Europe russian SPYING
German Counterintelligence as Whistleblower —
or What Awaits Us If We Don’t Wake Up
The warning issued by German counterintelligence is one we should all take seriously.
We thought the Cold War had ended long ago. Well… we were a bit off. It merely dozed off, convinced it had earned a well-deserved rest. The West assumed that after the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/09/1989), the Stasi had vanished into thin air — everyone except the Kremlin, that is. Moscow held on to plenty of loyal servants, active or “sleepers,” first in Germany but hardly only there. Berlin now finds itself on the front line. That became clear the moment Germany decided to rearm and become Europe’s largest conventional military power.
Faced with this shift, Russian intelligence has reorganized and adapted seamlessly.
Recent revelations from the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV — German counterintelligence) and other German agencies show that Moscow now relies on hybrid espionage. Russia isn’t simply spying anymore; it’s recruiting “disposable” agents, targeting civilian infrastructure, and probing NATO’s foundations — including France’s. In other words: the Cold War isn’t over. It just changed costumes.
1. An updated Threat
As early as spring 2025, German intelligence leaders were already warning that Russian espionage and sabotage had reached “unprecedented levels.” More recently, the BfV flagged a sharp rise in “infiltration, espionage, and acts of sabotage,” hitting military sectors as well as logistics and energy. (Ukrinform)
In France, we’ve barely discussed the strange incidents that disrupted SNCF traffic — unexplained fires in switching centers, electronic failures, cyberattacks on hospitals and local authorities, sabotage of public infrastructure, even infiltration inside the Paris police headquarters that left four victims.
Social networks and AI have become disturbingly effective partners in all this.
“We are observing aggressive behavior from Russian intelligence services,”
— BfV President
During the Cold War, Russia relied heavily on “sleepers.” Today, it’s shifting methods: fewer spectacular operations, more low-visibility actors with no official cover. A hybrid profile is emerging.
Just months ago, Bulgarian nationals were arrested after painting antisemitic graffiti, including at the Shoah Memorial. Make of that what you will.
Spy drones
Regular sightings of “unidentified drones” over NATO countries — including France — have become routine. Authorities publicly claim ignorance of their origin. Hard to believe our air-defense systems would be unable to identify or stop them…
2. The “Disposable Agent” Model
The pattern is simple: someone is spotted on social media, paid a few hundred euros to complete a task (scouting, posting flyers, flying a hobby drone…), and then tossed aside. The new label is “disposable agent.”
The exact same method is used by Iran in Israel — arrests are already piling up there.
For Russia (and Iran), the model is ideal: minimal cost, minimal diplomatic risk, minimal visibility.
For the West: asymmetric chaos — countless small actions, countless gray zones, little noise. A counterintelligence nightmare.
3. Why the Old Model Hasn’t Disappeared
You’d think the fall of the USSR and the “end of history” had retired the classic spy. Not so. In the 1990s, the BfV warned:
“It must be assumed that an unknown number of individuals from various former intelligence services continue operating illegally in the Federal Republic of Germany.” (Ukrinform)
Remember: thousands of Stasi officers found themselves jobless overnight. Some went West. Others were hired by Moscow. And let’s not forget: Russia’s current president headed the KGB office in East Germany.
Today, facts speak for themselves: clandestine traditions didn’t vanish — they adapted.
Europe’s loosened borders, combined with rising irregular migration, have accelerated the rise of one-off agents who serve their handlers once and disappear.
4. What Are the Targets?
• Critical infrastructure & logistics: mapping military bases, weapons routes to Ukraine, heavy logistics. Iran has used the same playbook in Israel.
• Information, influence & cyber: targeted messaging, bots, fake accounts, disinformation. The field keeps expanding.
• Civilians as indirect assets: recruits aren’t professionals — just marginal actors tempted by quick cash. Their role: sow doubt and disruption.
5. The Russian Calculation: Why Keep the Old Style model?
• Moscow doesn’t want to throw away decades of trained “human capital.”
• Traditional sleepers are expensive (language, cover, insertion), but for Russia, it’s a strategic investment.
• Tech and geopolitics demand subtler infiltration: civilian covers, university settings, marriage, dual nationality — all noted by the BfV.
It’s no longer only about what to spy on, but how to do it without getting caught.
6. Why Is Germany Sounding the Alarm Now?
Several converging factors:
• Germany’s support for Ukraine and its militarized supply chain make it prime espionage real estate.
• Moscow now sees Germany as its number-one European adversary.
• A multiplication of small incidents — drones, scouting, sabotage — forming a hybrid zone between war and classic espionage.
• And, recently, public warnings:
The BfV and BKA are urging citizens to stay alert, avoid shady online offers, and report suspicious behavior.
“Don’t let yourself become a disposable agent.”
— BKA Awareness Campaign (Sept. 2025), Arab News
7. What Can France and Europe Do?
Even if the warning originates in Germany, the lessons apply widely:
• Increased vigilance: any “easy money” job offer online should raise alarms.
• Stronger civilian counterintelligence: spies no longer wear trench coats.
• Cross-border information sharing: a drone over a German base may be part of a European-wide operation directed from Moscow.
• Public awareness: the cheapest espionage lever is ignorance.
8. A New Era of Espionage-Sabotage?
The invisible weapon now wears ordinary clothes: a Russian student, a temporary worker, an influencer hired on the side. The model keeps evolving.
And classic sleepers aren’t gone — merely dormant. Ready for activation. The BfV put it bluntly: “an indeterminate number is still active.” (Ukrinform)
Attention must now cover both:
• the revival of old clandestine networks
• and the rise of new hybrid systems
Social networks make recruitment easy, cheap, and discreet — just like organized crime, which has used similar tactics across Europe.
Conclusion
The message is simple: Russian espionage hasn’t taken a vacation. It has changed outfits.
While European leaders juggled other crises, believing the era of “sleepers” was behind us, German intelligence is sounding the alarm. Espionage, sabotage, influence — the spectrum is widening.
As the line between war and peace blurs, one question looms:
Will we be ready to watch the border, no matter the face of the person crossing it?
Such is the world we live in.
