Among the nations or apart from them?

Over time, more than one Israeli leader has articulated an ideology of Radical Independence, that the State of Israel operates on its own, based on its own values and interests, and will always be willing to “go it alone” if necessary – even without the United States, should that special relationship ever degrade. Most clearly of course we see this in a common (not inaccurate) formulation that the Jewish people – as individuals and as a collective – have been mistreated and misunderstood for centuries and suffered as a result of their powerlessness. So too the State of Israel stands alone, misunderstood and mistreated – but no longer powerless. As a corrective, the advent of Jewish self-determination through sovereignty, has finally positioned us to reject dependency on the tolerance of others. We proclaim our righteous indignation: “let them shun us, just another manifestation of the oldest hatred, we are always singled out, etc.” And while not entirely untrue, the radically independent reaction – “we will stand alone if we must” – belies the reality of Zionist history, and even Zionist ideology, which gave rise to the State of Israel many decades ago.

A phrase common in Zionist literature recognizes the Jewish claim to the Land of Israel – Palestine as it was referred to geographically back in the day – “by right and not by sufferance,” (ironically also a phrase also used to secure Jewish rights in some Diaspora communities, both before and after WWII). Of course, this formulation begs the question as to who acknowledges and ultimately permits and supports that claim to the Land “by right.” While Zionists historically may have argued that the right is inherent, leadership also recognized the need for external validation of this right. At times that support may have depended on Christian sensibilities around the connection of Jews to historic Palestine, garnering sympathy for the cause as a result of Jewish suffering in pogroms or the Holocaust, or framing the role of a Jewish democratic state within the broader geopolitical landscape, particularly the Cold War environment. In these frameworks, Zionist and subsequent Israeli leadership viewed international acceptance as not merely desirable, but imperative.  And while history shows many occasions of Israeli leaders pushing the envelope, they have generally acceded to the considerations presented by close allies.

Notwithstanding Israel’s oft-asserted willingness to go it alone, the origins of Zionist political engagement depended in their entirety on a combination of international receptivity to the Zionist dream, and actual diplomatic engagement with the “Great Powers” of the world to pursue the creation of a Jewish National Home. In Herzl’s formulation from the 1890s: “Let sovereignty be granted us” (and originally he left the whereabouts of this sovereignty open to discussion) – one need not ponder all too much as to “Who” would be granting that sovereignty.

Of course, Herzl himself pinned his hopes on the Ottoman Sultanate with respect to Palestine, but he also entertained visions of, and engaged in diplomatic efforts with, other global powers assisting in securing Jewish rights and a path to sovereignty.   The jubilation with which Zionists welcomed the Balfour Declaration depended precisely upon the assertion of Great Power influence to support the creation of a Jewish National Home. So too the flurry of Zionist diplomacy among the victorious powers at the end of WWI that secured recognition of the Declaration’s language within the League of Nations Mandate. And lest we think that Herzl, and subsequently Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were not truly representative, Jabotinsky himself consistently referenced the expectation of ongoing British support, and extended that approach to America, as critical for realizing Zionist aspirations.

Of course the very creation of Israel depended on, and Zionist diplomats lobbied for, the recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and the subsequent decision of the UN General Assembly to partition Palestine and create a sovereign Jewish state. The stability – limited as it may have been – of ceasefires with Israel’s neighboring Arab countries in those early years depended on diplomatic support from Western powers who helped work out armistice agreements, a pattern repeated through shuttle diplomacy after subsequent wars in the region. And whether the results were satisfactory to Israeli leaders or not, they nearly always deferred to Western leadership, particularly the United States, in shaping the parameters of those deals, whether temporary or of a permanent nature such as the peace agreement with Egypt. While the rhetoric might play well domestically, the claim that Israel always makes these decisions based solely on its own assessment of its security needs, regardless of the assertions of its allies and the broader international community is misleading. While that may be the course Israel is charting now, it was not always thus for the Jewish state.

The argument one hears to support Radical Independence – that it is incumbent upon the rest of the world to understand Israel’s unique position – is of course appropriate. But if taken seriously, should it not also be reciprocated? Is it not also incumbent upon Israeli leadership to understand and truly consider the perspectives of others in the international community – particularly among those who have been more inclined to support Israel’s place among the nations?  Dismissing every critique as antisemitic provides simple and easy cover to avoid hard conversation. Simply saying that America behaved similarly in Iraq misses the point – Israel is not America and has a more precarious position internationally.  This approach does not require giving credence to every critique of Israel, especially those that deny the legitimacy of Jewish self-determination while embracing that of others. But it does demand that Israeli leadership consider the role that international diplomacy, and especially public opinion in the United States, may play on the future stability and ongoing success of the Zionist enterprise. The historical record would confirm that advocates for Jewish nationalism have always taken world opinion into consideration, and not typically gone it alone.

This question of consideration by international entities, both state and non-state actors, becomes increasingly relevant as the current war not only persists, but expands. The erosion of support among liberals in the US, should be viewed with great trepidation. While it is comforting to lump all of one’s adversaries into one basket (i.e. Iran’s useful idiots), it is intellectually dishonest to conflate Nazism or Iranian/Hamas’s calls for Israel’s destruction with the enmity that now further radicalizes the Arab street among those with no love for Hamas or Hizbollah, or disaffection among American youth when confronting the devastation of Gaza. It is even more disingenuous to make that comparison with friendly powers and others who sympathize with Israel’s right to self-defense, yet offer harsh criticism (and words of advice) and truly lament the weakening of our special bond. What would Herzl do?