El-Alamein’s Gamble: Ethiopia, Somaliland and the Berbera Option

The El Alamein summit may push Ethiopia and Somaliland closer together. Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan have joined their opposition to Somaliland’s recognition with demands over Nile waters and control of Red Sea affairs.

Their declaration increases pressure on both Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, although for different reasons. It may also strengthen their interest in a direct agreement over Berbera. A summit intended to restrict their choices could give them more reason to work together.

The declaration issued on 4 October rejects recognition of Somaliland, supports Somalia’s territorial claim and says Red Sea governance belongs to coastal states. It also backs Egypt and Sudan’s concerns about Nile water use and establishes continued coordination among the four governments.

This brings several regional disputes into one diplomatic front. The declaration grants no legal power to decide Ethiopia’s choice of port or reverse another country’s recognition of Somaliland. Its significance lies in the organized political pressure it creates. (Egyptian presidency: El Alamein Joint Declaration, 4 October 2026)

Ethiopia’s War Makes Sea Access More Urgent

Abiy Ahmed faces this pressure while fighting an alliance seeking to remove his government. Reuters reported on 21 September that seven armed opposition groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Amhara Fano National Movement, had joined forces. Addis Ababa has accused Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan of supporting that alliance; all three deny involvement.

Ethiopia’s accusations must be separated from independently established responsibility for the war. They nevertheless explain why the Alamein declaration is likely to deepen Ethiopian distrust of its signatories. (Reuters: Seven Ethiopian armed groups announce anti-government alliance, 21 September 2026) (Reuters: Ethiopia–Eritrea diplomatic rupture and accusations, 1 October 2026)

The fighting also shows how vulnerable Ethiopia’s routes to the sea can become. The Critical Threats Project’s 29 September review reported rebel advances along a secondary highway connecting toward the main Ethiopia–Djibouti road near Semera. Its 2 October assessment said federal forces had largely reversed the rebel gains in Afar.

The evidence supports concern about access, but does not confirm that the current war has cut both the road and railway to Djibouti. For Ethiopia, the possibility of disruption is enough to make another reliable trade route more valuable. (Critical Threats Project: Ethiopia War Security Review, 29 September 2026) (Critical Threats Project: Ethiopia War Security Review, 2 October 2026)

Berbera offers one possible answer. An agreement with Somaliland could reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on a single maritime gateway and provide access without a confrontation over Eritrean territory. The roads serving Berbera would still need protection, investment and dependable border procedures.

But Ethiopia would gain another route and another negotiating partner. Somaliland, in return, could gain regular trade, investment and a stronger position in its recognition campaign.

Somalia Offers Ports but Limits the Choice

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has said Somalia is prepared to negotiate Ethiopian commercial access to two or three ports under Somali sovereignty. That offer, reported on 4 October, leaves room for talks.

His participation at Alamein, however, also places Somalia alongside governments Ethiopia accuses of backing its armed opponents. Addis Ababa therefore has to judge both the offer and the political conditions attached to it. (Somalia Today: Somalia ready to offer Ethiopia access to up to three ports, 4 October 2026)

Somalia’s position is that Ethiopia may obtain access through arrangements approved by Mogadishu, while direct agreements with Somaliland remain unacceptable. That follows Somalia’s territorial claim, but it restricts Ethiopia’s freedom to choose a partner.

For Abiy, a port offer may look less dependable when the government making it also joins a regional front opposed to his Somaliland option. The problem is the political control built into the offer. Alamein could consequently make negotiations with Hargeisa more attractive.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry made its objection clear on 5 October. It said regional maritime discussions must take account of Ethiopia’s legitimate interests and rejected coercion and destabilization. It also reaffirmed peaceful engagement, without announcing a new agreement with Somaliland.

The response shows that Addis Ababa wants a voice in decisions affecting its access to the sea. It is unlikely to welcome an arrangement in which governments it distrusts decide which alternatives it may pursue. (Ethiopian News Agency: Foreign Ministry statement, 5 October 2026)

Could Abiy Reopen the Somaliland MoU Agreement?

The January 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU remains a possible starting point for renewed talks over coastal access and recognition. It faced substantial diplomatic pressure from the African Union, the Arab League, IGAD and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which backed Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Their positions raised the diplomatic cost of proceeding for Ethiopia. Addis Ababa rejected the Arab League’s criticism, but the wider opposition made implementation politically more difficult. (Reuters: Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU, 23 February 2024) (African Union statement, 3 January 2024) (IGAD communiqué, 18 January 2024) (OIC statement, 3 January 2024) (ENA: Ethiopia’s response to the Arab League, 18 January 2024)

Türkiye helped defuse the immediate crisis through the Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to pursue commercial sea access under Somalia’s sovereign authority, with the details left to further negotiations.

What Ankara did was to establish a framework rather than a completed maritime settlement. Its text did not explicitly cancel the Somaliland MoU, and no public cancellation by the MoU’s two signatories has been established. A March 2026 assessment by the South African Institute of International Affairs described the memorandum as never formally withdrawn, although on hold. (Official Ankara Declaration, 11 December 2024) (SAIIA: Ethiopian foreign policy and the MoU’s status, March 2026)

Alamein appears to reinforce Ankara’s emphasis on Somalia’s sovereignty while adding a wider political front against Somaliland’s recognition and Ethiopia’s role in Red Sea affairs. From Addis Ababa’s perspective, that could feel more restrictive than Ankara’s bilateral negotiating framework, although it does not formally amend that agreement.

Ethiopia’s reluctance to declare the MoU abandoned can be read as strategic ambiguity: keeping the Somaliland option available while managing regional pressure. If Abiy concludes that the summit’s signatories are narrowing his choices further, he may have stronger reasons to return to that option. (Egyptian presidency: El Alamein Joint Declaration, 4 October 2026)

Alamein may change the costs of that caution. If Ethiopia sees the summit as part of a wider effort to weaken its position, reopening talks with Somaliland becomes a more credible response. The two governments could negotiate a new agreement linking access to recognition, or set a phased timetable with clear steps for both sides.

Such a timetable would need to prevent port access from advancing while recognition is repeatedly postponed. Its value would come from agreed dates, responsibilities and a clear explanation of what happens if either side fails to act.

Somaliland’s Reaction: Its Future Cannot Be Decided Elsewhere

Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel, Dr Mohamed Hagi, rejected attempts to decide Somaliland’s future through outside political meetings. In comments reported by Qaran News on 5 October, he said such gatherings could not erase Somaliland’s history, sovereignty or the will of its people.

He also criticized the use of Mogadishu as a political proxy against Somaliland and friendly countries. His response defended Hargeisa’s right to speak for itself. It also placed the dispute within the wider struggle over regional influence. (Qaran News: Reported statement by Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel, 5 October 2026)

The government’s broader position was set out in a Foreign Ministry statement dated 3 October, before the summit. It rejected Mogadishu’s authority over Somaliland’s foreign relations, defended its relationship with Israel and supported negotiated Ethiopian sea access. It based Somaliland’s sovereignty claim on its 1960 independence, inherited borders and the restoration of statehood in 1991.

Although this was not a reply to Alamein, it explains the position from which Somaliland can respond. Hargeisa presents cooperation with other governments as a decision it has the right to make. (Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Government statement, 3 October 2026) (Full statement reproduced by Qaran News)

The challenge is to turn that position into wider diplomatic support. Alamein gives Somalia additional partners in its campaign against recognition. Somaliland can answer through a combination of negotiations, international engagement and protection of its existing relationships.

A firm defence of sovereignty can sit alongside practical offers of trade and cooperation. The aim would be to make Somaliland’s stability and participation valuable to more governments.

The Options Open to Somaliland

A stronger agreement with Ethiopia is one option. Hargeisa could seek negotiations that place recognition, transit rights, investment and security arrangements within a clearly defined bargain. Ethiopia’s need for another route gives Somaliland a negotiating opportunity, but the two sides want different immediate gains.

Addis Ababa wants usable access; Hargeisa wants that access to produce lasting diplomatic value. A phased agreement could bridge those interests if the recognition decision has a definite place in the timetable.

Wider recognition diplomacy is another option. Somaliland can take its case directly to African governments, explaining its history, institutions and commitment to maintaining the borders it inherited at independence. It can also build on existing diplomatic relationships to seek additional recognition and practical cooperation.

The effort would be stronger if governments heard a consistent argument supported by official documents and clear policy commitments. This would reduce the risk that Somaliland’s case is understood only through Somalia’s objections or another power’s military interests.

Engagement with the opposing governments remains available too. Somaliland could seek direct discussions with Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan to explain the economic purpose of a Berbera agreement and hear their specific concerns. Those talks would not require Hargeisa to abandon its claim to sovereignty.

However, they could help separate commercial cooperation from fears about perceived military threats, even if recognition remains disputed. Understanding which concerns are negotiable would give Somaliland more room to act than treating every disagreement as permanent hostility.

Security partnerships offer a further response, provided their terms protect Somaliland’s own interests. Leaders could seek coastal surveillance, defensive equipment, training and stronger protection for ports, airports and transport routes.

Any agreement involving foreign military access would need clear rules on permitted operations, command and emergency assistance. Investment and security cooperation would also be more durable if explained publicly and backed by broad domestic support. The purpose would be to strengthen Somaliland’s control over its territory and its ability to withstand pressure.

Berbera Can Connect Trade, Diplomacy and Security

Emirati investment gives these options an existing commercial base. DP World describes links between Berbera, Jebel Ali and inland destinations including Ethiopia. Further investment could improve roads, storage, energy and customs procedures, making Ethiopian access easier to use.

Somaliland could gain jobs and revenue, while Ethiopia would gain a more dependable alternative gateway. These shared benefits could support closer cooperation without requiring every partner to join a formal alliance. (DP World: Somaliland operations and regional connectivity)

Israeli security cooperation could add another part to that relationship. Middle East Eye’s 2 October reporting quoted Somaliland presidential adviser Mohamed Osman Fadal seeking air-defence systems and support against Türkiye. Those requests show an interest in stronger ties, but do not establish a defence guarantee.

Ethiopian transit, Emirati financing and Israeli security assistance could develop through separate agreements that support one another. Their combined value would depend on the benefits delivered to Somaliland as well as to its partners. (Middle East Eye: The Israel–Turkey clash coming to the Horn of Africa, 2 October 2026)

The Scoop: Alamein Could Strengthen the Partnership It Seeks to Constrain

Alamein’s gamble is that diplomatic pressure will contain Ethiopia’s maritime choices and Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition. That pressure could instead turn Berbera into the centre of a closer partnership, giving Ethiopia an alternative trade corridor and Somaliland greater leverage to secure recognition, investment and defensive support.

For Abiy, the choice now carries wider consequences: continuing strategic ambiguity preserves flexibility, while a negotiated agreement with Hargeisa could establish a durable maritime alternative despite regional opposition.

For Somaliland, the opportunity is to convert Ethiopia’s need for access into firm commitments that strengthen its sovereignty and bargaining power.

If Addis Ababa and Hargeisa reach an enforceable bargain linking access, recognition and clearly defined security cooperation, Cairo’s attempt to constrain them could help reshape the regional balance in their favour.