Damon Isherwood

Can science see the forest for the trees?

Australian biologist and author, Jeremy Griffith (Fair use, authors website)
Australian biologist and author, Jeremy Griffith (Fair use, authors website)

What Jeremy Griffith’s approach to the human condition reveals about the achievements—and limitations—of mechanistic science.

How can the same species be capable of such extraordinary kindness and such cruelty? Religious thinkers and philosophers have grappled with that paradox for millennia. While co-writing a book about the Australian biologist Jeremy Griffith, who has spent much of his career working outside the prevailing mechanistic approach to science, I was struck by the debt he nevertheless acknowledges to that approach. Research into genes helped explain how we inherit instinctive tendencies, and research into the nervous system shed light on how we learn from experience. Griffith brought those findings together to ask a different question. Could our ancestors’ emerging intellect have come into conflict with their inherited moral instincts? And if so, how might that clash have shaped the way we behave today?

* * *

The challenge of seeing how the parts fit together takes me back to my days as an architecture student at university.

During my architecture studies, I once presented a design of which I was rather proud. I had spent an unreasonable amount of time on the junction between the roof and an external wall. The materials were carefully chosen, the construction detail was convincing, and the drawing itself had the sort of precision that can persuade a tired student he had accomplished something rather important.

My Dutch tutor looked at it, then at the floor plan. Where, he wanted to know, would someone sit in the afternoon? I pointed to the living room. He considered the windows and the orientation of the building. What the room lacked, he highlighted, was gezelligheid – the feeling that you might like to pull up a chair and stay a while.

I had thought about almost everything except that. Or, more accurately, I had thought about it early on and then allowed the increasingly absorbing business of getting the details right to take over. The construction detail was excellent. The prospect of spending a winter afternoon in the space: less appealing.

There is a distinction here that reaches well beyond architecture. We can become very good at explaining how the components of something work while remaining unclear about how they fit together. Indeed, excelling at the details can make that uncertainty rather easy to overlook.

It’s easy to get lost in the detail. (Image by Marmi Sica on Unsplash)

I’ve been thinking about this while working on the book with co-author Fiona Cullen-Ward. At the centre of Griffith’s explanation of the human condition is a question that has interested me far beyond the design of buildings: why are we the way we are?

More particularly, why does a species capable of such extraordinary sensitivity and cooperation also behave with such indifference and cruelty? Why do we recognise generosity and cooperation as admirable, yet spend so much energy defending and expressing our importance? How do we account for the uneasy relationship between our moral aspirations and our actual behaviour?

These questions give the phrase ‘the human condition’ its substance. They concern the person doing the thinking, including the uncomfortable business of being that person.

The limits of understanding the parts

Mechanistic science has made extraordinary advances in understanding the individual components of human behaviour. We know far more about inheritance, the nervous system and the development of behaviour than previous generations could have imagined. The painstaking investigation of these subjects deserves our gratitude. Anyone tempted to dismiss detailed scientific work should consider how much of their own understanding depends on it.

Yet it remains possible to know a great deal about the machinery of human life and struggle to explain the experience it produces. For example, an account of the processes involved in a defensive personal reaction does not, by itself, explain why a particular criticism feels like an assault on our worth. We also need to understand what is being defended, and why it matters so much.

Reductionism, broadly speaking, approaches a complex phenomenon through its constituent parts. It is an immensely productive method. The problem arises when we assume that the description of those parts has exhausted what actually needs explaining.

But to understand the human condition, we need to do more than examine the biological mechanisms involved; we need to understand how their interaction gave rise to our psychologically troubled state.

The difficulty of looking at ourselves

Griffith goes further. He argues that the difficulty in investigating the human condition has also been psychological. Investigating ourselves exposes us to conclusions we may find uncomfortable, especially when the subject is our capacity for selfish, even destructive behaviour. In Griffith’s account, the attraction of concentrating on mechanisms includes the protection it offers from confronting the larger question of ourselves.

That is a substantial claim, and one that needs an argument of its own. The existence of specialised research does not demonstrate that its practitioners are avoiding difficult truths. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether our emotional investment in an explanation of human nature can influence which questions we consider legitimate. Scientists, like the rest of us, have something at stake in the answer.

Griffith’s explanation of the human condition

His explanation begins with the difference between inherited instinctive orientations and the capacity of a conscious mind to learn through experience and understanding. He proposes that, as our ancestors developed this capacity, their experiments in directing their own lives brought them into conflict with established instincts.

In Griffith’s account, those instincts included a cooperative moral orientation. The emerging intellect therefore faced a particularly difficult predicament: it needed to experiment, yet deviation could be experienced as wrong. Unable to understand and justify that conflict, the conscious self responded defensively. Griffith traces anger, egocentricity and alienation to this struggle, and the guilt that intensified it.

There is much more to the explanation than can be accommodated here. Its relevance to the present discussion is its attempt to connect biological processes with the psychological predicament we recognise in ourselves. It asks us to examine how two ways of managing behaviour might interact, and what the consequences of that interaction might be.

I find that approach compelling. It takes the moral dimension of human experience seriously enough to ask how it arose and why it became a source of distress. It also gives the conscious mind an active role in the explanation, rather than treating the words we use about ourselves—guilt, pride, alienation—as incidental decoration.

Finding an explanation compelling, of course, does not finish the scientific work. Its premises, proposed sequence and explanatory claims all require scrutiny. A broad synthesis earns its value through how well it accounts for the evidence and how it stands up to alternatives. Those are precisely the questions worth pursuing.

Bringing the discoveries together

One of the most important points in our book is easily missed: Griffith credits the discoveries of conventional science with making his explanation possible. His account depends on the knowledge accumulated by researchers studying inheritance and the nervous system. The relationship he proposes could not have been investigated without their work.

This makes the question considerably more constructive. How do we preserve the rigour of specialised investigation while making room for the thinker who attempts to connect its findings? How do we ensure that the whole remains available for examination as our knowledge of the parts becomes ever more elaborate?

Architecture offers a modest reminder. The quality of a building depends on the details, but the details have to serve a conception of how people will live together within it. At some point, someone has to step back from the drawing and consider the life it is meant to accommodate.

I think the study of human nature demands that same willingness. We have worked extraordinarily hard to understand the components of our existence. The question of how they come together to produce our troubled, contradictory humanity deserves an equally serious effort.

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Fiona Cullen-Ward and I explore these ideas in our book, Jeremy Griffith: The biologist who solved the human condition so we can fix the world (2026). The full book is free to download.

About the Author
Growing up in Sydney, Australia meant I was unquestioningly secular, as perhaps only an Anglo Australian can be. It followed that my vehicle for answering the why's and wherefore's of existence was science. Recently I discovered that my great-grandmother on my mother's side was Jewish; and moreover, Judaism was matrilineal! With this aspect of my heritage revealed, a great need was awakened in me to reconcile the scientific and religious approaches.
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