Europe’s Israeli Paradox
Eighty years after the end of the Second World War, Europe finds itself confronting a contradiction largely of its own making.
Western Europe emerged from the catastrophe of 1939–45 determined to reject the nationalism that had helped destroy the continent. Over succeeding decades it embraced liberalism, multiculturalism and increasingly open immigration policies.
There were several waves. Post-colonial migration brought large Muslim populations from Pakistan and elsewhere to Britain, and from North Africa to France. Later came migration from the Middle East and Africa, accelerated by wars, the Arab Spring, the collapse of Syria and Libya and Europe’s willingness to receive large numbers of refugees and migrants.
The demographic consequences are undeniable. Europe’s Muslim population increased substantially, particularly in Western Europe, and migration accounted for an important part of that growth.
Western Europe’s great miscalculation, however, was not simply immigration. It was allowing immigration on such a scale without sufficiently insisting upon integration.
Of course, this does not describe every Muslim living in Europe. But it does describe a problem that European political correctness has too often made difficult even to discuss. Substantial communities have developed whose religious and communal identities can sometimes be stronger than their identification with the countries in which they live.
We see manifestations of that alienation in hostility towards national symbols, in radical Islamist movements and, since 7 October, very visibly on Europe’s streets. Demonstrations ostensibly about Gaza have included calls for intifada and slogans demanding a Palestine “from the river to the sea”.
Jews have felt the consequences.
There is an old European antisemitism which never disappeared. Today it is joined by antisemitism connected to the Middle Eastern conflict and by a radical anti-Zionism that sometimes makes remarkably little distinction between Israelis and Jews.
This has also changed politics. As Muslim populations have grown, Israel and Palestine have ceased to be purely foreign policy questions. They have become domestic European political issues. Politicians count votes and governments respond to constituencies. It would be naive to believe that changing demographics have no bearing on the increasingly difficult relationship between parts of Western Europe and Israel.
The contrast with Central and Eastern Europe is striking.
Countries such as Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states do not share Western Europe’s colonial history. They did not acquire large post-colonial populations from the Middle East, North Africa or South Asia. Their twentieth-century experience was very different.
They experienced Nazi occupation, communist dictatorship and Soviet domination. For them, Russia is not an abstract geopolitical threat. It is part of their recent history. Poles remember Soviet domination. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians remember occupation and annexation. Czechs remember Soviet tanks. Ukrainians are living the consequences today.
These countries have their own complicated histories with Jews and antisemitism, and not all Central and Eastern European governments take identical positions on Israel. Nevertheless, they have generally not experienced the same combination of post-colonial immigration, domestic Middle Eastern politics and political pressure over Israel that has developed in parts of Western Europe.
They also understand Russia.
For several decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western Europe behaved as though major war on the continent belonged to history. Defence spending fell, armies shrank and security became something Europeans largely assumed NATO, and ultimately America, would provide.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine destroyed that illusion.
Europe suddenly rediscovered the importance of missiles, drones, air defence, intelligence, deterrence and military preparedness. This has produced an uncomfortable irony. The Israel that parts of Europe increasingly condemn is also the Israel whose technology Europe increasingly needs.
European imports of major weapons increased by 210 per cent between 2016–20 and 2021–25. Among European NATO countries, Israel has become the third-largest supplier of imported major weapons, behind only the United States and South Korea.
Europe wants Israeli missile defence systems, radar, drones, anti-tank systems, cyber capabilities and intelligence expertise.
And so we arrive at the European paradox.
Western European politicians look at Gaza, demonstrations in their streets and their changing electorates, and increasingly distance themselves from Israel. European defence planners look east at Russia and increasingly look towards Israel.
One side talks of sanctions and embargoes, while the other wants Israeli defence systems. Politicians worry about being seen as too close to Jerusalem, while their defence establishments worry about Russian missiles.
There is an element of hypocrisy here that should be called by its name.
European governments are perfectly entitled to disagree with Israeli policy. Friendship does not require unquestioning support. But there is something difficult to reconcile about condemning the Jewish state’s security policies while simultaneously seeking to purchase the products of the security establishment that those policies and decades of conflict helped create.
Israel developed missile defence because missiles were fired at its cities. It developed intelligence capabilities because intelligence failures cost Israeli lives. It developed expertise in drones, cyber warfare and counter-terrorism because these were never theoretical subjects for Israelis.
For decades Western Europe enjoyed the luxury of believing that hard power was becoming less important. Israel never had that luxury. Central and Eastern Europeans, with Russia on their doorstep and Soviet domination within living memory, never entirely believed it either. Ukraine has now reminded the rest of Europe.
There is a profound historical irony in all of this. Eighty years after the Holocaust, antisemitism is again a serious problem on European streets. Jewish schools and synagogues require guards and some Jews think twice before displaying their identity openly.
At precisely the same time, European governments are turning to the Jewish state for technology capable of protecting their own populations.
Perhaps Europe needs a little more honesty. Honesty about the consequences of mass immigration without successful integration, about the relationship between demographic change and domestic politics, about antisemitism and where it comes from, and about the strategic importance of Israel.
Europe’s contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal.
Parts of Europe may increasingly dislike what Israel does. But Europe increasingly needs what Israel knows.
27 September, 2026
Len Judes, KML
Former President and currently Honorary President, Israel Britain Chamber of Commerce, President of the Israel-Lithuania Chamber of Commerce/Technology Hub
