How to fix the centrism problem

Israeli centrism, contrary to popular belief, is not suffering from irrelevance, but from fragmentation. The need for a credible, pragmatic centre has never been greater in a country so utterly divided over issues of religion, democracy, and security. To revive the centre, it is not enough simply to wait for another charismatic general to arrive with a recycled message of unity, but rather to build a political infrastructure that is viable, resilient, and compelling to a wide spectrum of Israelis.

Too often, Israeli centrist parties define themselves not by addition, but by subtraction. Not Bibi, not Meretz, not Smotrich, not the Haredim, et cetera. And yes, this identity may offer momentary unity whilst in opposition, but it collapses the moment real decisions need to be made.

Centrism cannot live on clichés, though: it needs detailed policy architecture. Start with constitutional stability, and amend Basic Laws to require, let’s say, a 70-member supermajority for constitutional changes, while preserving judicial review under clearer guidelines.

Next, enshrine universal service. Pass legislation phasing in a five-year framework of mandatory military service for all citizens – not just the non-Haredi Jews, male Druzim and Circassians – along with a civilian-service alternative for Haredi and Arab Israelis. Offer subsidised vocational training and leadership programmes to make civilian national service an attractive option.

The economy is a significant matter, too: introduce sliding-scale tax credits for businesses in the Negev and Galilee and expand housing grants for young families outside Gush Dan. Pair these with regional infrastructure bonds to fund local roads, schools and medical clinics.

Israel’s centrists, too, rise and fall with their founders. We know already that this is unsustainable: a viable movement necessitates internal elections, policy forums, and permanent grassroots infrastructure. A policy institute, a think tank tied to the party modelled after the Kohelet Forum or Molad should be introduced, but aimed at centre-ground policy. Task it with publishing quarterly policy proposals on security, economy, society and whatever other matters are most important at that time.

We should, too, democratise candidate selection by holding open primaries to allow grassroots engagement and leadership renewal, and train municipal candidates to run in local elections to cultivate local legitimacy rather than focusing entirely on the larger echelons of Israeli politics. Without this, every new centrist hope will be simply the last one in a different pair of shoes.

Another problem is the security narrative. The language of security has, historically, been ceded to the right. Israel needs a security doctrine that is strong but realistic, without the strategic errors often seen in decisions of the right. Defensive clarity should be achieved, and it should be done so by affirming the IDF’s right to neutralise threats in the Gaza Strip and the North. Then, a diplomatic horizon should be articulated, by endorsing phased autonomy and demilitarisation for the West Bank, under continued security coordination and demilitarised zones monitored by the IDF. This should be done alongside the promotion of a coordinated civilian supply corridor with tight military oversight in Gaza, thereby decoupling aid from Hamas whilst, at the same time, undermining its grip. Centrism should be the adult in the room, and implementing this positions it as such.

There is also a point in a comment by fellow Times of Israel writer Leo Benderski on my previous post: the centre’s complicated position on national security is often boxed in by both the left and the right; the former seeing it as too rigid and the latter viewing it as too soft. This, though, makes the centre uniquely positioned to redefine security not solely as military strength, but as the broader concept of strategic thinking in the long term rather than simply trying to survive in the day to day.

Another problem is that the Israeli centre has long failed to win trust in Mizrahi and peripheral communities. That, though, must change. We should speak to the periphery (seriously), because the centre is too often more of a Tel Aviv sermon than anything else. Funding should be channelled towards vocational high schools and regional colleges in the Negev and Galilee; Mizrahi heritage education alongside Ashkanzi narratives should be included in national curricula in the hopes that cultural inclusion can be achieved; and permanent regional party liaisons should be appointed, with rotating town halls outside Gush Dan held. This is not about optics; it’s about embedding centrism in communities that have long been patronised or ignored by the centrist elites.

The fifth, the final issue is the system itself. This, of course, is heard often but rarely discussed in truth. The truth is, though, that Israel’s fragmented political system serves to amplify the extremes and punish pragmatists. Structural reform is essential. We should raise the electoral threshold from 3.25% to, let’s say, 4.5% given that the previous raise was a success. So too, we should begin with a 30-seat regional pilot alongside the national list, to force stronger representation. We should ban post-election floor crossing by locking MKs into the party on whose list they were elected unless a full party split is authorised by the court. Coalition politics will always be messy, but clarity and consistency can restore public trust.

We know already that Israel doesn’t lack a centrist electorate; it only lacks a centrist offer. Most Israelis want what centrism, at its best, can offer: security without chauvinism, democracy without chaos, economic promise without abandonment. But they will not vote for a party that doesn’t believe in itself, or doesn’t know what it’s for.

Brick by brick, law by law, the centre must cease improvising and begin constructing something better.