Europe’s Geopolitical Crisis Opens Doors to Israel

In July 2026, the European Union attributed sabotage against Polish infrastructure, including combined heat and power plants, to Russia’s Federal Security Service. Moscow’s confrontation with Europe is reaching the systems that sustain civilian life, far from the Ukrainian front. Protecting them requires capabilities that connect security with technology. Israel could be a useful partner in that effort.

Russia’s hybrid warfare against Europe combines cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage and foreign information manipulation and interference. Many of these operations take place in the gray zone between peace and war, through state agencies and proxies, sometimes making attribution and an effective response difficult. Their logic is to maintain pressure, weaken trust in institutions and raise the domestic cost of confronting Russia. Identifying disruptions, protecting infrastructure and keeping essential services running have become central national security tasks for European governments.

The geopolitical context extends beyond Russia. Europe faces this threat while a rift in trust with the United States raises doubts about how far its security planning can rely on Washington. Disagreements over trade, Ukraine and defense burden-sharing pose a practical question for European governments: which capabilities must they control themselves to preserve their freedom of action when American priorities change? The transatlantic alliance continues to function, but the assumption that both sides will consistently share the same strategic outlook has become harder to sustain.

Europe is also moving toward selective distancing from China in sensitive sectors. Its declared policy is to reduce critical dependencies and diversify suppliers while maintaining extensive trade. Chinese export restrictions on raw materials and technologies demonstrate how economic dependence can constrain political choices. Decisions about suppliers, technologies and industrial partners consequently carry growing geopolitical weight.

Israel could contribute to Europe’s search for capabilities and partners. According to the Israel Innovation Authority, Israeli high-tech exports reached approximately $85 billion in 2025, accounting for 58 percent of total exports. The figures demonstrate the sector’s economic importance and Israel’s dependence on access to markets and international relationships. Israel has a direct interest in turning its technological capabilities into lasting partnerships.

That strategic logic encounters a difficult political reality. In Pew Research Center’s spring 2026 survey, 73 percent of adults in Germany and 78 percent in Spain expressed an unfavorable view of Israel. Public opinion does not determine government decisions or commercial agreements on its own, but it shapes part of the environment in which they are made. Cooperation with Israel may now require a European government, university or company to explain to its public why that cooperation is justified.

Technological cooperation is also exposed to these disagreements. In July 2025, the European Commission proposed partially suspending Israel’s participation in Horizon Europe, specifically in the European Innovation Council’s Accelerator, which provides grants and investment to companies. The proposal itself shows that Israel’s technological strengths offer no guarantee that scientific relations will remain separate from political disputes.

The economic balance also calls for modesty. The EU accounted for 31.7 percent of Israel’s trade in goods in 2025, while Israel represented approximately 0.8 percent of the EU’s goods trade with countries outside the bloc. Israel can be highly valuable in particular fields and projects. That falls well short of broad European dependence on Israel. A convincing Israeli proposal must begin with a defined European need and a contribution that can be demonstrated.

Germany’s Arrow 3 agreement illustrates this possibility. The first operational system was handed over in December 2025 as part of Germany’s acquisition of a capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Technology developed jointly by Israel and the United States is addressing a European security requirement. The agreement creates a substantial relationship around a specific capability, alongside continuing disagreements over Israeli policy.

The next stage could extend the partnership into civilian and industrial fields. A joint project to protect an electricity grid, for example, could connect a European operator with Israeli technology companies and researchers. The work could include identifying intrusions, detecting unusual activity and rehearsing the continued provision of services during an attack. Israel’s potential contribution to countering Russian hybrid warfare could then be tested under practical conditions and assessed on performance.

Alongside developing these tools, there is room for joint exercises involving infrastructure operators and public authorities. A hybrid operation may combine a technical disruption with false information intended to amplify fear and undermine trust. Joint exercises could examine how participants identify connections between events, share information and communicate reliable information to the public. Each side would bring its experience, and the solutions would need to fit the institutions and societies in which they are used.

Artificial intelligence could broaden cooperation beyond protection against attacks. Israeli and European companies could develop applications for industrial maintenance, energy efficiency and the early detection of faults. Working with European manufacturers and operators would allow technologies to be tested in their intended setting, with decisions on further investment based on results.

For these partnerships to last, European participants would need a meaningful role in development, production and the economic benefits. Local employment, joint investment and agreed ownership of the results could create an interest in continuing the work. Israel, meanwhile, would need to preserve incentives for research and employment at home. A successful partnership would expand capabilities on both sides and give its participants reasons to sustain it.

This effort would have to advance with countries and institutions willing to commit to it. Alongside established partners in Western Europe, opportunities in Northern and Eastern Europe merit examination according to their needs and willingness to invest. Concern about Russia does not itself indicate sympathy for Israel. Even within a single country, governments, universities and companies may reach different decisions. A horizon of three to five years would allow cooperation to begin with defined projects and expand following demonstrated success.

Diplomatic work would be needed in parallel. Gaza’s humanitarian situation, settlement policy and the prospect of a political resolution of the Palestinian issue remain central disagreements with Europe. Progress on these questions would influence the willingness to deepen relations. European governments also need to clarify what conditions would allow cooperation to expand and consider the costs of restrictions for their own security, research and industrial needs.

Israel’s challenge is to offer Europe capabilities that help it respond to the new geopolitical conditions, and to demonstrate that reliable relationships can be built around them. Protecting infrastructure against Russian operations, developing technology jointly and expanding industrial capacity could provide starting points. As this work produces clear benefits, and is accompanied by efforts to reduce political friction, it could gradually broaden the options available to both sides.