources on securing the borders and easing other threats.

While Israel remains passive on the diplomatic front, the other regional actors around it are not. Other than Pakistan and Qatar, the mediators between Iran and the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were influential in shaping these understandings. Similarly, regional actors are active in the reconstruction of Gaza, the future of Lebanon and the new Syrian regime.

Israelis perceive diplomacy as weak and an act that results in infringements of sovereignty and concessions to the enemy. However, if the past few years have shown us anything, it’s that there’s much to gain in influence and strategic goals through smart negotiations. By not partaking in any conversations (unless pushed by Washington), Israel lost out on many achievements that could’ve complemented its military successes.

Not only that, but by highlighting, post-Iran war, the differences in objectives between Israel and the US, Israel creates the perception that allying with Israel is now a liability. Whereas in the past, peace with Israel granted access to US support and Western markets, America’s and Israel’s interests now publicly diverge on some issues, disincentivizing other regional actors from easing relations with Israel or joining the Abraham Accords. The public isn’t asking for enduring peace, and it’s unlikely any Israeli leader will emerge willing to make that case to them. What it does want is stability – and a government competent enough to deliver an end to its wars, rather than protract them.