Could the Haredi draft crisis end the war?

The events of October 7 and the ensuing multi-front war have transformed the issue of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) recruitment from a matter of principle into an existential one, posing a threat to the stability of the government. This concern may push political decision-makers to end the war, in order to alleviate the enormous pressure on them stemming from the contradiction between the acute need for combat personnel, the general public’s demand for Haredi recruitment on the one hand, and the Haredi refusal to serve in the army on the other hand. 

The issue of (non) recruitment of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) to the IDF is perceived by many in the Jewish public as embodying a blatant injustice, given that the “people’s army” model is based on an equal sharing of the security burden among all groups in Israeli society. The prolonged absence of the Haredim from the ranks of the IDF thus violates the principles of fairness and equality on which this model is based.

However, despite the anger aroused by the non-recruitment of the Haredim, the issue was not perceived as existential until recently. Moreover, doubts were often raised about the objective need for mass ultra-Orthodox enlistment, let alone the potential benefits of such enlistment compared to its anticipated negative impact on women in the army, given the requirements of gender separation in the Haredi tradition.

All this changed fundamentally after October 7. The war has transformed recruitment of the Haredim from a matter of principle into an exisential issue, given the urgent need to bolster the military’s ranks in light of hundreds of fallen soldiers, thousands of wounded, and exhaustion of reservists. Indeed, surveys conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in recent months show broad political agreement on the need for Haredi enlistment. This demand is not only a characteristic of the political left and center; we found that about three-quarters of voters for the Likud and Religious Zionism parties support the immediate or gradual recruitment of most Haredim. However, it appears that both the dire security situation and public opinion demanding the mass enlistment of Haredim have not impacted Haredi leaders, who remain steadfast in their opposition to any recruitment plan and have even intensified their rhetoric on the matter.

In an attempt to meet the real need for additional IDF soldiers, the government has decided to raise the reserve service age and extend the service of conscripts, moves that have intensified public criticism. Conversely, Defense Minister Gallant’s announcement of the issuance of the first recruitment orders for Haredim in the coming month is fueling protests among the Haredi leadership and public.

Paradoxically, this political morass could potentially be resolved by taking steps to end the war, which would reduce the urgent need for “fresh” combat personnel and revert the issue of Haredi recruitment to its historical context – a debate over the principle. In such a situation, it is also likely that the government would attempt, and perhaps even succeed, in promoting a softened recruitment law that meets the Supreme Court’s demands to begin recruiting and drafting Haredim while being acceptable to both the right-wing base and the Haredim. Of course, this scenario contradicts the fierce statements of the government ministers and the prime minister regarding an absolute victory and fighting without a time limit until it is achieved; however, it serves their key political goal – keeping the coalition intact and the prime minister’s position secured. Therefore, the possibility that the issue of Haredi recruitment could actually put pressure on the government to end the war should not be underestimated.

As we look to the future, we can learn from the current situation that the continued exemption of the Haredim from mandatory military service largely depends on security stability. Although surveys show that the Haredi public holds hawkish views, they may agree to support a process of de-escalation and perhaps conflict ending solutions such as the two-state solution in order to maintain their privilege of not serving. This would also allow them to somewhat mitigate the general public’s hostility while also avoiding the draft. If this happens, it could serve as a wake-up call for the political left as well, which previously saw the Haredim as potential political partners but has since “sobered” and accepted the Haredi shift to the right: it is possible that, on “the day after,” such political alliances with the Haredim, considered unthinkable in recent years, could be forged.