Four Strategic Challenges for the US & Israel the Elections Won’t Change
Even as the votes are still being counted, it is clear that the Israeli elections could profoundly affect relations between the US and Israel as well as the broader Middle East strategic environment. However, whoever the Prime Minister may be, they will find themselves staring down at least four trends that, despite the unprecedented tactical cooperation between Israel and the US against Iran, could cause tensions in the strategic relationship. While these strategic trends have received some coverage, the overwhelming focus on the elections in both Israel and the US has largely obscured their significance.
Declining Faith in the US
Many emerging strategic tensions in the US-Israel relationship (beyond those shaped primarily by domestic politics) share a common nexus – declining faith in the US. This is coupled with the much-written-about trend of declining support for Israel in the US – but that is a trend about which many excellent articles have already been written. What is less covered is that the US reputation, while still relatively strong, has taken more than a little hit in Israel of late. From Gaza to Iran and Lebanon, the US was able to get Israel to end major combat operations by underwriting the future of the security arrangements. With Hamas still controlling around forty percent of Gaza, Hezbollah potentially reconstituting, and Iran still acting with aggression, some in Israel are beginning to doubt the US and questioning whether their state should return to the more self-reliant posture that it had before the mid-1970s. While this might reduce the level of US influence in Israel and the region, it would also come at a high cost to an already stretched Israeli economy. Therefore, neither country has an interest in a collapse of faith in the US, and both sides will have to work together to restore it or face a new, more challenging strategic reality.
Israeli Border Insecurity
On October 7th, 2023, Israel’s admittedly weakly defended border with Gaza was shattered and with it much of the Israeli security establishment’s faith in itself – at least when it comes to defense. A deeply flawed strategic concept underlay Israel’s pre-October 7th assessments and contributed to the catastrophe of the day. As a result, Israeli commanders express little trust in strategic assessments that say an attack is not imminent. The antidote Israel has developed to this feeling of border insecurity is a form of “active defense” centered on defending forward of the border. This active defense posture has two pillars. The first is to constantly disrupt any potential enemy’s ability to mass for an attack. The second principle is the need for buffer zones across the border. This is a serious challenge for the relationship with the US. The US has made it very clear that its policy is that Israel will return to its borders. Without a solution for border insecurity, the US is unlikely to make headway in its regional policy objectives, and Israel will continue to take the kind of aggressive actions that complicate US strategy for Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. This, in turn, will be a continued source of friction between the two countries’ regional strategies.
Strategic Objectives for Iran
Most Israelis believe that Iran will remain an existential threat to Israel as long as Iran is capable and its regime is unchanged. When Israel and the US began joint operations against Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury/Operation Rising Lion, the Israeli population bore a significant share of the cost. They did so and supported the war with the belief that any cost paid was worth it because the only way for Israel to be able to live with security and safety is for either the regime to fall in Iran or Iran to be forced to end its nuclear and missile programs and support of proxies. When the US signed its fourteen-point agreement with Iran, many Israelis felt that the US objectives were far more restrained than those of Israel. Similarly, many Israelis interpret the current situation as the US having been defeated by Iran. This means that even if the US were to strike an agreement with Iran that did not address Israel’s concerns, Israel would eventually feel the need to restart combat operations against Iran, which would complicate the US position in the region. The more the US might try to force Israel away from such actions, the more it might reinforce the Israeli drive towards greater autonomy.
New Blocs in the Middle East
The tensions between Israel and Turkey are no secret. Turkey’s relationship to Saudi Arabia (another US partner) was enshrined in the Mecca Agreement in August 2026, which helped cement what was already true: an emerging series of fault lines between a Saudi-Turkish bloc and an Israeli-UAE bloc. Turkey was instrumental in the establishment of the al-Sharaa government in Syria and continues to play a military role there. Israel continues to operate in Syria to prevent the establishment of a Turkish military presence near the Syrian border and protect the Syrian Druze population from coming under the Turkish-backed government. This is not the only area of contention. Turkey and Libya are on one side of a Mediterranean gas field dispute with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel on the other. Israel and the UAE generally back Somaliland. Turkey and Saudi Arabia back Somalia. Israel and the UAE generally support Ethiopia, while Turkey and Saudi Arabia generally back Eritrea. This is not the first time tensions have arisen between a US Ally and a US partner, but for all sides, it will require careful management, especially as the US will inevitably have to make decisions in each conflict area where the two blocs are facing off.
Conclusion
Post-election, Israel’s Prime Minister will have their hands full with domestic matters as well as with the security threats both inside and beyond the country’s borders. It would be easy to push off these four underlying trends in the relationship to a later date, but if their severity is not at least acknowledged and mitigated by both the US and Israel, these trends are likely to continue to cause greater tension and danger in the strategic relationship going forward.
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The views, facts, opinions, and conclusions expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Army War College, or any other government agency. References to or reprints of this article should include the above disclaimer
