Even if Bibi’s right, the country can’t trust him

The discovery last weekend of the six murdered hostages was a hammer blow. It followed a week in which the publication of secret recordings of the prime minister’s meetings with former hostages and families of hostages exposed a hair-raising absence of humanity, and the leaked transcript of last Thursday’s security cabinet meeting revealed the hair-pulling frustration of Defense Minister Galant and senior security officials with Netanyahu’s prioritizing the Philadelphi Corridor over the return of hostages. That last hammer blow was one too many to the guts of a country already beaten down by almost a year of consistently tragic news. Like a dam bursting, hundreds of thousands of Israelis who had equivocated for months about joining demonstrations demanding a deal with Hamas poured onto the streets on Sunday night and a national strike was called for Monday.

But – is it possible that Netanyahu is right? Perhaps the demonstrations and Monday’s general strike really are, as he claims, a “show of support for Hamas and Sinwar.” Maybe by retreating from the Philadelphi Corridor, and releasing 1,000 or more Hamas members from our jails, some with blood on their hands, we are strengthening Hamas at a time when victory is so close? Would this allow them to smuggle weapons into Gaza, restore the depleted ranks of Hamas, and reorganize?

In the first phase of any deal we would likely see some 30 hostages returned from Gaza. But then what? Do we leave the rest of the hostages in Gaza while we retake the Corridor following the likely collapse of the talks, and lose more soldiers in battle to a revitalized and re-armed Hamas? Or do we use the same calculus to release the rest of the hostages, with the same results? And what would happen if global pressure is so great that we are unable to re-enter Gaza and Hamas is left unhindered to rehabilitate itself?

And perhaps Netanyahu is right not to trust his defense minister, the heads of the army, Shin Bet and Mossad, who have all told him that the army can deal with a retreat from the Philadelphi Corridor and re-take it if necessary. Perhaps he’s right to say that our military leaders gave similar undertakings regarding Oslo, and the withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza. Not to mention their failure to predict October 7.

Here’s the problem: most of us just don’t believe Netanyahu anymore. He has so little credit in the bank. It was he who believed that the only way to avoid a Palestinian state was to “manage the conflict” and ensure that Hamas remained a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority. It is widely known that Prime Ministers Rabin and Sharon challenged their military chiefs with “what if” scenarios that pitted the generals against their own security proposals. But for so long as the military acted in accordance with the vision Netanyahu vigorously advocated, he did not ask these same questions. It is why he cannot shift the blame for October 7 to the military, however hard he tries.

And how many times can Netanyahu promise that victory is close, without an end in sight? On February 7, he told us that “victory was within reach” and that the IDF had destroyed 18 out of Hamas’s 24 battalions (in a war prosecuted from the north of Gaza, and with Hamas in control of the Philadelphi Corridor). On April 7, we were, in his words: “One step from victory.” On June 17, we had allegedly destroyed half of Hamas’s capabilities in Rafah, and on August 30, we were informed that the entire Rafah Brigade had collapsed. Notably, the Critical Threats Project, created by the American Enterprise Institute (a center-right think tank) recently published an in-depth report that stated that, as of August 5, Hamas had reconstituted close to half of its battalions in the north of Gaza to some degree (all of which occurred during Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor) and only three of their battalions have been effectively neutralized as fighting forces.

With soldiers still dying on an almost daily basis, who are we to believe?

In most, if not all, polls since October, a large majority of the public thinks that the main motivations for Netanyahu’s decisions are personal or political. Examples are abundant, from the sublime to the ridiculous, whether it is the appointment of Itamar Ben Gvir — an agitator and convicted felon and the man Netanyahu promised to never include in his government — to be the minister responsible for the police; his acquiescence to the foiled “rabbis law,” which would have robbed local authorities of desperately needed funds, instead providing unnecessary positions to unwanted rabbis; or the shameless public funding of the retiling of Netanyahu’s Caesarea swimming pool.

Perhaps another argument against Netanyahu’s claims is that his own security credentials are hardly unimpeachable. While he believes that only he can deal with the Iranian threat, Netanyahu has profoundly failed on that count. It was Netanyahu who pushed Trump to withdraw from the JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal. That deal may not have been perfect, but it greatly limited Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and gave Israel a 10-year window to build up its offensive and defensive capabilities. Trump’s withdrawal was unilateral and no alternative was put in place to limit Iran. Neither Obama nor Trump launched a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities as Netanyahu had hoped, and since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has had the freedom to enrich uranium to the point where today its “breakout time” — the time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb — is close to zero. Additionally, Netanyahu’s comprehensive failure to take on his coalition partners by failing to talk about the “day after” the war has resulted in his total inability to promote what was once his grand vision — the building of a regional coalition against Iran.

But even were we to concede that Netanyahu’s motivations are wrong, his security credentials moderate at best, and his messianic self-image delusional, maybe the bottom line is right. Maybe we do need to keep the Philadelphi Corridor because to lose it will be far worse for Israel’s overall security. And painful as the loss of the lives of all the remaining hostages may be, perhaps it is better than what may follow a withdrawal.

But even to have this debate is to deny one of the underlying unique strengths of this tiny country since its creation: that no soldier, alive or dead, will be left behind. Part of the contract between the state and its citizens is not just as David Ben Gurion said: “That every Jewish mother will know that she has put her child under the care of worthy officers,” but that everything will be done to bring those children home, even when the cost has been appallingly high. It is why in 2004 Israel released 400 Palestinian prisoners and 36 others (including Hezbollah leaders Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Abd Al-Karim Obeid) for the return of three bodies and a rogue former Mossad agent; in 2008, it released the unrepentant child murderer Samir Kuntar and four others in exchange for the return of two bodies; and in 2011, Netanyahu himself agreed to the release 1,027 Palestinians (including Yahya Sinwar) for the return of one soldier, Gilad Shalit. While the dangers were clear, and even likely, such deals were seen as vital to public unity and strength.

Even the Shamgar Commission, appointed in 2008 by Ehud Barak to create a framework for hostage trades, which proposed to limit the ratios of prisoners to hostages in such exchanges (the exact details have never been published), determined that the highest prices should be paid for those taken while serving in the IDF and for civilians kidnapped in terrorist acts. Notably, in January 2023, Matanyahu Englman, Netanyahu’s hand-picked state comptroller, released a very critical report stating that, in the 10 years since its completion, not a single governmental discussion has been held regarding the Shamgar Commission’s Report. Many answers could be proffered for why, but Netanyahu’s own argument is probably best reflected in the response by Lior Lotan, Netanyahu’s former hostage coordinator, as to why the report had not been adopted. In 2019, Lotan argued that adoption of the report’s conclusions would drastically reduce flexibility in negotiations. In other words, there was a time, before his criminal trials and the formation of his current coalition, that Netanyahu not only accepted the underlying importance to Israeli society of hostage swaps, despite the dangers, but he also believed he should not be restricted by the price we may need to pay.

There is no clear answer whether prioritizing Philadelphi over the hostages is right or wrong. However, it is hard to buy into the reasoning of the man who once took the opposite approach. It is hard to trust a man whose motivations for his decisions are so questionable and whose security credentials so equivocal. Perhaps, worst of all, it is hard to trust a man so driven by his willingness to pay any cost to remain in power.  It was Natan Eshel, Netanyahu’s close confidante and aide, who admitted in a secretly recorded conversation in 2020 that Netanyahu’s key to success was his focus on creating division: “Hate is what unites our camp.” Just as Netanyahu acted to create deep divisions over the judiciary, the civil service, and now our army and security forces, his latest prioritization of the Philadelphi Corridor (important as it may be) over the return of the hostages has turned even the formerly unchallenged understanding that Israel’s deepest strength — its unbreakable commitment to bring hostages home — into another issue that divides the left and right in Israel. He clearly believes that the sacrifice of such a value, critical until now for Israel’s national resilience and security, is preferable over the end of his coalition.

With the security establishment firmly in agreement over a hostage deal despite the dangers, indications that this war that is not likely to end any time soon (even if Israel manages to kill Sinwar), and the preponderance of evidence pointing to personal and political motivations being the chief drivers of Netanyahu’s decisions, we cannot allow even this one last unifying value to be used by Netanyahu to divide us. It — and not the Philadelphi Corridor — is the bedrock of our existence.