From Ally to Afterthought: Israel’s New Role in US Policy

After months of friction with the Biden administration over Gaza and years of drift since the Abraham Accords, Donald Trump’s political return was met with extreme optimism in Jerusalem. For much of Israel’s right-wing, Biden’s criticism of the Gaza war highlighted what they saw as the strengths of Trump’s first term: firm backing of Israeli sovereignty, recognition of Jerusalem as the capital, and pressure on Iran.

But that optimism may have been misplaced.

Just a few months into Trump’s second term, a different foreign policy is taking shape—one favoring transactional deals, domestic optics, and strategic insulation over alliance loyalty. It’s still called America First, but this version shows less interest in sustaining traditional partnerships and more in scoring unilateral wins. As recent moves on Saudi nuclear talks, Houthi ceasefires, and Iran diplomacy suggest, Israel isn’t being abandoned—it’s being bypassed.

Riyadh Over Recognition

Perhaps the clearest sign came when the Trump administration reversed a longstanding bipartisan condition: that Saudi Arabia must normalize relations with Israel in exchange for US civil nuclear cooperation. According to senior officials quoted in Axios, Washington is now negotiating a bilateral agreement that includes potential uranium enrichment on Saudi soil, with no binding linkage to the Palestinian issue or Israeli security guarantees.

The rationale is clear. Trump views the deal as a low-cost, high-reward diplomatic “win” that could draw Saudi investment into US infrastructure projects—a politically useful deliverable as he approaches a midterm cycle. By sidelining the normalization requirement, Trump avoids the political minefield of Palestinian concessions while still projecting American influence.

For Israel, the implications are serious. The normalization-for-nuclear framework had given Jerusalem a degree of veto power—or at least consultation—in high-stakes regional technology transfers. Its removal signals a paradigm shift in how Washington weighs Israeli security interests against strategic economic gains.

The Houthi Deal: A Ceasefire Without Allies

Next came Yemen. In May 2025, following quiet mediation by Oman and with support from US Central Command, the Trump administration struck an agreement with Houthi leaders to suspend attacks on US-flagged ships in the Red Sea in exchange for a halt in American airstrikes. The Houthis explicitly excluded Israel from this arrangement, with a spokesperson stating on Al Jazeera that “resistance against Zionist aggression” would continue.

This marks a functional divergence from both Biden’s and Trump’s first-term strategies. The former at least attempted a regional containment framework; the latter is now opting for threat compartmentalization. From Trump’s perspective, the calculus is efficient: safeguard commercial lanes and reduce exposure to quagmire conflicts. But from Israel’s standpoint, it signals a reduction of alliance coherence, raising the question of whether the US will respond when threats target Israeli—not American—assets.

Engaging Iran: From Maximum Pressure to Tactical Containment

Perhaps most consequential is Trump’s decision to reopen nuclear talks with Iran. According to The Wall Street Journal, the informal framework—dubbed “JCPOA 2.0”—includes partial sanctions relief, stricter inspections, and a cap on uranium enrichment. While US officials insist enrichment will stay “well below weapons-grade,” critics in Congress and Jerusalem argue the deal implicitly accepts Iran’s right to a civilian program—long a red line for Israel.

The shift is stark. Trump’s first term emphasized maximum pressure, including the killing of Qassem Soleimani and sweeping sanctions. Now, the strategy echoes Obama-era diplomacy: restrain, engage, de-escalate. Senior Israeli defense officials, speaking to Haaretz, warn that even limited enrichment increases the risk of breakout scenarios.

Yet Washington’s argument carries weight. With Iranian-backed militias expanding in Iraq and Yemen, and China deepening ties with Tehran, the US is under pressure to contain rather than provoke. The core split is over risk tolerance: Israel sees containment as a path to proliferation; Trump’s team sees it as a way to prevent war.

From Isolation to Rapprochement: The Turkey Shift

In a sharp reversal from his first term, Trump’s second administration is also restoring ties with Turkey—once a focus of Israeli-backed lobbying in Washington. Back then, Israel pushed successfully for Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program after its purchase of Russian S-400s, citing its support for Hamas and regional destabilization. In 2025, strategic utility overrides those concerns. Washington has reopened security and economic channels with Ankara, prioritizing its role in NATO logistics and countering Russia over Israeli objections.

This shift also explains the US withdrawal from eastern Syria, where American forces had worked with Kurdish militias opposed by Turkey. Pulling out removes a key irritant in US–Turkish ties and signals deference to Ankara’s border priorities. For Israel, the loss is strategic: the US presence had checked Turkish ambitions and supported more Israel-friendly actors. The message is clear: in this version of America First, smoothing ties with regional powers like Turkey now outweighs Israel’s preferences.

Strategic Misread or Structural Shift?

The common thread in these developments isn’t malice toward Israel—it’s structural realignment. Trump’s second-term doctrine doesn’t oppose Israeli interests per se; it simply prioritizes unilateral flexibility over alliance coherence. Israel, once framed as a regional pillar in American foreign policy, is now treated as one node among many—a partner when interests align, and a bystander when they don’t.

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In truth, the strategic error may lie in Jerusalem, not Washington. Over the past decade, Israel’s diplomatic architecture has become overly dependent on personal rapport with US presidents—especially Trump—at the expense of deeper, institutional diversification. By focusing primarily on Washington, Israel allowed relationships with Brussels, New Delhi, and moderate Arab states to stagnate or remain underdeveloped.

The result is a diplomatic monoculture vulnerable to shifts in US priorities.

Adapting to a New Order

A recalibrated Israeli foreign policy must prioritize realism over sentimentality. This involves strengthening strategic dialogues with partners such as the European Union, India, and the African Union—actors whose interests align with Israel’s capabilities in energy, water management, and defense technology. At the regional level, Israel should deepen its defense cooperation with Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, with a focus on joint preparedness for proxy conflicts and cyber threats—areas where US involvement may be minimal or inconsistent.

Equally important is reducing dependence on personal relationships with individual US presidents or administrations. Israeli diplomacy needs to become more institutionalized, ensuring continuity that can withstand electoral changes and partisan shifts in Washington.

In today’s shifting global order, American alignment can no longer be taken for granted. Trump’s second term may not be overtly hostile to Israel, but it reflects a growing indifference. Confronting that indifference will require strategic maturity, not just political loyalty.

Conclusion

Trump hasn’t abandoned Israel. But his second-term foreign policy makes it clear that America will no longer act as Israel’s proxy. In a world of selective engagement, Israel must rediscover how to act on its own terms—or risk becoming a permanent observer to decisions that shape its future.