Jimmy Carter, 39th US president, has died. 

The role of the United States in the chaos of 1979 is an undeniable reality. President Reagan repeatedly stated that America’s misguided policies in Iran caused the fall of the late Shah, calling it a historical stain in American history [Televised Debate, November 1984].

Despite the Shah’s 37-year alliance with the U.S. in the Middle East, Carter effectively undermined him [George Bush, January 26, 1979], notably by dispatching General Haig to Iran to incapacitate the military [Richard Nixon, Politique Internationale, Spring 1981]. Carter himself admitted to following the duplicitous advice of U.S. Ambassador Sullivan, a sympathizer of pro-Mossadeq forces [Carter’s Memoirs, 1982, p. 443]. American officials later condemned Carter’s policies as deceitful and Sullivan’s views as dangerously misguided [Schumer, 1980, p. 148].

Years later, Brzezinski acknowledged that the political uprising against the Shah had U.S. backing [Power and Principles, 1983, p. 356], which ultimately led to his removal from power [Kissinger, The Economist, February 10, 1979]. This policy miscalculation not only caused the Shah’s downfall but also plunged Iran into chaos, leaving it a victim of history [Alexander Haig interview].

Carter observed the 1979 crisis in Iran from a distance, while his State Department displayed overt hostility toward the Shah [Brzezinski, ibid, p. 355]. The Shah soon realized that neither Carter nor the U.S. had any intention of supporting him, and he described America’s policy as delusional [Sullivan’s Memoirs, 1981, p. 336]. The Carter administration repeatedly instructed its ambassador to warn the Shah about human rights issues [Encounter Report, November 1984]. History has since recorded Carter’s administration as confused, hypocritical, and paralyzed in the face of Iran’s escalating crisis [Michael Ledeen, Failure in Iran, 1980, p. 231]. At the height of the turmoil, the Shah was abandoned [Nixon, Leaders, 1984, p. 360].

Jimmy Carter and the late Shah of Iran, 12/31/1977. (Photo : National Archives 177337) / Free for all platforms

Carter lacked a true understanding of the crisis or its catastrophic consequences. He failed to make sound decisions [Nixon, ibid, p. 312] and did not grasp the irreversible damage his policies caused [Brzezinski, ibid, p. 380]. Sullivan even advised Carter to demand the Shah leave Iran immediately and to align with Khomeini [Carter, ibid, p. 443]. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies were disorganized, ignoring one another’s warnings [French Interior Minister, November 6, 1980]. Most notably, the CIA failed to predict the 1979 upheaval or the disastrous rise of the mullahs in Iran, cementing Carter’s role as a key figure in the fiasco.

Carter’s moralizing, cloaked in populism, often bordered on naivety [Time, May 10, 1976]. He claimed to act in the name of God [Herald Tribune, April 1976] but appeared out of touch with reality [Ledeen, ibid]. The late Shah harshly criticized Carter, admitting that his gravest mistake was following U.S. advice, which led to the release of murderous terrorists who later orchestrated more violence [Washington Post, June 22, 1980]. The Shah astutely questioned Sullivan, asking, “Why is the CIA so intensely active against me?” [Sullivan, ibid, 1981, p. 156].

The Shah foresaw the devastating catastrophe that was unfolding. Carter, wielding his political and intelligence apparatus, deliberately supported opposition forces to pressure the Shah. Later, the CIA Director confirmed the Shah’s concerns, stating, “Had we shown more vigilance, America’s policy during Iran’s turmoil could have been different” [Turner, Newsweek, March 5, 1979].

Carter’s policies were unrealistic, clumsy, short-sighted, indecisive, and full of contradictions, causing global repercussions [Shafa, Crime and Punishment, p. 611]. His treatment of the Shah during his illness was inhumane. It was Carter who, among world leaders, quickly deemed Khomeini a “sacred” figure, describing him as a religious and moderate leader. The ties between Khomeini and Carter before 1979 became clear to all [BBC Report, May 21, 2016].

The Iranian Tose’eh newspaper later published an interview with Giscard d’Estaing, who said, “The U.S. rang the death knell for the Shah’s rule because Carter had no hope for the regime’s survival” [Tose’eh, September 23, 1998]. When Khomeini orchestrated the hostage crisis, Carter first wrote a pleading letter and then resorted to prayers [Jody Powell’s Memoirs, 1984, p. 44]. Though he later sent a rescue mission, it ended in failure.

Carter’s presidency was marked by indecision and weakness. His administration was a series of contradictions, errors, and incompetence, leading to global distrust in both his government and U.S. foreign policy [Shafa, ibid, p. 624].

American authors have frequently criticized Carter’s populist and controversial behavior [Ronald Kessler, Presidential Secret Service, Chapter on Carter, 2003]. While Carter is now gone, his policies live on in what can be described as “Carter 2” (Obama) and “Carter 3” (Biden) regarding the Islamic Republic. Perhaps his death will mark the end of these misguided policies and their dark legacy. Yet, the world first faced the rise of Islamic radicalism during Carter’s era, and the battle against terrorism continues to this day.

Ismail Haniya, the Islamic Terrorist of Hamas meets with former US President Jimmy Carter in Gaza City-June 16, 2009./ Photo by Radio California- Free for all platforms.