Beijing’s POV on Assad’s Fall-out

The dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has left China grappling with a sudden and significant geopolitical setback. Long considered a geostrategic pillar in the region by its protectors—Russia and Iran— Assad’s collapse has upended Chinese ideas for investment in Syria’s recovery and stability. With rebel forces taking Damascus and Iran and Russia exiting as clear losers, Beijing faces a stark reality: the assumptions that guided its strategy in Syria no longer hold, challenging its approach as a rising global power.

During Monday’s Chinese Foreign Ministry press briefing, Mao Ning was grilled by journalists from China-Arab TV, Anadolu Agency, and AFP about the sudden collapse of Assad’s regime. Questions focused on the future of Sino-Syrian relations, the reasons behind the regime’s fall, the roles of Russia and Iran, and Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, delivered in a critical and probing tone. Mao maintained a neutral stance, emphasising the need for a political solution led by the Syrian people, reaffirming respect for Syria’s sovereignty, and avoiding direct comments on the crisis’s causes or ties to Russia and Iran—a longtime Beijing narrative.

A Misstep in Syria

China’s initial response to the Syrian crisis revamping highlights its vulnerability in fast-moving conflicts where it lacks a direct presence. On December 2, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian assured reporters that China was closely monitoring Syria and supporting Assad’s stability efforts. No more than four days later, the rebels’ stunning advance exposed the limits of this commitment, leaving Beijing without a clear response.

In the same days, China’s ambassador to Syria, Shi Hongwei, still emphasized the importance of enhancing cooperation between China and Syria in health and infrastructure. This focus on collaboration occurred during the critical hours marked by the liberation of Aleppo amidst ongoing conflict. This apparent disconnect underscores Beijing’s absence of control on the ground and its over-reliance on Russian and Iranian intelligence, which had prematurely declared Assad’s regime secure. As Assad fell, Beijing’s political and diplomatic investments crumbled, revealing a costly miscalculation.

China’s Dilemma with Its Partners

The collapse of Assad’s regime also spotlights the challenges China faces with its strategic partners—Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These relationships, essential to Beijing’s global aspirations, increasingly bind China to conflicts that undermine its image as a proponent of stability and peace. While Moscow and Tehran have invested heavily in Syria only to face defeat, Beijing has attempted to maintain a careful balance, supporting its allies without sharing the full weight of their losses.

This balancing act reflects the broader dynamics of the so-called CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) axe. While these partnerships allow Beijing to extend its influence, they also create vulnerabilities. A weakened Russia in Ukraine or a humiliated Iran in the Middle East not only destabilizes the region but tarnishes Beijing’s standing as a reliable global leader.

Strategic Gains?

However, China’s position is not without potential advantages. The collapse of Assad’s regime and the entrenchment of conflicts involving its partners, such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s struggles in the Middle East, have distracted Western powers. This division of focus may enable Beijing to consolidate its influence in the Indo-Pacific while avoiding direct entanglement in fighting conflicts.

China’s pragmatic approach to post-Assad Syria could also yield opportunities. The new leadership in Damascus may prioritize rebuilding an economy devastated by war, with its GDP falling by 85%. China’s financial resources and infrastructure expertise make it a valuable partner, and its prior inclusion of Syria in the Belt and Road Initiative positions it to play a leading role in reconstruction efforts.

Challenges to Beijing’s Flexibility

However, challenges abound. Rebel groups in power hold anti-Western views, creating potential openings for Beijing to engage. Nonetheless, these groups are also wary of foreign influence, complicating overt Chinese attempts to shape Syria’s post-Assad trajectory. Complicating matters further is the presence of Uyghur militants within rebel factions. A top China priority could likely be to pressure Syria’s new leadership to exclude these militants from power and potentially deport them. Still, such efforts may face resistance from factions with long-time ties to these fighters.

Beijing’s strategy may also contend with the broader perception of the CRINK bloc. The US and the Western powers increasingly treat China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as a unified adversarial bloc, regardless of the actual cohesion among these nations. This perception limits Beijing’s ability to distance itself from its partners’ failures and reinforces its association with their defeats.

From a Chinese perspective, the fall of Assad’s regime can underscore the risks of over-reliance on flawed partnerships and overconfidence in authoritarian regimes’ resilience. For Beijing, the challenge lies in crafting a strategy that preserves its influence in Syria while minimizing its exposure to the failures of its partners. As China navigates the aftermath, its approach will test its ability to project power in volatile regions while maintaining its carefully cultivated image as a global stabilizer.

The fall of Assad’s regime poses a significant challenge to China’s narrative, advanced through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Presented as a framework for fostering reconciliation and peace, the GSI was a central element of Beijing’s efforts to position itself as a stabilizing force in the Middle East, too, as seen in its role mediating the Iran-Saudi reconciliation earlier this year.

When Xi Jinping met Assad in 2023, Beijing framed Syria as part of the ‘wave of reconciliation’ China promoted in the region. However, the collapse of Assad’s regime has contradicted these optimistic assessments, challenging the narrative of a stabilizing Chinese role. Despite this setback, China may find ways to reinvent its approach, leveraging its pragmatic diplomacy to adapt to the new realities in Syria and maintain its influence—quite distant from its partner.