Europe’s Hormuz Calculation: Why Restraint Prevails

Donald Trump’s call for NATO allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz places European governments in a strategic dilemma in which their geopolitical commitments collide with their economic vulnerabilities. Their refusal to join the U.S. operation in Hormuz was a strategic calculation. Whether Europe participates or abstains may lead to similar outcomes, but at different levels of risk and cost. As the adage goes, of two evils one chooses the lesser, and this reflects Europe’s current position. Yet this strategic restraint is conditional rather than indefinite: it depends on both the duration of the conflict and the orientation and success of diplomatic efforts to end it. Should the war drag on or diplomacy fail to secure the reopening Europe expects, military involvement may ultimately become increasingly difficult for Europe to avoid.

As a lifeline for global energy markets and, by extension, for Europe’s fragile economic stability, the Strait of Hormuz is not just a maritime corridor. Its closure amid the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran has pushed Europe to a crossroads where its geopolitical posture toward Russia stands in tension with its economic priorities. The disruption reportedly prompted the Trump administration to temporarily ease sanctions on Russian oil in an effort to stabilize surging energy prices. As reported by Semafor, “high prices have boosted its revenues by $150 million a day, with Urals crude up 40% month-on-month.” Confronted with such a situation, “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy all denounced the decision to allow the delivery and sale of Russian oil stranded at sea, which will allow the Kremlin to replenish its war chest for the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” Politico Europe reported.

European leaders have been explicit about the risks. Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez warned that the war in Iran risks ‘playing Russian roulette’ with the lives of millions. Under pressure from Washington to allow the use of Spanish air bases, Sánchez rejected, in a televised address, participation on the grounds that joining the operation would contradict both Spain’s interests and its broader diplomatic principles. His remarks reflect a broader European concern that involvement could deepen instability rather than limit escalation.

Given the strategic importance of Hormuz for global trade—especially for Europe and major Asian economies—Trump has urged not only European allies but also Asian partners and even China to contribute to securing the Strait. Yet, despite the stakes, Europe has chosen hesitation over alignment. Many critics have labeled their decision as a sign of weakness or described it as a direct reaction to Trump’s threat and criticism of Europe. These interpretations miss the depth of Europe’s decision, overlooking the strategic caution underlying its position. Firstly, Europe seeks to counter Russia’s influence and economic regeneration that the closure of Hormuz is fostering; secondly, it must protect its own economic stability, which depends heavily on uninterrupted energy flows through Hormuz. These competing priorities make any decision difficult.

Therefore, NATO allies’ refusal regarding Hormuz stems neither from division with the U.S. nor from Trump’s rhetoric. Although both accepting and rejecting the call carry advantages, Europe has more to lose by joining than by dismissing it amid the war. French President Emmanuel Macron has made this position clear. While declining immediate involvement in Hormuz, he emphasized that such a decision could be reconsidered “once the situation is calmer.” Speaking at a defense meeting, he stated: “France did not choose this war. We are not taking part in it. We have a purely defensive position. Our objectives are clear: to protect our nationals, our diplomatic and military sites, and our interests in the region.” Yet given France’s economic interests, as well as its geopolitical opposition to Russia over the war in Ukraine, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz is, in a way, as significant as these concerns for France. Therefore, he suggested that there is no reason to engage France—or more broadly Europe—in a war it neither initiated nor controls. This allows Europe to avoid entanglement in a conflict that could escalate further and destabilize the global economy. As for Chancellor Friedrich Merz, he stressed the legal and political constraints on European involvement, noting that Germany “lacks the mandate from the United Nations, the European Union, or NATO.” He emphasized that neither “the United States nor Israel consulted European partners prior to the conflict,” reinforcing the argument that Europe should not automatically assume responsibility for its consequences.

Europe’s position reflects a sober assessment of outcomes. Whether Europe intervenes or abstains, the end goal remains the same. Its objective is a secure and open Strait of Hormuz. The difference lies in the cost. Direct involvement risks lives, resources, and political capital, while also endangering the very shipping lanes such intervention is meant to protect. Refusal, by contrast, preserves strategic flexibility, allowing Europe to protect its interests while reducing exposure. EU officials have made clear that member states are unwilling to expose personnel to direct military risk in the Strait under current conditions. 

What U.S. allies need is either for the Strait of Hormuz to remain open during the war or for the conflict to end so that the Strait can reopen safely. Danish officials indicated that any future European role would need to remain tied to de-escalation rather than coercive military enforcement. So, despite the scope of the economic impact that the closure of Hormuz may have on the European economies, they have framed their response around diplomacy and de-escalation. Engaging in Trump’s initiative to reopen the Strait while the war continues may worsen the situation rather than help limit escalation and foster the safe passage of tankers. Yet, if they refuse—as is currently the case—this may pressure Trump to reconsider continuing the war. In turn, this creates the possibility of de-escalation, which represents their best chance of seeing the Strait reopen without incurring direct risks.

Critics may argue that abstention undermines transatlantic unity. But unity without strategy is not strength—it is exposure. By declining to engage militarily, European leaders have chosen caution in the face of uncertainty and implicitly signaled that the reopening of the Strait cannot be separated from the broader question of war itself. A secure passage is not simply enforced; it can also be negotiated through de-escalation. Italian officials also moved to dispel interpretations of Starmer’s statement suggesting “a collective plan” to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait, emphasizing that no government was actively considering a forcible operation to break the blockade.

Furthermore, Trump’s criticism of Europe is primarily a way of addressing what he sees as European strategic mistakes regarding their dangerous policy towards Russia since 2014. During a G7 summit in 2025, he labelled U.S.-EU policy that fostered the isolation of Russia as “a big mistake.” In this context, Trump’s criticism reflects broader transatlantic disagreements over burden-sharing and over the strategic consequences of Europe’s post-2014 Russia policy. This blind policy has turned against the West by threatening both its influence and its security. It also puts the United States at risk politically, economically, strategically and even militarily, while struggling to maintain its influence over these domains. By criticizing Europe while signaling openness toward Moscow, Trump appears to be attempting a strategic recalibration.

There is also a subtler logic at play. Europe’s refusal introduces pressure on Washington. Without allied backing, the sustainability of prolonged confrontation comes into question. This, in turn, may incentivize a shift away from escalation toward resolution. In that sense, Europe’s inaction is not passive—it is strategic restraint aimed at altering the trajectory of the conflict. For example, in dismissing both Trump’s request to help secure Hormuz and his statement about “a bad future for NATO allies” who declined to assist, Spanish defense officials framed abstention as a means of reinforcing pressure for a negotiated end to hostilities rather than prolonging the conflict through military participation.

In this sense, European governments are not choosing between action and inaction, but between two forms of risk. One is immediate, visible, and military. The other is indirect, slower, and political. They have chosen the latter—not because it guarantees success, but because it minimizes exposure while preserving the possibility of a more durable outcome. In a crisis defined by uncertainty, Europe’s refusal is not a retreat from responsibility. It is a recognition that sometimes, the most effective way to secure a passage is not to force it open, but to ensure the conditions under which it can remain open. Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares reinforced this stance, arguing that European actions should avoid adding further tension to an already volatile regional confrontation. With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the war in Iran is indeed starting to “weaken Europe,” as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, according to a readout of his talks with Germany’s Steinmeier. But trying to solve this issue by joining an operation to militarily facilitate the reopening of the Strait amid the war could deteriorate the situation.

That is also why France withheld support for the U.S.–Bahrain draft resolution that China and Russia vetoed. It instead advanced a separate diplomatic framework centered on de-escalation rather than enforcement. Unlike Russia, which benefits from the closure of the Strait, France and China depend on it. But as they have more to lose than to gain in joining a coalition to secure Hormuz, or as such an operation could worsen the situation, they chose not to support it. Regarding China’s opposition to the resolution, Fu Cong argued that any Security Council action should avoid legitimizing further escalation, insisting that maritime security in Hormuz depends first on ending hostilities.

Likewise, the broader strategic implications extend beyond Europe. For China and other energy-dependent powers, disruption in Hormuz exposes vulnerabilities that could reshape global energy alignments. Yet for Europe, the immediate concern remains narrower and more urgent: avoiding direct entanglement while preserving the conditions for eventual maritime stability.

However, Europe’s strategic restraint will not last long and may be challenged if the war continues or the disruption extends beyond any possible agreement between the U.S. and Iran. The European Central Bank already warned that a prolonged conflict-driven energy shock could weaken European growth, increase fiscal strain through higher defense and energy-related spending, and trigger instability in sovereign debt markets. In either case, Europe and major Asian economies may indeed be forced to take action in Hormuz. As the conflict erupted around the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly told a Qatari television channel that the future of the Strait is “a matter of Iran and Oman.” Since then, Iranian officials have advanced the idea of controlling and potentially weaponizing Hormuz following any agreement. Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader said: “after the imposed war, by defining a new regime to the Strait of Hormuz,  Iran will move from being under sanctions to a powerful position in the region and in the world.” In a report by Mehr News Agency this month, he also said, “the Strait of Hormuz represents an opportunity as precious as an atomic bomb,” adding, “Indeed, having in one’s hands a position that allows you to influence the global economy with a single decision is a major opportunity.” Furthermore, the Head of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Azizi reportedly stated that “the draft bill prepared by the Islamic Consultative Assembly to define the legal framework of the Strait of Hormuz is now ready,” adding “It will be approved as soon as parliamentary sessions resume, to become a deterrent law.” His remarks came following reports that Iran and Oman planned to discuss a joint toll system for vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Aware of this, Trump threatens to use force against Oman unless it “behaves just like everybody else,” he said.

Therefore, Europe may still find itself in an impasse due to Iran’s proposed policy regarding the Strait. It is true that Iran and the United States appear close to reaching an agreement to end the war which is precisely the outcome Europe wants and which aligns with Europe’s expectation that Hormuz will reopen without any military intervention. Iran’s apparent intention to impose tolls and retain coercive leverage over the Strait complicates that expectation. Backed by Gulf States, the United States and Bahrain are set to propose a revised UN resolution over Hormuz which, if passed, could help solve these problems. Referring to the proposed resolution, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a video posted on the U.S. Department of State’s Facebook page: “if the international community can’t rally behind this and solve something so straightforward, then I don’t know what the utility of the UN system is.” However, citing diplomatic sources, Reuters reported that Russia and China are waiting to veto it.

This suggests that tensions may continue between Iran and Europe, whether diplomatically or militarily following a potential agreement to end the war. As reported by Al Arabiya, citing a French military source, “France’s Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier group is moving into the ⁠Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as part of efforts by France and Britain to prepare for a future mission to help secure freedom of navigation in ⁠the strait of Hormuz.” Germany also reportedly dispatched a minesweeper in the eastern Mediterranean with its Defense Minister Boris Pistorius saying that: “the country has begun a naval deployment to the eastern Mediterranean in a move that ensures readiness to secure global maritime passages.” Following these initiatives, the United Kingdom also reportedly announced plans to deploy jets, drones and warships in Hormuz as part of this multinational operation aimed at restoring “freedom of navigation” in the Middle East. 

Developments may still unfold in line with Europe’s preferred outcome—namely, the reopening of the Strait without direct European military intervention. Besides, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated that any Iranian attempt to impose tolls on Hormuz would make a diplomatic settlement politically unfeasible for Washington and unacceptable to the broader international community.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump told CBS News that negotiators for the United States and Iran are “getting a lot closer” to finalizing an agreement that would end the war between the two countries. He later wrote on Truth Social that, as part of a memorandum of understanding on a peace deal, “an Agreement has been largely negotiated,” adding, “In addition to many other elements of the Agreement, the Strait of Hormuz will be opened.” So the situation might turn around for Europe. This suggests that Europe’s hope for a secure and open Strait of Hormuz without direct military involvement may yet be realized. But Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Bagaei already warned that the ongoing talks between Tehran and Washington remain at a complicated stage. According to him, “we are both very far and very close to an agreement.” He also reportedly said that the Strait of Hormuz has nothing to do with the United States, addressing this issue as a matter between Iran and the coastal states of the Strait. 

Soon after Trump’s announcement that Hormuz will be fully reopened as part of the memorandum, Fars News Agency reported that Trump’s claim regarding the reopening of Hormuz is “far from reality,” stressing that Iran will continue to manage the Strait after a deal with the U.S. Axios has provided a detailed explanation of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding draft, citing a U.S. official. According to the detailed outline of the document, a 60-day ceasefire would be established and Iran must reopen the Strait of Hormuz, remove naval mines deployed in the waterway, and allow vessels to transit Hormuz freely. Meanwhile, Tasnim News Agency reported that under the memorandum,  the Strait of Hormuz would not fully return to its pre-war status. The report clarifies that the proposed framework only guarantees a return to pre-war levels of ship traffic within 30 days, with Iran insisting it will continue “exercising its sovereign right” over the Strait of Hormuz through measures to be announced later.

Iranian officials reinforced this dynamic, making their intention to control and impose tolls in the Strait clearer. For them, the narrow waterway is not merely a global shipping lane, emphasizing its role regarding Iran’s national security, their sovereignty over Hormuz, being part of Iran’s territorial waters and its strategic use to shape both the regional and new global order: Iran International reported that, Hossein Shariatmadari, the Supreme Leader’s representative at Kayhan newspaper urged the government to charge transit fees on vessels passing through the Strait. He emphasized that “The Strait of Hormuz is part of Iran’s territorial waters and we retain the legal right to collect transit fees from ships and vessels passing through our territorial waters.” Mohsen Rezaei, a military adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, went further by framing Iran’s management of Hormuz as a “legal right” to ensure its national security according to Reuters. Iranian General Ali Abdollahi also stated that, “the Revolution Leader’s plans and strategies for managing the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz guarantee the region’s future, the regional order, and the new world order under the strategy of ‘strong Iran’, where foreigners have no place.” Europe therefore remains uncertain as to whether it will need to intervene militarily in Hormuz. In the meantime, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer supported the ongoing effort as the progress towards an agreement to end the war continues. Following the announcement of the Memorandum of Understanding which is set to bring an agreement between U.S. and Iran closer than ever before, he said in a post on X, “We will work with our international partners to seize this moment and achieve a long-term diplomatic settlement.” 

Europe’s refusal, then, was never simply a rejection of Washington’s call. It was a strategic wager that restraint would preserve greater leverage than immediate intervention. Whether that wager proves sustainable depends on the durability of any U.S.–Iran settlement and on Tehran’s future intentions in Hormuz. But Europe’s calculation is already clear: in a crisis where military action could secure passage only at the cost of wider instability, strategic caution remains the least dangerous path—provided diplomacy can prevent the Strait itself from becoming a permanent instrument of geopolitical leverage.