China’s Silent Intelligence War against Israel and India
Beijing is increasingly acting as the strategic enabler of two revisionist powers — Pakistan and Iran — by helping them build the space-based surveillance capabilities needed to monitor and challenge democratic rivals.
For years, Western policymakers viewed China’s partnerships with Pakistan and Iran primarily through the lenses of trade, energy, and arms sales. That assessment is becoming dangerously outdated.
A growing body of evidence suggests that Beijing is now playing a far more consequential role: helping both Pakistan and Iran develop the space-based surveillance capabilities needed to monitor, track, and potentially target their principal adversaries — India and Israel.
The implications extend far beyond Asia or the Middle East. They point to the emergence of a Chinese-backed intelligence ecosystem that is reshaping the military balance across two of the world’s most volatile regions.
A recent investigation by ThePrint revealed that Pakistan has dramatically expanded its Earth-observation satellite network, launching six satellites between January 2025 and June 2026. Many of these launches were conducted with Chinese assistance, using Chinese rockets and technology. According to Indian experts cited in the report, the constellation is specifically optimized to provide frequent coverage of Indian territory, particularly Jammu and Kashmir.
This is not merely a civilian space program.
Pakistan’s satellites possess capabilities that can be used to monitor military deployments, track infrastructure developments, and improve battlefield awareness. Combined with access to China’s far larger network of military and dual-use satellites, Islamabad is acquiring intelligence capabilities that would have been impossible to develop independently.
Indian military leaders have already sounded the alarm. Following the India-Pakistan confrontation of 2025, senior Indian officials publicly accused China of providing Pakistan with real-time intelligence support during the crisis. Whether every detail of those allegations proves accurate is almost beside the point. The broader reality is clear: China’s space architecture is increasingly serving as a force multiplier for Pakistan’s military.
Israel should pay close attention.
The same pattern is emerging with Iran.
Reports published this year indicate that Iranian entities gained access to Chinese satellite imagery systems capable of producing highly detailed observations of military facilities. According to investigations based on leaked documents, Iranian planners used Chinese-provided imagery to monitor American military assets in the Gulf.
If Chinese satellite capabilities can help Tehran monitor U.S. bases, they can also help Tehran monitor Israeli airfields, missile-defense batteries, naval facilities, intelligence sites, and strategic infrastructure.
Modern surveillance satellites do not care whether their target lies in Nevada, the Negev, Kashmir, or the Persian Gulf. Once imagery exists, it can be shared, analyzed, and exploited.
This is where many analysts continue to underestimate Beijing’s strategy.
China does not need to deploy troops to Iran or Pakistan. It does not need to participate directly in military operations. By supplying launch services, navigation systems, remote-sensing technology, commercial imagery, and access to its broader space infrastructure, Beijing can dramatically increase the intelligence capabilities of its partners while maintaining plausible deniability.
The result is a model of influence that is cheaper, less risky, and often more effective than traditional military intervention.
For Israel, the strategic consequences are profound.
For decades, Israel maintained significant intelligence advantages over its regional adversaries. Those advantages rested not only on superior technology but also on the limited ability of hostile actors to collect high-quality intelligence consistently.
That reality is changing.
The democratization of satellite imagery and the rise of commercial space services were already eroding traditional intelligence monopolies. China’s entry into this arena accelerates the process by giving states such as Iran access to capabilities they would otherwise struggle to acquire.
What is emerging is not merely an Iran problem or an India problem. It is a challenge posed by a broader alignment of authoritarian powers.
China provides technology.
Pakistan and Iran provide regional pressure points.
Together, they create new intelligence and surveillance networks directed at two democracies that happen to sit on the front lines of geopolitical competition in Asia and the Middle East.
India has recognized the danger and is rapidly expanding its own military satellite constellation. Israel should be undertaking a similar reassessment of the strategic implications of Chinese-enabled surveillance capabilities in the hands of Tehran.
The lesson is straightforward: the next intelligence challenge facing Israel may not originate in Tehran alone.
It may begin hundreds of kilometers above the Earth, in a satellite launched with Chinese technology, operated by a Chinese partner, and quietly providing hostile actors with an unprecedented view of Israel’s military and strategic landscape.
The age of China’s indirect intelligence warfare has already begun. Israel can no longer afford to ignore it.
