How to Preserve Israel’s QME
How to Preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge
On Tuesday, November 18th President Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reached an agreement in principle which deepened the US-Saudi defense partnership. The agreement made Saudi Arabia a “major non-NATO ally” and entitled the state, in future years, to buy state-of-the-art military equipment, including approximately 45 F-35 fighter jets. The F-35 is considered the world’s most advanced warplane. So far Israel is the only Middle East country that has it.
Israel opposes the sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia. According to an Israeli Air Force position paper, the transfer may undermine Israel’s national security. The Jewish state is already surrounded by forces that seek its destruction. Giving F-35s to a leading Middle East monarchy like Saudi Arabia, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, would compound the national security threat. In 2023, Saudi Arabia nearly upgraded its relations with Israel by joining the Abraham Accords. But those discussions were suspended on October 7th, when Israel was invaded by Hamas.
Having failed to persuade President Trump to exclude F-35’s from the Saudi procurement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu switched to Plan B. He lobbied Trump to impose conditions on the sale that would mitigate the potential harm. Primarily, he angled for a Saudi promise to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, such as by joining the Abraham Accords. An announcement of normalization would bring Israeli-Saudi liaisons out of the shadows, promote closer ties, and momentously fulfill the promise of the Abraham Accords. However, the Crown Prince countered Netanyahu’s condition with a condition of his own. He agreed to normalize relations only if Israel would facilitate statehood for the Palestinians, something that could severely imperil Israeli security. Consequently, the normalization bid lost steam. Now Netanyahu is scrambling to form a Plan C strategy to reduce the F-35 threat.
A key US statute could help. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the president must certify to Congress that any major arms transfer to a Middle Eastern country other than Israel will not compromise Israel’s qualitative military edge, known as “QME.” QME is the ability to defeat military threats from Middle East states or non-state actors. The Act gives the president broad discretion when configuring foreign military sales to meet the QME goal.
In practice, the Pentagon conducts a QME “assessment” of each proposed weapons deal and presents to Congress any desired Israel-protecting restrictions in its QME certification. The legislative and executive branches may negotiate adjustments to the QME plan during the subsequent appropriations process. Finally, the administration inserts the congressionally approved QME limits in the government-to-government contract that implements the military sale.
In the Saudi purchase of F-35s, the relevant government-to-government contract could ensure that Israel consistently receives the latest generation of F-35 technology, with the Saudis remaining a generation behind. In addition, the contract could include a proviso on non-aggression. The language would stop the Saudis from using F-35s or any other US military product directly or indirectly against Israel. Moreover, the document could prohibit the Saudis from transferring an F-35 or related technology to any third party. The terms could also include strict monitoring protocols to enforce the above restrictions. Any violation of these legal tripwires could entitle the US to terminate the contract immediately.
Such contractual safeguards for Israel’s defense should be acceptable to the Saudis, considering they already provide Israel a degree of defense cooperation. The Royal Saudi Air Force covertly helped Israel intercept Iranian drones during the Israel-Iran war in June.
The above clauses may also assuage the Israelis. At least, the protections would offer them more security than a normalization agreement. Normalization between sovereign rivals merely encourages exchanges of people and goods. Only a pronouncement (or act) of “recognition” can acknowledge a state’s right to exist.
From an American view, tying sufficient pro-Israel strings to the Saudi defense contract would not only satisfy the QME law but help promote Mid-East stability, a priority of American policy. The legal tailoring would certainly be cheaper and more reliable than trying to offset the F-35 sale to the Saudis by increasing military aid to Israel.
As long as the Trump administration protects Israel from any Saudi-acquired F-35s, the US will effectively maintain a strong pro-American military defense in a generally anti-American region of the world. Simply put, preserving Israel’s QME preserves America’s QME.
