A Gathering Storm: The Threat from Turkey in Syria

I recently penned an article detailing the strategic threat from Turkey. In this second part of that story, I explore recent developments that, coupled with Erdoğan’s imperial ambitions, complex alliances and old rivalries, internal Turkish politics and, finally, military and economic status quo – all point in one direction: conflict between Israel and Turkey.

That conflict has the potential to be greater in death and destruction than any Israel has fought to date. While Israel correctly focuses our defenses first on Iran and her proxies, we must not ignore this other growing strategic threat.

Turkish Delight: The Fall of Assad

The recent fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—courtesy of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army—after 54 years of family control, has left a vacuum that the winning rebels lack the capacity to fill on their own. With Russia primarily focused on Europe, Turkey is poised to fill this void with relative ease, as they have already been quietly assuming control of northern Syria for over a decade.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria offers Erdoğan several strategic and geopolitical advantages. First, it reaffirms his position as a symbolic figurehead to Muslims worldwide, something long desired by Ottoman Sultans and an integral part of his vision. The importance of this cannot be overstated. As Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for symbolic control, Turkey is quietly gaining power and seizing more than just land—it is winning Muslim hearts and minds for generations to come.

More practically, Erdoğan will gain access to ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, which will allow Turkey to support prolonged naval operations in the region. This also positions Turkey to contest energy deposits off of Cyprus and Israel. By providing protection for ships carrying oil from Libya, Ankara’s potential agreement for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Syria’s new government mirrors the 2019 maritime accord it signed with Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNA). That earlier deal helped Turkey secure a foothold in the southern Mediterranean, challenging Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot claims to energy projects. Now, Ankara is using similar tactics in Syria, offering both economic and political support to enhance its influence. By controlling the northern bank, with additional footholds in the south and east, Turkey effectively secures hegemony over the eastern Mediterranean not seen since the Ottoman Empire.

The benefits don’t stop at sea. With a foothold in Syria, Erdoğan gains land access to Iraq, which in turn provides access to one of the world’s largest oil production infrastructures, further boosting his already substantial energy resources. He could also use this land corridor to, for instance, smuggle weapons through the former Shiite Axis with ease. If he can make Syria a Turkish protectorate, his advanced air defense systems could severely limit the Israeli Air Force’s ability to operate freely in the region, both practically and legally.

Perhaps Erdoğan’s greatest strategic gain in moving into Syria is the creation of a salient into the Americans’ planned India-Middle-East-Europe trade route, announced at the 2023 G20 summit. Erdoğan views this project as a direct threat, as it would reduce dependence on trade chokepoints like the Suez Canal, directly countering Turkish control over the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it would reduce international reliance on Turkish exports altogether, undermining Erdoğan’s economic and military power. On a political level, this massive economic initiative is believed to pave the way for a peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, further complicating Erdoğan’s pan-Ottoman ambitions.

Why we have ignored the problem until now

This may seem unorthodox, but I believe the primary reason lies in psychology. Simply put, in our desperation to be accepted by our neighbors, Israelis and Jews often avoid confronting the possibility of falling out with old friends.

Before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was Israel’s closest ally in the Middle East. We shared trade, cultural exchange, tourism, and even, allegedly, security cooperation. But that all changed in an instant—yet we didn’t.

Despite frequently hearing slogans like “wipe Israel off the map” and “drive the Jews into the sea” from leaders of the Islamic Republic, Israel still chose to arm Iran in its war against Iraq, viewing Saddam Hussein as the more immediate threat. Israeli society is deeply shaped by a desire for acceptance and the age-old yearning for peace with our neighbors—even at great cost. This is perhaps best evidenced by the large contingent of Israelis who embrace the mantra of land for peace.

We are seeing a similar pattern today with Turkey. Israelis have a deep affection for Turkey. As recently as 2022, hundreds of thousands of Israelis visited Turkey, and bilateral trade reached a peak of $8 billion. Despite his rhetoric, we’ve often dismissed the threat from Erdoğan. He is aging, and fearful of rival factions. Turkey is still a NATO member. Many have to date considered Erdoğan’s control of Turkey as more of a nuisance than a threat. This is the misconception that must change.

The Israeli Defense establishment is slowly coming to terms with this new reality. This shift is perhaps best illustrated by the nomination of Eyal Zamir to the IDF’s top post. A former commander of the IDF Ground Forces and an expert in armored warfare, General Zamir is likely to refocus the IDF from a small, specialized force that excels in asymmetrical counterterrorism and insurgencies, to a larger, multi-arm formation in anticipation of conventional warfare—potentially against a state-level adversary. The Nagel Commission has recently echoed this viewpoint, warning the IDF to prepare for a potential conflict with Turkey.

What must be done

There are three critical actions that can, and should, be taken immediately. I am not going to suggest military or intelligence operations against Turkey. However, there are strategic decisions Israel can make to both mitigate the threat while simultaneously enhancing our readiness.

First, we should exploit existing geopolitical rivalries that undermine Turkey’s imperial ambitions, particularly the gap between Turkey and Iran. The first step in this process is to isolate Turkey from Russia, Iran’s chief benefactor. Favorite historical rivals, the Turks have often frustrated Russian ambitions to access the Mediterranean. While Erdoğan plays both sides in the current Russia-Ukraine conflict—supporting Ukraine militarily and Russia economically—it’s clear that Putin’s Russia shares expansionist and imperialist goals similar to Erdoğan’s. These two visions cannot coexist, and Israel would be wise to exploit that. One avenue is to take advantage of their conflicting interests in Libya. Russia and Turkey back opposing sides in the Libyan conflict, with Russia supporting Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, while Turkey backs the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity.

We must also leverage our alliances. Supporting the Kurds and Druze goes without saying, but reinforcing our partnership with Greece is equally crucial. Greece’s security, both military and economic, depends on preventing Turkish dominance in the Aegean. Much like conventional wisdom suggests that Israel must reach an agreement with the Palestinians to be accepted into the Arab world (a view that, while still held by many, is increasingly outdated), Turkey must resolve its issues with Cyprus—and to a lesser extent, Greece—to be fully embraced by Europe. Israel should encourage both Greece and Cyprus to exact the highest price possible from Turkey in order to thwart its imperialist ambitions. The Greeks, in particular, are already angered by Turkey’s efforts to create exclusive economic zones in the region without including Crete.

Lastly, Israel must reinforce our defensive positions, both physically and diplomatically. The newly established buffer zone in Syria should be transformed into a formidable defensive line. This will have the added benefit of protecting us against the chaos unfolding in Syria, and facilitate our intervention to protect civilians in the area. We should also prioritize building roads between key IDF positions to ensure the rapid deployment of armored units. Diplomatically, Israel must set clear red lines, insisting that Turkey not deploy aircraft beyond a yet-to-be-determined boundary. As it stands, fighter jets from the Turkish mainland can reach Israeli airspace in around twenty minutes, which is a significant vulnerability. We must rearm, investing in conventional military power and ensuring that we have the capacity to sustain prolonged conflict through domestic production and reliable access to essential resources, particularly oil.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria has the potential to outmaneuver Israel and lead to a direct and devastating conflict. Our focus on more immediate threats has left us vulnerable, and it is crucial that we make key strategic decisions now to both deter conflict with Turkey and, should it arise, be fully prepared to win it. Turkey has vast—but not infinite—capabilities. With pragmatic and decisive strategic thinking, we can prevent this confrontation. But the first step in solving any problem is acknowledging it.