Implementing Trump’s 20-Point Plan

President Trump’s 20-Point Plan for Gaza is at a delicate hinge. As Phase I staggers without an agreed end-point and clear transition to Phase II, the U.S. must introduce an “implementation deal,” which may be another historic agreement.

Phase I, which was agreed upon in the Sharm Agreement that was signed on October 9, has been the war-stopping phase. It includes a return of 35 Israeli hostages out of 48 who were in Gaza (to date); Israeli redeployment to the Yellow Line within Gaza; release of some 2,000 Palestinian prisoners; and supply of humanitarian aid to Gaza. The Sharm Agreement also led to the reassertion of Hamas power in Gaza, which seems to have been a tacit part of the deal as well. Yet the end-point of Phase I remains unclear since some bodies of Israeli soldiers and hostages cannot be retrieved at this time. This loophole may lead to the collapse of the fragile ceasefire arrangements and to resumed warring.

The ambiguity regarding the transition to Phase II is another challenge facing the U.S. At the heart of Phase II is the withdrawal of Hamas military and government capabilities from Gaza to allow for the introduction of the International Stability Force (ISF) and Palestinian security forces, which should be, henceforth, the only armed forces in Gaza. In addition, a Palestinian Technocratic Government (PTG) is supposed to assume civic control of Gaza instead of Hamas. In this context as well, many questions – who, what, when and how – remain unanswered.

Matters are even more complicated since Phase II includes two sub-phases with distinct rationales, as well as a Phase III. In Phase II-A, which is implied to last three years, some 70-80 percent of Gaza will be Palestinian, as Israel further redeploys to a “red line” and Hamas withdraws its military wing from Gaza. In this period, the Palestinian areas of Gaza will be administered by the ISF and by the PTG, which will oversee Palestinian security forces and Gaza’s reconstruction and be overseen by a Peace Board chaired by President Trump. Their challenge will be to establish law and order in Gaza while dismantling Hamas tunnels and continuing the search for the last-remaining bodies of Israelis.

In Phase II-B, expected to begin around year three, Israel will further withdraw to the perimeter of Gaza, as the authority to govern and responsibility for security are gradually undertaken by the Reformed and Upgraded Palestinian Authority (aka “the PA”). Namely, at that point, Gaza and the West Bank will be governed as a single territorial and political unit. Like Phase II-A, Phase II-B is also overshadowed by ambiguity that will require another “implementation agreement,” which addresses issues such as the relationship between the PA and the Peace Board and between the ISF and Palestinian security.

As mentioned, the Trump Plan implies an additional phase – Phase III – which may overlap with the latter parts of Phase II-B. In Phase III, the U.S. will lead negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians – probably represented by the PLO – on a “political horizon” when the Palestinian right to self-determination is realized, most likely on the basis of Trump’s Peace to Prosperity plan of 2020.

This overview is essential for designing an “implementation deal” that facilitates the transition from Phase I to Phase II with a fighting chance of success. To do so, that deal needs to have the following components:

One: Clear benchmark for ending Phase I: Based on verified Israeli intelligence, the implementation deal should establish what Hamas needs to do and when in order to meet its current obligations regarding the return of bodies of Israeli. As mentioned, Israel seems to acknowledge that not all could be returned at this phase.

Two: a legal framework: The legal void in Gaza must be filled immediately in order for the ISF and PTG to deploy. This can only be done by “importing” the legal system of the PA in the West Bank and by re-applying the “Existing Agreements” between Israel and the Palestinians to Gaza, namely the Interim Agreement of 1995 and the Paris Protocol of 1994. Such a legal system is essential not only for Gaza’s economic revival and reconstruction, but also for regulating the movement of goods into Gaza from Egypt and Israel, as well as for having rules of engagement between the IDF, ISF and Palestinian security forces. Finally, the Existing Agreements also ensure that Hamas will not be able to participate in elections in the PA because they establish a requirement to accept the Oslo Accords.

Three: ISF Mandate: The mandate of the ISF must reflect the long-term vision for Gaza, notwithstanding that some Arab countries will only commit to time-limited participation. Namely, as the PA assumes the authority to govern and Palestinian security forces deploy in Gaza, the ISF will become more of a peace-keeping force that oversees Palestinian and Israeli compliance with the agreements.

Four: Begin reform of PA immediately: As the PA is expected to assume authority over Gaza within a few years, its reform and upgrade in the West Bank must begin as soon as possible. Arab countries should commit to a two-year program with tangible and realistic objectives regarding law enforcement and anti-terror capabilities, de-radicalization, reducing corruption, and preparing for the inevitable succession of Mahmoud Abbas.

Five: Legitimacy: The legitimacy of the Peace Board, ISF, PTG and of the reform and upgrade of the PA will emanate from a UN Security Council Resolution, aka “international legitimacy,” and from a decision by the PLO to grant such mandates. Dual legitimacy — international and national — is the cornerstone of a sustainable political structure in Gaza.

Six: UNRWA: The PTG will act as Gaza’s civil administration, providing basic services to the population, ideally replacing Hamas and UNRWA. Furthermore, the areas of refugee camps must be integrated into the nearby municipal areas so that they are rebuilt as permanent residences. This means that some of the presence of UNRWA in Gaza must be withdrawn.

The genius and weakness of Trump’s 20-Point Plan lies in its ambiguity, which was essential for agreeing on and implementing Phase I. Transitioning to Phase II will require another stroke of genius. We need another deal soonest.

Gidi Grinstein is Founder and President of the Reut Institute and co-author of (In)Sights: Peacemaking in the Oslo Process, Thirty Years and Counting. Gidi hosts the podcast (In)Sights.