Commanders for Israel’s Security: Why Its Voice Deserves Serious Consideration

At a time when Israel faces extraordinarily difficult security, diplomatic, and demographic challenges, one Israeli organization deserves particular attention: Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS). Its positions are controversial in some political circles, particularly its advocacy of eventual separation from the Palestinians and a negotiated two-state solution. But whatever one thinks of those positions, CIS represents an unusual concentration of senior Israeli security experience. Its assessments therefore deserve to be examined seriously in any discussion of Israel’s long-term security and future.

CIS is a movement of more than 550 retired senior officials from Israel’s security establishment and diplomatic corps. Its members include former senior commanders of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as well as officials from the Mossad, Shin Bet, the Israel Police, the National Security Council, and the diplomatic service. CIS says its members collectively represent more than 15,000 years of service and experience. Membership is generally restricted to officials who reached the highest ranks of their respective organizations.

That background is important. CIS is not simply another political advocacy organization commenting on national security from the outside. Its members spent their careers dealing with terrorism, intelligence, military strategy, diplomacy, border security, and the complexities of protecting Israel. They have served governments of different political orientations and have experienced firsthand both the capabilities and the limitations of military power.

Security is at the center of its argument

The fundamental CIS position is that Israel’s security cannot be based indefinitely on military force alone. The organization argues that Israel must combine military strength with diplomatic, political and economic measures designed to reduce long-term threats.

Its approach does not call for Israel to abandon security control prematurely. Indeed, CIS has repeatedly advocated maintaining Israeli security control in Judea and Samaria until satisfactory arrangements can be established as part of a final agreement. Its earlier “Security First” plan combined continued IDF security control with measures intended to reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians, strengthen Palestinian institutions, improve economic conditions, and preserve the possibility of future negotiations.

This is an important distinction. CIS does not argue that Israel should simply trust its adversaries or make unilateral concessions without security safeguards. Rather, its approach is that Israel can use its military strength to create conditions that improve security while preserving a diplomatic and political horizon.

CIS’s central strategic objective is separation between Israelis and Palestinians, leading eventually to “two states for two peoples.” Its stated vision calls for permanent, recognized borders that provide Israel with security, preserve a solid Jewish majority, and maintain Israel’s democratic character. It supports territorial arrangements based broadly on the 1967 lines, with adjustments reflecting Israeli security and demographic needs.

CIS’s reasoning is fundamentally Zionist as well as security-oriented. If Israel permanently controls the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean while millions of Palestinians remain without Israeli citizenship, the country faces a difficult choice: either extend equal political rights throughout the territory, potentially undermining the Jewish character of the state, or deny equal rights, potentially undermining its democratic character.

CIS therefore describes the continuing movement toward a single political entity as a strategic danger. Its 2025 “Initiative 2025” explicitly states that its preferred outcome is a security-based, negotiated two-state agreement, while recognizing that such an agreement is not feasible under current conditions. Consequently, CIS advocates steps that improve security and stability, strengthen prospects for a future agreement, and avoid irreversible actions that could make such an agreement more difficult.

That last point is especially significant. CIS’s position is not that a final-status agreement can simply be implemented tomorrow. Rather, it argues that Israeli policy today should take account of the kind of future that Israel wishes to preserve.

CIS also views the Israeli-Palestinian issue as part of a broader Middle Eastern strategic picture. It has advocated an Israeli regional initiative involving Arab states as well as the Palestinians. Its vision argues that cooperation with moderate Arab countries can create shared security interests and potentially provide a broader framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This approach reflects a basic strategic principle: Israel’s security is influenced not only by what happens insideJudea an Samaria and Gaza but also by its relationships with neighboring and regional states and by its standing internationally.

CIS has accordingly emphasized that security, diplomacy, economics and Israel’s international position cannot be treated as completely separate issues.

Why should CIS be heeded?

Listening to CIS does not require accepting every CIS recommendation. Retired security officials can disagree with one another, and professional experience does not make anyone infallible. Moreover, CIS has a clearly stated political-security philosophy, and critics argue that its approach underestimates the difficulties of reaching an agreement with Palestinian leaders and the risks involved in territorial concessions.

Nevertheless, several reasons make its analysis worthy of serious consideration.

First, its members possess unusually relevant professional experience. Those who spent decades confronting Israel’s security challenges have a perspective that should not be casually dismissed.

Second, CIS explicitly incorporates security concerns into its diplomatic proposals. Its advocacy of separation is accompanied by recommendations concerning borders, continued security control during transitional periods, counterterrorism and other safeguards.

Third, CIS recognizes the limitations of its own preferred solution. Its current strategy acknowledges that conditions for a negotiated two-state agreement do not presently exist. That makes its argument less about wishful thinking and more about preserving future options.

Finally, CIS raises a question Israel cannot indefinitely avoid: What is the country’s long-term strategic destination? Managing the conflict indefinitely may be possible for a period of time, but it does not eliminate the underlying demographic, diplomatic, political and security dilemmas.

Israel possesses enormous military strength. The question is how that strength should be used to create a more secure and sustainable future.

CIS offers one answer: maintain overwhelming Israeli security capabilities while working toward separation, regional arrangements, and ultimately two states. Israelis and their leaders are entitled to disagree with that prescription. But given the depth of experience represented within CIS, its analysis should be part of the national conversation.

In a country whose future depends so heavily on difficult security decisions, the voices of those who have spent their lives defending Israel deserve to be heard—even when their conclusions challenge prevailing political assumptions.