Beyond Irro’s US Visit: Next steps for Washington–Hargeisa Relations

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Irro’ spent nearly two weeks in the United States from 5 to 19 September 2026, engaging in Washington and New York to press Somaliland’s case for deeper international engagement. His program included discussions with lawmakers, policy institutions, and engagement with the Somaliland diaspora. The visit gave Somaliland access to audiences that matter in American foreign-policy debates, but access by itself is not a policy outcome

For Somaliland, the more important questions are what follows the meetings and whether political attention can be converted into sustained relations with Congress, policy institutions, and American business. Can discussions about the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden lead to practical cooperations? And can Somaliland make an economic case that stands alongside its long-running argument for international recognition?

Since re-declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has built its own governing institutions and held a series of elections while continuing its long-running campaign for international recognition. For decades, however, that effort has not resulted in formal recognition by any UN member state. This situation changed on 26 December 2025, when Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland. The decision also generated strong opposition. The African Union reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while Somalia rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

Somaliland has also maintained an official representative office with Taiwan since 2020. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the mutual establishment of representative offices in July 2020. This cooperations is in the areas of fisheries, agriculture, energy, health, education, and information technology. These relationships have increased Somaliland’s external profile, but they have not removed their wider diplomatic dispute over its status.

Building Somaliland’s case in Washington

A central event in the Washington program came when Irro delivered a keynote address at the Hudson Institute on 14 September, 2026, marking his first official U.S. visit since winning the November 2024 presidential election. During the event, President Irro framed Somaliland’s value around regional maritime security, the strategic port of Berbera, and proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb strait amid rising Red Sea tensions and Houthi threats.

The port city of Berbera is situated on the Gulf of Aden, across from Yemen and near the maritime pathway that leads to the Red Sea. Continuing insecurity around the Red Sea has demonstrated how quickly regional conflict can affect commercial shipping and global trade. Recent attacks on commercial ships illustrate how rapidly the instability in these waters can influence international trade.

Somaliland can point to Berbera, its coastline, and its strategic location. But geography alone will not build a partnership. Hargeisa also needs to show where practical cooperations could work, whether in trade, logistics, maritime affairs, or other areas of shared interest.

Irro also used the visit to strengthen contacts with Capitol Hill. On 19 September, he met Senator Ted Cruz. According to Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the discussion covered recognition, strategic cooperations, security, economic cooperations, and regional stability.

Senator Cruz had already made his position public. In August 2025, he wrote to President Donald Trump urging US recognition of Somaliland, pointing to its position on the Gulf of Aden, relations with Taiwan, and possible security and economic cooperations. His position represents the view of a US senator, not a change in US recognition policy.

Congressional engagement with Somaliland also predates this visit in 2022; the Somaliland Partnership Act was proposed to require a review of aspects of the USA-Somaliland relationship, including security cooperations; it did not itself provide US recognition of Somaliland.

The opportunity lies in what comes afterwards. Somaliland needs regular contact with lawmakers, congressional staff, and policy institutions. Those relationships have to continue when there is no presidential delegation in Washington.

From strategic interest to commercial reality

Security formed another part of the Washington program. On 17 September, Irro met with representatives from the Atlantic Council and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The Somaliland Foreign Ministry said the discussions covered the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, shipping lanes, international trade, and strategic cooperations.

The timing is understandable. Conflict in Yemen and attacks on commercial vessels have pushed Red Sea security higher on the international agenda. Somaliland sits beside this increasingly important maritime corridor. That gives Berbera both commercial and strategic relevance.

Somaliland should use this interest, but security should not become the entire basis of its relationship with Washington. Security priorities change. Trade, investment, technology, education, and business links can give the relationship a broader base that lasts beyond the current security concern.

This may be the harder test. Somaliland regularly promotes Berbera, livestock, fisheries, minerals, energy, and infrastructure as areas with economic potential. Getting those sectors discussed in Washington is useful. Getting companies to invest is another matter.

An American company considering it would first want a clear answer to practical questions—how easy is it to register and license a business? Can the contract be enforced? What taxes apply? How are commercial disputes handled? Can profit and capital be transferred? And is there reliable information about the local market?

If the US visit leads to interest from American business, Somaliland needs to be ready with credible information, clear procedures, and projects that investors can properly assess.

There is a difference between saying Somaliland has fisheries, minerals, or a strategic port and presenting a commercially workable opportunity. Diplomacy can open the door. The business environment will determine whether investors walk through it.

On 23 September, people from Somaliland, as well as those who support their cause, assembled in front of the United Nations Headquarters in New York City (Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza), asking for global recognition of their country. Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry reported the rally as a public call for international recognition.

The gathering took place during the UN General Assembly high-level week. It was a diaspora-led public advocacy event rather than an official United Nations event, but it gave Somaliland supporters in North America a visible platform at a time when diplomatic and media attention was concentrated on New York.

The following day, Irro appeared at the Council on Foreign Relations, where the announced discussion focused on Somaliland’s recognition bid and the regional security landscape. The two events served different purposes; the rally sought public visibility, while the CFR meeting placed Somaliland’s arguments before a foreign-policy audience.

Somalia remains central to the equation

Somalia rejects Somaliland’s claim to independence and maintains that Somaliland forms part of Somalia. The African Union and United Nations have also continued to affirm Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, even after Israel recognized Somaliland in December 2025. The United States has likewise stated that its policy has not changed. Washington’s approach therefore sits within a wider set of interests involving its relationship with Mogadishu, counterterrorism, maritime security, and regional stability in the Horn of Africa. Somalia does not recognize Somaliland as an independent nation; therefore, Somalia views Somaliland as being a part of Somalia. The UN briefing also recorded Somalia’s rejection of Israel’s recognition decision.

For Hargeisa, this means making more than a historical argument for recognition. It also needs to explain how closer international engagement with Somaliland would fit within the wider region. That question will remain part of the debate.

Conclusion: What happens next?

A presidential visit can secure meetings and create attention. “A presidential visit can secure meetings and create attention, but sustained engagement after the visit is equally important.

Congressional offices need continued engagement. Policy institutions need reliable contacts in Hargeisa. Investors need clear information. Business inquiries need timely answers. Security discussions will also need to move from general interest to specific areas of cooperations.

The diaspora also has the potential to contribute. Somalilanders across North America work in business, education, technology, and many other fields. Their professional networks can help build trade links, attract investment, support research, and connect people and institutions instead of primarily being organized to advocate for recognition.

The longer-term significance of Irro’s visit will therefore become clearer over time.

Six months or a year from now, are the relationships built in Washington still active? Have business discussions moved forward? Are U.S. companies looking seriously at opportunities in Somaliland? Have any of the meetings led to practical cooperations?

Those questions will tell us more than the number of meetings held in September.

President Irro’s visits gave Somaliland a larger audience in Washington. That is useful, but it is only a beginning.

Somaliland has spent years trying to get its case heard. The next step is to build on that attention through sustained engagement and practical cooperation with Washington. AS

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Editor’s Note: Zakarie Mohamed Abdi serves as a senior advisor at Somaliland’s Ministry of Trade and Tourism.